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ABSTRACT 
CHINA’s EXPANDING CULTURAL INFLUENCE IN THE AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION: A CASE STUDY OF THE CHINESE MEDIA IN KENYA 
 
SEPTEMBER 2018  
HUI-PING TAO, B.A., PENN STATE UNIVERSITY  
M.A., PENN STATE UNIVERSITY  
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST  
Directed by: Professor Briankle G. Chang 
 
This dissertation seeks to demonstrate China’s growing cultural influence in 
African countries and illustrates how China attempts to use its economic power and 
cultural influences to shape African countries’ foreign policies towards China by using 
the Chinese media and cultural expansion in Kenya as a case study. In order to achieve 
this objective, this study examines the internal and external economic and political forces 
in both China and Kenya that have helped to establish the current pattern of China’s 
media involvement and other cultural engagements in Kenya. This study also explores 
the extent and nature of China’s cultural and media involvement in Africa with a specific 
focus on Kenya; penetration of Chinese news and other cultural productions in Kenya 
was examined. This study analyzed the response of Kenyan media to China’s recent 
engagement with the country, especially China’s increasingly involvement in media and 
other cultural production in the country. 
China’s growing presence in Africa has provoked a heated debate about the nature 
of Chinese engagement and its implication for the African continent. Critics argue that 
China is using its power to develop a neo-colonial system in Africa. Rather than direct 
 viii 
political control of African countries, China operates behind closed doors to influence 
African countries’ foreign policies toward China. Despite criticism of colonialism, some 
observers perceive current Sino-African relations as a partnership for development. Both 
China and African countries are gaining significant benefits from this relationship. After 
analyzed two leading Kenyan newspapers’ coverage of China’s involvement in Kenya, 
this study found that both newspapers’ representations of China are natural; unlike 
Western media’s negative views of Chinese presence or China’s positive self portrait. 
However, Kenyan media’s framing of China’s engagement in the country should not be 
viewed as stagnant because China-Kenya interactions are rapidly evolving.  
 
 
  
 ix 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................................................v 
ABSTRACT......................................................................................................................vii  
CHAPTER 
1: INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................1  
Introduction……......................................................................................................1 
Research Objectives……..……………….…………………………………..........2 
Methodological Framework……..………………………………………………...5 
Selection of Media Texts……………………….…..…………………………......7 
Related Literature………………………………………..………………………..9 
Significance of the Study………………………………...……………..………..13 
Plan of the Study……………………..…………………………..………………14 
 
2: TRANSFORMATION OF THE CHINESE MEDIA….……………..…………….....16 
Chairman Mao Era……………………………....……………….........................16 
The Chinese Media Under the Reform…………………………………………..18 
Media Development between 1978 and 1989………………………….………...20 
Media Development between 1992 and 2000s……………………….………….29 
Global Expansion…………………….…………..……………………...……….36 
 
3: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA’S ENGAGEMENTS IN AFRICA… ….44 
Early Sino-African Encounters………..…………………………........................44 
Sino-African Relations between 1949 and 1978…………………………...........46 
Sino-African Relations between 1978 and 1989………………………………...48 
Post-Cold War Sino-African Relations………………………..…………...….....53 
Sino-African Relations in the 21st Century……………………..………………..56 
Cultural Cooperation…………………………..……………………………..…..62 
The Confucius Institutes in Africa…………………………………..………..….64 
Media Cooperation………………………………..………………………...…....68 
Chinese Media in Africa.…………….………………………..………………....73 
The Challenges of Chinese Media in Africa ……………………………...….….79 
Chinese Telecommunication Sector in Africa...……………………..…………..81 
 
 
 x 
4: CHINA’S GROWING CULTURAL INFLUENCE IN KENYA………………...…..87 
Brief History of Sino-Kenyan Relations…………..………………………..……90 
President Jomo Kenyatta Era: 1963-1978……………………………..…………91 
President Daniel Moi Era: 1978-2002…………………………..……...………..93 
President Mwai Kibaki Era: 2002-2013……………………….………………...94 
Penetration of Chinese Media and Cultural Productions in Kenya………….....102 
The Confucius Institutes in Kenya………………..…………………………….125 
 
5: MEDIA REPRESENTATION OF CHINA IN KENYAN MEDIA..…………….... 129 
The Images of China…………………………………………………………....131 
Perceptions of China in Africa………………………………………………….131 
Media Development in Kenya………………….....…………………………....133 
The Political Economy of Kenyan Media…………………..……..…………....149 
News Framing of China’s Involvement in Africa………………………..……..151 
Methodology………………...…..……………………………………………...152 
Sample Collection………………………………………………………………153 
News Framing of the Chinese Presence in Kenya………..……………..….......155 
            Representation of China in the Kenyan Newspapers…………………………...161 
6: CONCLUSION.…………………………………….………….……………..……...166 
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………177
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, Mao 
Zedong, the eventual chairman of the Party, adopted the Marxist-Leninist theories of 
communist ideology. The objective of Marxist-Leninism theories is to create a social 
structure that is classless, that has a centrally planned economy, and that operates by 
collective economic production (Andrain, 1994). During the Mao era, the Chinese 
economy was relatively stagnant and inefficient. China was isolated and had little 
interaction with the Western world. 
After the death of Chairman Mao in 1976, Deng Xiaoping became the new 
leader of the Chinese Communist Party. Instead of following Mao’s central economic 
planning and public ownership, Deng initiated a series of economic reform programs 
and the Open-Door policy of 1978, for the purpose of modernizing China (Brautigam, 
2009). China’s economy has grown rapidly since the reforms. In order to sustain rapid 
economic growth and political stability, China sought to secure energy resources, 
broaden their investment activities, and search for new markets for their manufactured 
goods. These objectives led China to the African continent (Alden, Large & de 
Oliveira, 2008).  
In addition to China’s rapid economic growth, African countries’ economic 
performance has also improved over the past decade. As its economy continues to 
grow, Africa has become a huge consumer market with strong commercial potential. 
As a result, Chinese companies have been able establish and expand their business 
ventures into the global arena (Leak, Lund, Roxburgh & Wamelen, 2010). Low-
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priced, Chinese manufactured goods have emerged as popular trade items among 
African countries; almost all African countries are flooded with low-cost Chinese 
merchandise (Leak, Lund, Roxburgh & Wamelen, 2010).   
China's growing economic interest in, and engagements with, Africa has 
received considerable attention over the past years. However, there is no united 
perception regarding China's active engagement with Africa. The proponents of 
China's engagement are optimistic about the increased Chinese presence in Africa, 
while the critics are concerned about the negative impacts that might be caused by a 
large Chinese presence. Optimists suggest that the African economy is benefiting 
from China's recent investment. The Chinese government's aid, as well as monetary 
investments has helped African countries improve their infrastructure and stimulate 
their economies (Kurlantzick, 2009; Suzuki, 2009; Jakobson, 2009). Unlike the 
positive perspective, opponents are skeptical about China's real interest. They argue; 
that China is a resource extractor and only cares about its own interests and the 
exploitation of African resources rather than benefiting the host nations, and thereby, 
this type of interactions is a threat to African interests (Zweig & Bi, 2005; Frynas & 
Paulo, 2006; Taylor, 2006; Melber, 2007; Herman, 2007; Rich & Recker, 2013).  
 
 
Research Objectives 
Over the past two decades, the Chinese economy has grown rapidly. In order 
to meet domestic demand, and to stay competitive in the global market, the Chinese 
government and private sectors are expanding their economic investment around the 
world. The search for natural resources and consumer markets for its growing 
economy drives the intensity and diversity of China’s recent engagement with the 
 3 
African continent. For China, Africa is not just a political object for countering the 
United States and Soviet Union’s hegemony; instead, it is a source of natural 
resources, energy, consumer markets and investment opportunities for the Chinese 
government and its private sectors (Lampton, 2008).  
China’s engagement with Africa is not effortless. China and its private 
companies are facing many challenges in Africa; one of them is a cultural 
misunderstanding between the Chinese and the African people. Such 
misunderstandings often lead to social tensions and, consequently, difficulties for the 
Chinese government and private sector entities to conduct business in Africa 
(Ighobor, 2013). In order to minimize such social tensions, China is using its 
economic and political power to bridge the cultural gap within African countries and 
to assure other nations that China is Africa’s new development partner (Naidu, 2010), 
and is not a threat or “neocolonialist” (Kurlantzick, 2007). The Chinese government 
promises that the purpose of its engagement with Africa is nothing more than 
promoting both stronger trade and investment relations between China and African 
nations (Mbaye, 2010). 
To enhance its relationship with African countries, China has acknowledged 
that it needs to win the hearts and minds of the African people. In doing so, it altered 
its national image management strategies and is employing new approaches to 
introduce an unbiased image of China to the outside world. As part of this image-
rebranding effort, the Chinese government has invested numerous resources to expand 
its cultural and media operations in other countries, with the goal of improving 
China’s image. Billions of dollars are being invested in China’s state-owned seeks to 
establish its own global media empire and to break the Western media monopoly 
(Shambaugh, 2015).  
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This study used Kenya as a case study to examine the expanding operations of 
Chinese media in the country and the growing Chinese presence in Kenyan media. 
Kenya was chosen as a case study for this project due to its economic and political 
importance in the African continent. On economic front, when China increased its 
economic activities in Africa, Kenya became an important hub for the Chinese 
government and private sectors. In recent years, China has increased their investments 
in Kenya’s local infrastructure, manufacturing, technology and media sectors 
(Patroba, 2012).  
In addition to the economic significance of Kenya, it is also an important 
cultural hub for China. By the end of 2016, the Chinese government has established 
forty-eight Confucius Institutes in more than thirty-three African countries; four of 
them are in Kenya. China has also awarded a large number of scholarships to Kenyan 
students, and Nairobi has become the home of China’s state-run media headquarters 
in Africa. Examining the Chinese media’s expansion in Kenya as a study case, this 
study seeks to demonstrate that China has a growing cultural influence in African 
countries, and to illustrate how China uses its economic power and cultural influences 
to shape African countries’ foreign policies. In order to achieve this objective, this 
study attempts to accomplish the following: 
1. Examine the internal and external economic, political and 
technological forces in both China and Kenya that have helped to establish the current 
pattern of China’s media involvement and other cultural engagements in Kenya: 
i. Political and economic developments in China that have led to its 
growing presence on the global stage. 
ii. Global political and economic developments that have facilitated 
China's growing presence on the global stage. 
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iii. Political and economic developments in Kenya that have led to China's 
growing presence on the global stage 
iv. The shift in international alliances and political, economic and 
technological developments in Kenya as well as in Africa in general that have 
facilitated increasing economic and political ties to China. 
2. Examine the extent of China’s cultural and media involvements in 
Africa with a specific focus on Kenya: 
i. Penetration of Chinese news and other cultural productions in Kenyan 
media including newspapers, television, film, etc. 
ii. Financial, technological and other material support such as personnel 
training by China for Kenyan media and other cultural production enterprises. 
iii. Cultural exchange programs through government agencies and non-
state actors. 
3. Analyze the response of the Kenyan media to China’s recent 
engagements in the country, especially China’s increasing involvement in media and 
other cultural productions.  
 
Methodological Framework 
China has made great economic achievements since initiating the economic 
reform and the Open Door policies in 1978 (Barboza, 2010). However, China's 
economic success does not guarantee a positive national image or reputation that 
favors China in many parts of the world. Since the 1990s, the term “the rise of China” 
is often countered by the phrase of “China threat” (Roy, 1994). The national image 
refers to the way a nation is viewed by other countries. In recent years, China has 
acknowledged huge conceptual differences between its self-perception and the way 
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other countries perceive China. To narrow this gap, the Chinese government took a 
more active approach to improving its international image with the ultimate goal of 
shaping national policies in other countries, especially those in Africa, towards China.  
Media has the power to construct appropriate and inappropriate views and to 
determine what events or information are important and unimportant for the public 
(Hall, 1997). The media is a critical instrument in building a positive national image 
or a means to criticize any event, issue, and country. China’s rapid economic growth 
has drawn increased attention around the world, especially in the Western media. 
However, the images represented in most of the western media are not completely 
real; they are biased and sometimes deliberately demonized (Liss, 2003). Such 
inaccurate portrait in foreign media motivated China to defend itself and speak to the 
world in its own ways. Since 2009, the Chinese government has invested billions of 
dollars in its media’s global expansion. The goals of Chinese media’s international 
expansion are to build a positive national image and provide an accurate reflection of 
a modern China to foreign audiences. 
This research seeks to analyze the response of Kenyan media to China’s recent 
engagements with Kenya, especially on China’s increasing involvement in media and 
other cultural productions in the country. By analyzing some of Kenya’s leading 
newspapers, this study seeks to obtain a better understanding of Kenyans’ perception 
of Chinese presence in the country and how China was presented in the mainstream 
Kenyan media. Framing analysis was employed to examine the Kenyan media’s 
coverage of China’s engagement in Kenya to see how Chinese presence and China 
were framed in the Kenyan newspapers.  
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Framing is defined as the way in which events and issues are organized by the 
media to help their audiences understand the content (Reese, 2003). Framing theory 
was first developed in 1974 to explain how the information senders construct a piece 
of information to the public in the communication process (Goffman, 1974). It is 
often uses to analyze how a certain issue, event, and phenomenon is constructed and 
confined by the media (Gamson, 1992; Reese, 2001). According to Entman, “to frame 
is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in 
communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation and treatment recommendation for the item 
described” (Entman, 1993:53). In other words, frames are functioning as an 
instrument to “define problems, make moral judgments and suggest remedies” (Ibid) 
and help the media to shape the public’s perceptions of the event, issue, and world 
(Bryman, 1998).  
Media frame is an effective tool for producing and maintaining the hegemony 
of a preferred frame. Using framing analysis will allow a greater understanding of 
how different media frames produce power and create knowledge to favor certain 
groups. The purpose of analyzing Kenyan media's response to China's involvement in 
the country is to obtain a better understanding of how Chinese presences and China is 
framed in the leading Kenyan newspapers after China intensified its cultural and 
media investment in the country.  
 
Selection of Media Texts 
National newspapers can be used as a powerful communication system in any 
given country because of their power to constitute the perceptions that shape and 
change people's views of certain events and nations. In this way, the national 
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newspapers circulate "definition and of the situation" that have great impacts on the 
formation, maintenance, and reproduction of a dominant consensus (van Dijk, 1993). 
Knowledge of any type news "is never neutral or an objective phenomenon but a 
matter of place from which one speaks, to whom, and for what purpose". Therefore, 
the national newspapers' discourse is a form of ideological representations of events 
(Barker & Galaninski, 2001:22). 
This study used the leading Kenyan newspapers to unpack the ways Kenyan 
newspaper represented China engagement in the country, especially its increasing 
involvements in media and other cultural productions. Using framing analysis as a 
methodological tool enables the researcher to obtain a better understanding of the 
ways media texts are encoded the potential forces that are influencing such media 
frames.   
This study will analyze media frames of the Daly Nation and The Standard. 
Both the Daily Nation and The Standard are respected publications in Kenya. 
According to K.J. Ho, a prestigious newspaper should include two standards: quality 
of news reports, and its influence on other media organizations and political elites 
(1962). Following Ho’s standards, both newspapers were selected as the 
representative of Kenyan newspapers because of its quality of journalism and political 
influences. The Daily Nation is viewed as the most influential of all the newspaper in 
Kenya (BBC). Together with other sister publications such as Sunday Nation, the 
Nation media group is the largest newspaper group in Eastern Africa (Nation, 2013). 
The Standard is the oldest newspaper in Kenya. It was established in 1902 as The 
African Standard. It is owned by the Standard Group Limited, whose primary 
shareholder is SNG Holding Limited, the Standard Group also owned the Kenya 
Television Network (KTN) (Onyebadi & Oyedeji, 2011). The time frame of news 
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articles selected for analyzing is between January 1, 2016, and December 31, 2016. 
The reason for selecting this time period was due to the limited newspaper data 
access.  
 
Related Literature 
Over the past years, China’s presence in Africa has triggered conflicting 
reactions and assessments. The debate on the impact of China’s contemporary 
engagement in Africa has been divided between those optimists who believe China’s 
intention is to promote mutual benefit and that African states are benefiting from 
Chinese trade, investment, and aids. They argue that China is making a real positive 
difference in African countries’ economic development, and that recent African 
nations’ economic growth is an evidence of such engagement. While many Western 
and African critics view Chinese presence in Africa with suspicion, considering 
China’s political rhetoric and generous aid packages to be a means to achieve its 
exploitative agendas. They perceive China as a neo-colonial power in Africa (E. 
Cheng, 2007); the real intention of China’s current engagement in Africa is to exploit 
Africa’s natural resources and raw materials (Taylor, 2009). 
Western often views China and African critics as a neo-colonial power that “is 
capable of the same exploitative practices as the old colonial powers” (Flynn, 2013). 
Robert Rotberg depicted China as an “extractive and exploitive” economic power 
with neo-colonialist tendencies in his book China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and 
Influence. He argues, like old colonial powers, China's engagement damages African 
nations' development, delays industrialization, and ruins the local industry. China also 
risks good governance in Africa by supporting dictatorships and corrupt African 
governments who violated human rights (as in Sudan & Zimbabwe). China is only 
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interested in Africa's natural resources, not in the long-term development of the 
African countries (Rotberg, 2008).  
In his book, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the 
World, Joshua Kurlantzick details a critical view of China's recent approach to global 
politics. Kurlantzick suggests this approach is a dangerous form of "imperialism." He 
argues that, instead of using military power, China is using its economic and cultural 
power to achieve its goal to be a major player in the international community. He 
warns the rest of the world to be skeptical of Chinese intentions and motivations and 
uses African countries as the primary example of this dangerous manipulation 
(Kurlantzick, 2007).  
Some African officials also voice their concerns. For instance, the Nigerian 
Central Bank Governor, Lamido Sanusi, published an article in the Financial Times 
that warned African nations to “get rid of its romantic view of China and accept 
Beijing is a competitor as much as a partner and capable of the same exploitative 
practices as the old colonial powers." He believes African countries are opening 
themselves up to a “new form of imperialism”, in which China extracts Africa's 
natural resources and selling back the manufactured goods to African markets. He 
worries low-cost Chinese manufactured goods imported to Africa will hurt the local 
economy (Flynn, 2013).  
In “Special Report: China Storms Africa” Richard Behar makes the 
connection of China's current investment in Africa with Africa's painful history with 
colonization. In this article, China was portrayed as an emerging hegemonic power 
that is using its dominant power to exploit a vulnerable continent. He suggests that 
China’s current presence in Africa is a second "scramble for Africa", and the current 
one is harsher because it is more rapid and spread-out (2008).  
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Some Sino-Africa scholars found both the silences on the role of the West and 
flawed understanding of the West's ongoing neo-colonial relationship with Africa 
characteristic approaches are problematic. Kwesi Kwaa Prah contended, it is 
hypocritical of Western nations to bring up concerns about China's engagement in 
Africa, given the fact of the West’s long history of colonial relations with the Africa, 
which continues to the present day (2007). Garth Le Pere also suggests, the perception 
of China as a “neo-colonialist” power in Africa is a product of Western motivated 
misrepresentations that aims to contrast self-representation of the West in Africa, 
which is altruistic or beneficent, to the opportunistic, exploitative and damaging role 
of the emerging powers, like China (2008). For these scholars, the purpose of the 
West to label China’s engagement in Africa as a form of “neo-colonialism” or China 
as an “economic colonizer” is to warn African countries to back away from China’s 
investments. However, they believe this objective is neither realistic nor supportive of 
the African countries to participate in global economics or to benefit from China’s 
engagement with African countries.  
Unlike critics that criticized China’s presence in Africa as a form of “neo-
colonialism”, some observers perceive China’s engagement with Africa as being 
based on “profound friendship” to promote mutual benefit (Shinn & Eisenman, 
2012:13). In China in Africa: An African Argument, Chris Alden presents a balanced 
and comprehensive exploration of China's involvement. In this study, Alden not only 
discusses the opportunistic nature of China's involvement in Africa but also praises 
China's contributions on the continent. For him, China has undoubtedly done more 
good than bad in Africa. China’s engagement with Africa is “part of a long-term 
strategic commitment to the continent,” and is motivated by economic demands and 
to “build effective cooperative partnerships across the developing world” (2007:5). 
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He suggests that the narrative of Sino-African relation is still in the making. It is 
impossible to determine the role that China plays in Africa in such a short period of 
time. However, the impact of China’s engagement with Africa will be determined in 
the upcoming decades. Alden concludes his study with a suggestion to African leaders 
to take an active role in determining the parameters for China involvement (2007). 
This mutual benefit perspective is strongly promoted by Chinese officials. The 
Chinese officials constantly remind the international community China’s engagement 
with Africa is mutually beneficial because they are constructed on a basis of equal 
partnerships, mutual interest, and reciprocal respect (G. Sun, 2004; Hu, 2006). Some 
Western officials also shared this mutual benefit perspective. For example, former 
President of the World Bank, Robert Zoellic mentioned on several occasions that 
China’s investment in Africa’s infrastructure is good for the African countries. He 
even suggested that the World Bank would like to partner with China as a joint effort 
to ease poverty in Africa (Beijing Review, 2008). Former Zambia’s Minister of 
Finance Felix Mutati also claimed, “there is no doubt China has been good to 
Zambia…They are bringing investment, world-class technology, jobs, and value 
addition. What more can you ask for” (Polgreen & French, 2007)? 
In short, optimists who view China as a positive force for African countries’ 
development believe that China’s presence in Africa is a win-win situation, benefiting 
both China and Africa. African countries receive, aids, technological expertise, 
human resources, and industrial production know-how from China. For China, Africa 
provides energy resources, new consumer markets and investment opportunities 
China needs to sustain its economic growth. Both Africa and China meet their 
economic needs (G. Sun, 2004; King, 2010).  
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Other than perceive positive or negative perspectives of the impacts of China’s 
current engagement with Africa, there are also a group of commentators who try to 
characterize China’ growing presence in Africa as part of the trend in globalization: a 
global quest for resources and development. For instance, Luk Tak Chuen argues, 
China is operating within a larger system of neoliberal globalization and following the 
Western neoliberal economic policy (Chuen, 2008; Manji, 2008). The main argument 
of Chuen’s article is that China’s engagement with Africa is operating within a large 
system of neoliberalism, China is not the only global power player that is extracting 
natural resources and raw materials from Africa; indeed, many developed countries 
are doing precisely the same thing. Therefore, it is the responsibility of every country 
that has a stake in Africa’s development, including China, to make every effort to 
limit the negative impacts caused by their practices in Africa (Chuen, 2008). 
It is problematic for any narratives that only offer a one-dimensional 
interpretation of Chinese involvements in Africa. For studies only focusing on the 
negative aspects of Chinese involvements in Africa, they often fail to acknowledge 
the positive contributions and the possibility that ordinary African citizens may 
benefit from the Chinese presence. On the contrary, for those studies that fail to 
acknowledge the negative impact of Sino-African relations, they are ignoring the pain 
and suffering that is caused by Chinese business practices in many African countries. 
Maybe the truth lies somewhere between these positions. It all depends on how 
individual African government manages to enhance benefits and reduce harmful 
effects of Chinese influence.  
 
Significance of the Study 
This study examines China’s expanding cultural in the age of globalization. It 
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is a case study of Chinese media and cultural expansion in Kenya. This study unpacks 
the political, technological, and economic forces, internal and external, in China and 
Kenya that have helped to establish the current pattern of China’s media involvement 
and other cultural engagements in Kenya. Moreover, this study examines the extent 
and nature of China’s cultural and media involvements in Kenya in particular; and in 
Africa in general. It is grounded in the political economy perspective of 
communication, focusing on the expansion of Chinese media and other cultural 
engagement in Kenya.  
In recent years, the growth of Chinese influence and companies across Africa 
has brought about a heated debate. Both economic and political implications 
emerging at the global level raise concerns within the academic world and media. 
Most of the recent Sino-Africa studies are focused on the debate of China's military, 
political, and economic presence in Africa, very little literature examines China's 
growing presence in Africa from a cultural perspective. This research tries to shed 
light on the growing Chinese cultural influence in Africa. In doing so, this research 
uncovered the internal and external factors, both in China and Kenya, intensified 
China’s engagement in Africa. 
 
Plan of the Study 
This study comprised of six chapters. Chapter One includes a brief review of 
China’s contemporary engagement with Africa, the objectives of the study, 
methodology, Sino-African relation literature, theoretic framework, and the plan of 
study sections. Chapter two looks at the transformation of Chinese media from a 
political economic perspective. Chapter three provides a detailed account of China’s 
political, economic and cultural cooperation with African countries. Chapter four 
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focuses on the Chinese culture and media involvement in Kenya. The chapter offers a 
detailed discussion of current Chinese media and other cultural expansion in Kenya. 
The chapter also uncovers China's technological support to Kenyan media and other 
cultural production enterprises. In addition, the chapter also addressed various 
Chinese cultural exchange programs, either provided by government agencies or non-
state actors. Chapter five provides an analysis of the leading Kenyan newspapers’ 
response to Chinese presence. The chapter introduces the theory of framing analysis 
that was employed to analyze data from the Daily Nation and The Standard, for the 
present project. Chapter six presents a summary of all the findings, contributions, and 
limitation of the study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE CHINESE MEDIA 
 
 
In order to gain a better understanding of the current Chinese media’s global 
expansion, it is important to review the important stages of Chinese media 
transformation. In doing so, this chapter begins with a brief review of the Chinese 
media system since Mao’s era through Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms and open-
door policy in 1978, which was the driving force for the dynamic transformation of 
contemporary Chinese media. The review of the media system during the Mao era 
helps to understand how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) employs the media as 
propaganda apparatus to propagate the CCP’s policies, to instruct the public, to unite 
the public, and to mobilize the Chinese people (Bishop, 1989). Followed is a section 
that examines the Chinese media development after Deng Xiaoping initiated 
economic reform and open-door policy in 1978. The internal and external social, 
political, and economic factors would be discussed in this section to gain an 
understanding of how the Chinese media outlets transformed from pure propaganda 
instruments to business enterprises, and how market competition has undermined the 
influence of state-owned media and assisted market-oriented media to gain more 
autonomy. The next section is a brief review of the process of Chinese media 
internationalization. It discusses the impacts of globalization on the Chinese media. 
 
Chairman Mao Era 
According to the traditional Marxist principle, the mass media is a powerful 
instrument of a government’s propaganda machine. To propagate its ideology, to 
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rationalize its authority, and to prevent conflict, the ruling party should hold a total 
control over media content (Hong, 1998; C. Huang, 2006). For the leaders of the 
communist country, the control of intellectual production, such as mass media, is an 
important element of controlling the society. As Marx and Engels pointed out, "The 
ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas . . . The class which has 
the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the 
means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those 
who lack the means of mental production are subject to it" (1970:64). When the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeated the Kuomintang and became the sole 
ruling party in Mainland China in 1949, the CCP took over all newspapers, 
magazines, and radio stations that were established during the Republican period 
(1911-1949) and structured its media system based on Marxist-Leninist 
communication philosophy. Under the Marxist-Leninist media model, media 
functioned as a tool of the Communist Party to achieve its objectives (Chang, 1989). 
One of the basic functions of the Marxist-Leninist media was to “control, limit, and 
restrict information, as well as to diffuse new ideas and values” (Barnett, 1979:391).  
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 until the 
death of Chairman Mao in 1976, China was a fundamentalist communist society; 
every aspect of people's life was strictly under the CCP control. During this period of 
time, the economic development was sidetracked from the CCP’s political agenda and 
media functioned as the ideological state apparatus to serve the CCP’s political needs 
and social control (Chu, 1986; He, 2003; Wu, 1994).  
During the Mao era, media’s operations were guided by the “Party’s 
principle”. They adopted the CCP’s ideology as their own and propagated “the Party’s 
programs, policies, and directives; and that they must propagate the Party’s leadership 
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and stick to the Party’s organization principles and press policies” (Tong & Cheng, 
1993:148, cited in Zhao, 1998). Moreover, media not only needed to propagate 
Party’s policies, they were also required to play “the role of leading social opinion, 
helping political stability and resolving various social problems” (Li, 1991:355). 
Under such circumstances, the communication between the Party and the public was 
basically a top-down process, as information flowed from the Party to the public by 
the media (Zhao, 1998). In short, the objectives of the mass media during the Mao’s 
ear were to strengthen Party power and to maintain the Party’s leadership status 
among the masses (Ibid).  
Prior to the inception of Deng’s economic reforms in 1978, the government 
subsidized all media in China (Akhavan-Majid, 2004). The government is the owner, 
the manager and the practitioner of the media (Chu, 1994). After the death of 
Chairman Mao in 1976, his successor Deng Xiaoping took over the leadership of the 
country and began a process of decentralization, commercialization, and 
internationalization that transformed the Chinese media system dramatically. 
 
 
The Chinese Media Under the Reforms 
The structure of the Chinese media experienced tremendous change after the 
introduction of economic reforms in 1978. When Mao died in 1976, the Chinese 
economy totally collapsed. China was on the edge of famine and faced not only 
serious economic crisis, but also a high level of social and political insatiability. 
Against this background, Deng used economic reform as a means to reconstruct 
China’s economic system and to restore Chinese people’s faith in the Party (Chan, 
1993; Gordon, 1997; Keller, 2003). Under Deng’s leadership, the CCP abandoned its 
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ideological orthodoxy in favor of a pragmatic approach to economic development 
(Gordon, 1997). Economic development and the replacement of Maoist political 
struggles became the country’s top priority (Naughton, 1993).  
Deng realized that the challenges Chinese society faced at the time were the 
increasing demands of people’s material and cultural needs and the backwardness of 
production. Deng acknowledged, his legitimacy and success were dependent on his 
ability to improve the economic situation and to raise people’s living standard (Kuan, 
1991; Rowen, 1996; Wang & Chang, 1996). The economic prosperity market 
economy brought to the Western countries helped Deng to convince other CCP 
leaders to embrace the market economy. For Deng, the building of socialism could 
not skip the period of the market economy; regardless if it was viewed as capitalism 
(Bettelheim, 1988; Qian & Wu, 2000; Xiao, 1993).  
As a result of the economic reforms, the average Chinese citizen living 
standard improved significantly and their agricultural production increased. After its 
successes in agriculture, the reform expanded to other sectors and industries. Under 
the planned economy, the government allocated the raw materials to factories and 
distributed their products. The situation changed during the reforms because market-
oriented economy required the companies to adjust their production to meet the needs 
of both domestic and international markets, rather than rely on the central government 
instructions (Bettelheim, 1988; Qian & Wu, 2000).  
The shift from a planned economy to a market economy was a long process 
and required various practices. The economic reform was initially introduced at the 
CCP’s Eleventh Central Committee in 1978, suggested that the class struggle must 
stop, and economic development should be the top priority of the country. During his 
speech at the twelfth national congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1982, 
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Deng acknowledged the importance of the market economy and suggested the party 
changed its goals and methods of operations (Dittmer, 1983; Kuan, 1991). He 
declared that the aims of the reforms were to end China’s isolation from the world and 
to encourage foreign investment, “science, technology, and management systems, and 
to new ideas from anywhere in the world, regardless of the country’s political system” 
(Vogel, 2011:58). After the Fourth Plenary session in 1991, the Chinese government 
announced that in order to accelerate the development of a socialist planned 
commodity economy China should create an economic system that combined 
planning with the use of market forces. As a result, the Chinese economy has shifted 
from a planned economy to market economy, adopted some market economy 
functions, and promoted market economy as the core of its economic policy 
(Bettelheim, 1988; Qian & Wu, 2000; Shirk, 1993). The transformation from a 
planned economy to a market economy has not only altered production approaches 
and the Chinese people’s economic and social life; it also had a great impact on the 
Chinese media (Lull, 1991).  
 
Media Development Between 1978 and 1989 
Under the planned economy, the Party took full responsibility for the media’s 
financial management; no matter if it was a profit or loss. No need for media 
organizations and media practitioners to worry about the financial condition of their 
organizations (Y. Zhao, 1998; Akhavan-Majid, 2004). As time went by, media 
operation's financial support became a burden to the government and the state was 
unable to meet the increased funds required by the media. The situation forced the 
Chinese government to withdraw its subsidies and gradually required all the media to 
be financially self-sufficient by 1994 (Zhao, 2000). Media organizations, like other 
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State-owned Enterprises (SOEs), began to take responsibilities for the revenue and 
financial performance. Although the concept of commercialization was new, it did not 
take too long for media organizations to understand and adopt the market principles 
(Lynch, 1999). 
For the Chinese government, the main objective of the media reform was to 
reduce media's financial dependency on the government through the process of 
commercialization (White, 1990). Being a financially independent organization, mass 
media had to place profit making on the top of their business objective list, to make 
money by themselves, rather than on their connections with the government (Wu, 
1994). In other words, to be financially self-sufficient, "mass media have had to 
reorient themselves to the needs of the market and to increase their financial assets by 
all legitimate means" (Chan, 1993:6).  
Media reform was also designed to increase the media’s ability to help the 
government communicate with the public. Stimulated by China’s modernization and 
economic growth, it did not need government support and did not increase the 
government’s financial burdens (Lynch, 1999). The Chinese government’s goal was 
to turn “media outlets into public units under business management”, and media 
organizations would get a “limited amount of state support for infrastructural 
investment” and be “responsible for additional financial resources needed for their 
normal operations” (Pan, 2000).  
 Another important media reform policy during this period was the Chinese 
government giving the media permission to receive advertising in 1979 (He & Chen, 
1998; C. Huang, 2000). This policy was designed to increase the media’s ability to be 
financially independent, and to boost the country’s modernization process and 
economic growth without the need for increasing media subsidies (Lynch, 1999). 
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During the Cultural Revolution, advertising was labeled as a capitalist evil and was 
prohibited in China for decades (J. Wang, 1997). When China launched the economic 
reforms and reopened its doors to the West, the government’s negative view against 
advertising was radically revised. The Chinese government’s justification for 
readopting advertising was “advertising transmitted important economic information 
that helped link producers and consumers” (Stross, 1990:488). The government 
claimed that advertising is a tool to introduce products to potential customers; it is no 
different than what factory sale representatives already did in China (J. Hong, 1994).    
Since advertising was reintroduced and endorsed by the Chinese government 
it has gradually become the primary source of revenues for media organizations. 
Competition for advertising revenues between different media organizations was very 
intense and most of the Chinese media outlets became more entertainment-oriented 
for the purpose of attracting more audience. The commercialization of media sectors 
has transformed the Chinese media from the party masses model in Mao's era to the 
market audience model in Deng’s reform era (Y. Zhang, 2000). 
Deng’s economic reforms and the Open-Door policy have greatly improved 
the living standard of ordinary people. With more money and free time, people’s 
lifestyle changed; they began to pay more attention to the outside world and tend to 
consume more entertainment. In order to meet readers/audiences’ demands, media 
organizations reduced the proportion of the government propaganda materials and 
expanded the entertainment section. Diversified entertainment information has gained 
increasing popularity among the Chinese households, to some extent; it has become 
an important aspect of people’s lives (Y. Huang, 1994; Lee, 1994; Zhao, 1998). 
The Chinese media content has changed dramatically since the reforms, the 
commercial and entertainment content increased significantly, even though the Party 
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still tightly controls ideology. For the print media, the number of soft stories was 
increased to gain more readerships. Two types of journalistic content became more 
prominent than before, one is societal news that covers human-interest stories, news 
of crime, and breaking news of accidents or natural disasters, the other one is 
criticism reporting, ranging from coverage of everyday problems faced by ordinary 
people to investigative exposes of corruption (Pan, 2000). In addition to increasing 
soft news stories, the front page of the Party newspapers was no longer just published 
top Chinese leader’s speeches, Party’s policies, government documents and other 
national affairs, instead, important domestic and international news were routinely 
reported on the front page of these Party organizations (Y. Zhao, 1998). The 
increasingly diversified newspaper content offered the readers with more alternatives 
and changed people's perceptions of the world (Chang, 1989). 
Despite the content changes, the print media also moved toward a direction to 
expand its pages to make more room for commercial advertising since the early 
1990s. One of the examples is Wenhui Daily, a Shanghai-based newspaper published 
a four-page newspaper for 53 years, has expanded its paper to eight pages in 1992. 
There was a combination of factors driven this page expansion trend. People's need 
for different types of information, especially economic news and information is one 
important factor contributed to the newspaper's page expansion (Cao, 1999). 
Increasing profits from advertising is another important factor. Since the media 
reform, advertising industry grew rapidly; there was not enough room for most of the 
newspapers to accommodate all the advertising. Advertising clients must wait for 
several months to put their advertisements on the major newspapers. To resolve such 
market demand, most of the print media expanded their pages (Cao, 1999).  
In order to survive the intense market competition, the news media employed 
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another strategy to boost the revenue: publishing evening newspapers, lucrative 
tabloid and weekend edition newspapers. As a supplement of morning newspapers, 
evening newspapers are mainly feature human-interest news, cultural news, sports, 
and community news. Their focuses are on readability and popular appear. The 
portions on economic and world news were also increasing in the evening newspapers 
(Chu, 1994; Lynch, 1999). 
Changes not only occurred in the content of the media, the style of media 
reporting changed as well. Chinese journalists began to alter their reporting style and 
incorporated elements of Western-style news reporting in their reports (Huang, 2003; 
Pan & Chan, 2000). Their study examined the change of journalistic paradigms, Pan 
and Chan discovered that a number of Chinese journalists were keen to embrace 
western news values and norms although they were still playing the role as an 
ideological apparatus of the Party (Pan & Chan, 2000).  
Like newspapers, similar changes also occurred in the broadcasting sector. For 
instance, domestic and foreign news coverage was expanded. Entertainment programs 
such as soap opera, traditional opera, and foreign feature films became routine. All 
the content changes were brought by the market economy for the purpose of 
increasing advertising revenue. The quality of live news presentation and 
commentaries also improved. Both the numbers of daily news bulletin airings and the 
quantity of investigative news programs increased dramatically (Zhao, 2000; Yin, 
2006).  
Decentralization policy was introduced to decentralize media ownership and 
to expand a national-provincial media system into a national, provincial, municipal, 
and county media system in order to increase the flow of information for economic 
development and to enhance the power of the propaganda (Lieberthal, 1995). It also 
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encouraged lower levels of the state apparatus to set up and operate their own media 
organizations to increase production and profits, unlike centralized system, in which 
all media were owned and operated by the state (Zhang, 2011).  
Since the initiation of the policy, the central government started to grant more 
autonomy in production and marketing to lower level governments (Chan & Qiu, 
2003). The process of decentralizing media ownership led to several important 
changes in the Chinese media. In print media, the circulation in the newspapers 
located in the national center declined; circulation in the provincial media and sub-
provincial levels media grew rapidly in the early the 1980s (Wu, 2000). A similar 
result of structural decentralization also occurred in the broadcasting sector. In the late 
1970s, all television stations belonged to the central, provincial, and some 
metropolitan governments.  
Because of an important decision made by the All-China Radio at the 
Television Conference in 1983, China's broadcasting system was decentralized to four 
levels scheme-center, province, city, and county. Consequently, only the CCTV and 
its affiliated stations remained supervised by central party, all other stations were 
reported to lower-level authorities (Y. Huang, 1994). The number of television 
stations increased rapidly in the early the 1980s (Polumbaum, 1992). By the end of 
the 1990s, only one-third of stations were national television stations, the rest were 
sponsored by lower-level local governments (Wu, 2000). 
Prior to the decentralization process initiation; local television stations were 
allowed to air only the programs that already broadcasted on CCTV. Under such 
constraint, local television station’s development was limited. However, the 
circumstance changed after the initiation of the decentralization of ownership and 
operation rights over media to lower levels of the government, the local media 
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organizations were given more autonomy over financial, production, and marketing 
decision (Cho, 2007).  
Newspapers also granted journalistic autonomy in deciding the content of their 
newspapers in the late 1980s. It was in this relaxed environment that journalists were 
able to play a role in educating the public and in promoting the liberal ideals in the 
late 1980s before the student’s protest took place at the Tiananmen Square (Goldman, 
1994). Moreover, bad news and critical (negative) news reports, which had not been 
seen under Mao’s rules, began to resurface in the media in the late 1980s 
(Polumbaum, 1990). News media began to publish the perspectives that embraced 
concepts such as freedom of the press, democracy, political reform and media reform 
(He, 2006). 
There were several positive outcomes of this decentralization policy. 
Politically speaking, the newly established lower level new media organizations 
provided an excellent chance for local leaders to express their concerns as well to 
spread central party propaganda. From the economic perspective, increasing number 
of media outlets means the revenue of advertisements also increased, those newly 
founded state media organizations became profit-making enterprises and contributed a 
greater number of advertising profits to the central government (Esarey, 2005). 
Even though China’s media environment became more diverse and 
increasingly commercialized in the 1980s, the mass media still needed to play their 
role as the state’s propagandists (Brady, 2006; Thierstein & Kamalipour, 2000). Also, 
the reforms in the 1980s were not designed to change the political structure or the 
Party ideologies; the CCP’s ideology towards the media has remained unchanged. 
Freedom of the press was still a taboo in Deng’s regime. In Deng’s view, the media is 
valuable ideological instrument for the Party to use to unit and stabilize the country 
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(Chan, 1994). Thus, the Chinese media continued playing the role of the propaganda 
instrument of the Party, while they practiced under a market economy and a loosened 
ideological atmosphere. In other words, the CCP still holds dominant power over the 
media (Zhao, 1998). In the competitive market environment, Chinese media needed to 
serve two masters, the Party and the market, they are no longer regarded as pure tools 
of Party’s mouthpieces like their role before the reforms (Chang, Wang & Chen, 
2002; Luther & Zhou, 2005; Zhao, 1998).  
Under strict media control, there was no way the media could host any debate 
on policy issue until the introduction of economic reforms. During the 1980s, policy 
debates became an important part of politics in China. The exchanges exposed many 
social issues that the state had tried to neglect. The CCP was too afraid to endure 
more challenges; therefore it demanded the media to reserve 80 percent of their 
coverage for positive reporting or reporting a favorable image of the Party (Y. Hu, 
1986). Despite the government's intervention, journalists started to urge the 
government to reform media policies. They demanded the government grant more 
autonomy to news organizations and keep the state's intervention to a minimum (Pu, 
1986). Moreover, the print media continued to publish Chinese intellectuals' critical 
opinions that called for a new ownership structure and political liberalization. During 
this period, journalists tried to show they supported the general direction of the 
reforms, and they were loyal to certain pro-reform power groups (X. Zhang, 1993).  
In the spring of 1989, student-led protests against official corruption because 
of the lack of political democratization exploded in Beijing and other cities across 
China (Fathers & Higgins, 1989). In response to a massive protest, the Chinese 
government shut down the World Economic Herald, a regular forum of its critics. The 
government's action triggered journalists and people to join the protests. More than 
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1,000 journalists signed a petition demanding more freedom of press. Freedom of the 
press became a catchphrase of this movement (Jernow, 1993). 
The Chinese government then imposed martial law in Beijing. Escorted by 
tanks, the troops imposing martial law blasted their way into Tiananmen Square and 
killed more than 1,000 civilians. In the following months, thousands of people were 
arrested because of their connections to the protest movements (Brook, 1992). This 
student-led pro-democracy movement has a serious impact on the history of politics 
and media development in China in different ways to different degrees (Hazelbarth, 
1997).  
After the Tiananmen crackdown, the media was negatively affected because 
during the student protests, a great number of media workers, even those who worked 
for the Party’s organization, joined the protests in Beijing, openly discussed the 
movement and called for democracy. Since the Tiananmen crackdown, the Chinese 
government reimposed constricted media control by issuing more restrictions on 
reporters and editors (Wong, 2005). The government silenced independent and liberal 
voices; thousands of journalists were persecuted and dismissed from their positions or 
forced into exile. Between 1989-1992, more Chinese journalists were jailed. Any 
potential risk for the media to threaten the Party’s political and ideological authority 
was carefully monitored (Y. Zhao, & Z.Z. Guo, 2005).  
After the Tiananmen crackdown, the CCP has put social stability back on the 
top of its priority list over any other issues in development (Naughton, 1993). The 
media sector was one of the fields that was seriously affected by this new priority 
because they were labeled by the government as one of the "hardest hit disaster 
zones" of the creation of liberal ideas and protest activities; journalists were accused 
of having "turned their backs" on the country (X. Zhang, 1993). The short-term 
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experiment with better autonomy for the media from 1986 to 1988 was perceived by 
the CCP as an “editor-in-chief doing whatever-he-wants-to-do system” and declared 
unacceptable (Q. Yu, 1989:4).  
 
Media Development between 1992 and 2000s 
For three years after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, the process of 
commercializing media sector was harshly stunted. The process of commercialization 
regained momentum in 1992 when the Party initiated another reform of programs and 
called for faster economic growth (Pei, 1994). New market forces started to have a 
profound impact on the media sector, even though media was still tightly controlled 
by the government (Brady, 2007).    
After the Tiananmen crackdown, the majority of Western nations imposed 
economic sanctions against China and condemned Chinese government's violent 
actions against the student's protests. Such economic sanctions led to the deterioration 
of China's international relations and the decline of foreign investment. China’s 
economy was stagnated for three years (1989-1991). In 1992, Deng traveled to the 
southern cities of China and gave a series of important speeches to reaffirm the 
importance of the free market, opening up to other countries, and economic 
development (Pei, 1994). After Deng’s southern tours, the 14th Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party introduced a new economic development model named the 
“Socialist Market Economy”. Economic reconstruction was once again the top 
priority of the national development and the market was a driving force for economic 
change and development (Zhao, 1998). The purposes of the 1990s economic reforms 
were to re-centralize, emphasize market integration, support reforms of ownership, 
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and improve regulation, unlike the reforms in the 1980s, which objective was 
decentralization (Naughton, 2009). 
The process of commercialization and privatization of state-owned enterprises 
was accelerated in the 1990s. In 1993, the Chinese government carefully started the 
process of privatization and gradually let uncompetitive companies collapsed. As 
commercialization process progressed, most Party organs gained some financial 
autonomy from the state and became profit-making organizations in 2000 (Zhao, 
2000). This kind of new independence in media financial structures brought the 
changes on media content, media functions, and the relationship between media 
organizations and government (Winfield & Peng, 2005). The incentive to attract more 
readers and audience has transferred media's priority from propagating government's 
policies to meeting the public's demands (Lynch, 1999; Lai, 2005). In order to satisfy 
the general public’s demand, many party newspapers extended their reporting from 
pure political propaganda to a broader coverage in the economy, technology, culture, 
entertainment, sports and other social issues (Lee, 2000). Newspapers also employed 
methods such as customer survey, letters to the editor, and reader’s feedback to 
engage and interact with their readers (Chang et al, 1994). 
Unlike their role under Mao’s planned economy, the Chinese media became 
important social agents actively constructing people’s understanding of social reality 
through the discourse of news content. As China accelerated the speed of its 
economic reforms in the 1990s, the aim of the Chinese media shifted from promoting 
the CCP’s ideologies to constructing the people’s perceptions of the world based on 
the values and national agenda constructed by the Party (Chang et al, 1994).  
The political atmosphere during the 1990s, especially after the 14th Party 
Congress, was relaxed. Operated under such political environment, media became 
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more decentralized and autonomous.  Investigative reporting increased in the media 
content to reveal the public opinions and examine the efficiency of the government 
officials’ performances. Under the decentralization policy, “the central press was no 
longer the sole authority on many subject areas, and new opportunities emerged for 
provincial media to examine governance issues at a distance from higher authorities” 
(Repnikova, 2015). This function is known as “yulun jiandu” (與論監督) literally 
translated as “supervision by public opinion”, meaning the media acted like a 
watchdog to watch the government officials’ performances. This is one of the 
important elements of the media development in this era (de Burgh, 2003). 
During the process of commercialization, the Chinese media was encouraged 
to establish market-oriented publications to increase their profits (Zhao, 1998). A 
small number of publications emerged. Most of them were technically connected to 
quasi-official institutions with only indirect ties to the Party-state and not under 
propaganda department supervision (Wu, 2000). For instance, Economic Observer, a 
Beijing-based weekly paper that focuses on in-depth economic news, is owned by a 
commercial enterprise with links to the Shandong Province government (Liebman, 
2005).  
Another important media development during the 1990s was the rise of non-
Party newspapers by different social and scientific institutions and mass media. The 
rapid growth of the non-party papers has led to a new stage of Chinese media's 
structural change. The growth of such non-party indicates the Chinese government's 
determination to push the reform further (C. Huang, 2000; He, 2000; Y. Zhao, 2000). 
One of the important influences of the rise of not-party commercial papers was the 
decline of the party organs' circulation (C. Huang, 2001).  
As the 1992 policy required all party organs to become financially self-
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sufficient by 1994, the party organs began to publish the subsidiary weekend editions 
and mass appeal newspapers and magazines to maximize their profits. The situation 
was intensified more in July 2003, after the Chinese government abolished the policy 
that required party and state offices to subscribe the party newspapers (Roberts, 
2003). In addition, the major party-owned media, including People’s Daily, have 
begun to expand their business activities in non-media sectors. These include 
investments in some of the most profitable business in China, such as real estate, 
hotels, tourism and telecommunication (He, 2000; Lynch, 1999).  
Since the late 1990s, the process of marketization of Chinese media has 
begun. Broadcasting industry followed by print media could be traded on the stock 
market. Since early 2002, nonmedia state companies were allowed to invest in media 
sector (Y. Zhao, 2005). Even though there still were restrictions that prohibited 
nonstate investors to hold more than 49 percent share of media organizations, the 
government has partly shifted media from the public toward private ownership. The 
combination of changes in management, financing, and ownership resulted in the 
media marketization (Hu, 2003). 
The emergence of large media conglomerates in the late 1990s was the 
product of the government orders, not driven by market forces. Media conglomeration 
lead to the concentration of power in the hands of a small group of elite individuals 
who would continue to dominate the Chinese media industry (Sparks, 2008). The 
process of media conglomeration began in 1996 with an objective to build stronger 
media team to compete with transnational media corporations (TNMCs) in the 
process of globalization (Z. Hu, 2003). In early 1996, the Guangzhou Daily, China’s 
most financially success party organ, was selected by the central government as 
China's first newspaper group. This press group operates, as a conglomerate owns six 
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publications and a wide range of business sectors in various areas. In 1998, the 
Guangzhou Daily Group became an important economic powerhouse in Guangzhou 
(Lynch, 1999). The central government approved seven major party organs to be 
transformed into media conglomerates between 1996 and 1998 (Y. Zhao, 2000). For 
the Chinese government, media conglomeration was China’s the first move to “link 
up the international track” and an important plan to strengthen the competitive 
position of the domestic media in the global market (Y. Zhao, 2000:17; Z. Hu, 2003). 
Two decades after the reform, Chinese media has become more market-
dependent rather than market-oriented (Sparks, 2008). Both big advertising and 
circulation revenue providers have increasingly interfered with media practices (Tong 
& Sparks, 2009). An example of advertising buyer interfering with media practice 
was the China Eastern airline pilots’ protest over working conditions and salary. Four 
local newspapers’ coverage of the event was similar: two did not report it; one 
newspaper did report the protest but did not mention the name of the airline, and the 
fourth one simply used the press release supplied by China Eastern. China Eastern 
airline’s power to control the narrative of these newspapers was based on its huge 
contributions to the newspapers’ advertising and circulation revenues (I. Wang, 
2008).  
Since the early 1990s, China has actively participated in the process of 
globalization and the best example is its endless efforts to join the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). After more than thirteen years of negotiations, China finally 
became a member of the WTO in December 2001. The Chinese government is fully 
aware of the benefits and possible risks of China’s accession to the WTO’s 
membership. On the one hand, China hopes the international media corporations will 
offer China’s media industry advanced technology, management, professional 
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training, and foreign capital to help China’s media renovate their infrastructure. On 
the other hand, the government is not sure about the ability of Chinese media to 
compete with international media players. As Ding Guangen, the Minister of China's 
Department of Propaganda warned the Chinese media that, “their good days will be 
over when China joins the WTO” (Z. He, 2003:209). 
What concerns the Chinese government most is the political-ideological threat 
posed by the western media. Through media content, western hegemony can promote 
its ideology effectively. To prevent such political-ideological threat, the Chinese 
government approves only foreign investors to invest in the production and 
distribution of cultural products and some entertainment services at the beginning of 
its WTO accession. The Chinese government insisted that for the time being, the 
media content should still produce by the domestic media (Chin, 2003).  
Despite the concerns and challenges, WTO accession led some significant 
changes in China’s media industries. In the film industry, the Chinese government 
placed a strict ban on any foreign involvement in film distribution, claimed it is 
critical to autonomy. The reasons behind this decision were to avoid Hollywood’s 
control of film distribution and to give the domestic media sectors more time to 
become a competitive competitor (Brent, 2000). In addition, China promised to 
import 40 films per year the number will increase to 50 films by 2005. The Chinese 
government also allowed foreign investors to keep up to a 49% share of media 
corporations that build, own, and operate cinemas in China (Y. Zhao, 2008).  
While China’s motivation was to learn know-how of modern media 
management, producing and marketing from global media groups, the Western 
transnational media companies were motivated by China’s huge market potential. 
International media conglomerates were eager to enter the Chinese media market to 
 35 
share huge advertising markets (Hughes, 2002). Since the 1990s, TNMCs have been 
actively expanding their business in China through different means to explore the 
market potential. Speed increased in the 2000s after China’s accession to WTO (Wei, 
2000; R. Tang, 2005). After years of resistance, the Chinese government granted 
broadcasting permissions to “government friendly” TNMCs allowing them to 
broadcast non-news programs to cable television audiences in the southeastern 
province of Guangdong (C. Huang, 2004), even though the WTO agreement does not 
require the Chinese government to open up its broadcasting market to foreign 
investors (Dudek & Xu, 2002; Hughes, 2002). 
In China, the mass media industry was the most profitable industry with the 
high investment return rate of 17-30 percent between 1988 and 1998 (Dong, 2000). 
This suggests China’s mass media industry “might be the last industry with staggering 
profits in the world” (Tao, 2001: 2). Many observers believe that as long as China's 
economy continues growing, the advertising business “will continue to boom as 
China heads towards an advertising bonanza with the 2008 Olympics in Beijing” 
(Hughes, 2002). It is based on this belief that major international media players 
desired a share of the Chinese market even they were losing money in China. The 
needs to maximize profit and know-how are the foundation of the collaboration 
between Chinese media industries and foreign media companies (Leow, 2004). 
There is a common hope that increasing economic liberation of the media and 
the presence of TNMCs in China will accelerate the country’s political 
democratization process (Kan, 2003). Unfortunately, this does not result in political 
liberalization (Hackett and Y. Zhao, 2005). In order to control an increasingly 
internationalized media, the Chinese government tightened its policy on foreign 
media entering China in 2005, as part of plans to control the domestic cultural 
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industry; the situation remains the same at present time.  
 
Global Expansion 
As discussed above, the major factors that motivated the Chinese government 
to open its domestic media market was its needs for media management and 
marketing know-how, the advanced technologies to produce and distribute media 
content, and foreign capitals to compete with international media companies. 
However, the information flow is not limited to inward flow from overseas, the 
Chinese government also realized the importance of expanding its cultural influence 
around the globe. The “going out” policy was first introduced in 1999 for the purpose 
of promoting Chinese economic interests abroad. In 2001, a new “going out” 
campaign was initiated with two major objectives: to improve China’s international 
image and communicate its perspectives with the world through its own media (Lu, 
2006). It is estimated that China has invested more than 60 billion RMB in four state-
owned media organizations: Xinhua News Agency, Central China Television 
(CCTV), China Radio International (CRI) and the China Daily in 2009 (X. Zhang, 
2009).  
After the Beijing Olympic Games in the summer of 2008, the “going out” 
campaign has been put in full speed because of the growing concern of Chinese 
media’s weak international influence. The western media’s negative news coverage of 
the Tibet crisis and the protests during the Beijing Olympics torch relay in 2008 
reinforced the Chinese authority’s concerns (Xin, 2009). As part of the Chinese 
media’s global expansion, Xinhua’s African News Service was launched in 2008 
(Xin, 2009). Its multimedia service in the English language was launched July 2009. 
In 2010, Xinhua also launched its own television network, China Xinhua Network 
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Corporation (CNC) broadcasting via satellite, cable, mobile phone, and the Internet 
(Barboza, 2010). According to Xinhua’s President Li Congjun, “the launch of CNC 
(was) an important move for Xinhua to enrich the agency’s business sectors, and 
embrace the multimedia world” (Xinhua, 2010). At the beginning, CNC World News 
Channel was only broadcasted in Chinese, and only aired news events and special 
news bulletins. A 24/7 English news service was offered a few months later, covering 
breaking news and major international political, economic, and cultural news. When 
CNC launched in early 2009, its programs only broadcasted to the Asia-Pacific 
countries and to a couple of European nations. In January 2011, its English offering 
expanded its broadcasting service to all of Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa 
(Cao & Liang, 2011). In 2010, Xinhua relocated its North American headquarters 
from Queens to the middle of Time Square in New York City. This move shows 
Xinhua’s ambition in international operations. It was designed to persuade the world 
that Xinhua is more than a propaganda instrument of the Chinese government (Peters, 
2010). In 2011, Xinhua teamed up with the Kenyan telecommunication company 
Safaricom to start a mobile newspaper in Kenya (McKenzie, 2012). 
According to David Shambaugh, professor of the George Washington 
University and an expert on China foreign policy, Xinhua’s international expansion 
was driven by several factors, and making money is the first incentive that motivated 
Xinhua’s global expansion. For Xinhua, “going out” is an opportunity to compete 
with its western counterparts such as AP, Thomson Reuter, and Bloomberg and to 
become a “real” international news agency. The business strategy Xinhua uses to 
achieve this objective is to lower its product price so that it is cheaper than other big 
Western news agencies (Shambaugh, 2013). The second factor is "to report the ‘real 
China’ to the world” through its own media (Q. Zhou, 2009). For the Chinese 
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government, the media becomes vital to building positive international image and 
eliminates misunderstandings of China. Finally, Xinhua’s global expansion is a move 
to transform Xinhua into a modern multimedia organization to challenge transnational 
news media such as CNN and Al Jazeera (Shambaugh, 2013).  
Central China Television (CCTV), originally Beijing Television, was 
established in 1958 and renamed China Central Television in 1978; the same year 
Deng initiated economic reforms and an Open-door policy. The State Administration 
of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) (Propaganda Department) strictly control 
CCTV’s contents and daily administrative operations. Like other media organizations 
in China, CCTV had to serve two masters: The Party and the Market. It must function 
as the government’s mouthpiece and also be commercially successful. CCTV 
represents an excellent example of how the media can operate as a propaganda 
instrument for the government and as a commercial enterprise that makes huge 
profits. Its viewership is greater than any other major television network worldwide 
(Si, 2014).   
As previously discussed, the aims of the CCTV’s global expansion are to 
enhance China's international image and increase its influences, especially in the 
countries China has great political and economic interests. CCTV's first overseas 
operation was opened in 1990 with an attempt to reach out to Taiwanese and overseas 
Chinese audiences. In the 1990s, president Yan Weiguang transformed CCTV from 
state-funded media organization to commercial broadcaster. When the new "going 
out" policy initiated, CCTV was aimed to transform itself to become China's CNN 
(Zhu, 2012). In 2000, the twenty-four-hour English Channel, CCTV International 
(CCTV-9) was launched. CCTV-9 entered the American cable market in 2002 as part 
of a deal that allowed AOL-Time Warner and News Corp access to cable systems in 
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Southern China (X. Zhang, 2011). 
CCTV and other eight provincial Chinese television stations launched Dish 
Network Great Wall Platform in 2005 targeted the Asian Community outside China 
(Si, 2014). In January 2012, CCTV opened a broadcasting hub in the Kenyan capital 
of Nairobi. This was China’s first news production center in the continent. The major 
tasks of CCTV-Africa are to "change the narrative about Africa” (McKenzie, 2012), 
to build the positive image of China, and share China's viewpoints on international 
affairs with the Africans (Gorfinkel et al., 2014).   
China Radio International (CRI) is another State-owned media company that 
expanded its operations to foreign countries as part of new "going out" campaign. 
CRI was founded in 1941 as wartime propaganda instrument against Japanese 
invasion. During the Mao era, CRI functioned as the CCP’s ideological apparatus to 
propagate Party ideologies and policies. Like other media, CRI began its reform in the 
late 1970s when Deng’s economic reforms started. The process of economic reforms 
has transformed this state-funded radio to be a market-oriented media (Sun, 2010).  
Like BBC and Voice of America (VOA), CRI also used different platforms 
and new technologies to communicate with its listeners. For example, CRI established 
a multi-language website to report political, economic and cultural information about 
China (C.C. Chen et al., 2010). CRI also collaborated with other international media 
organizations to produce and share program contents. Thus far, CRI’s cooperation 
with the NHK (Japan's national public broadcasting organization) is the most 
successful collaboration with other international media. China believes this kind of 
partnership will enhance China’s international image and increase its influence 
overseas (C.C. Chen et al., 2010).  
China Daily, an English-language newspaper founded in 1981, also selected 
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by the Chinese government to “go global”. In February 2009, China Daily launched 
its U.S. edition in New York. The content of the U.S. edition focuses on the United 
States and Canada’s business news and China’s economic, political, and cultural 
development (Shambaugh, 2013). In December 2012, an African edition of China 
Daily was launched in Nairobi. The emphasis of China Daily Africa is on Sino-
African relations because “the relationship between China and the African continent 
is one of the most significant relationships in the world today…it is growing and 
complex and not always understood-- not just by those in other parts of the world but 
Africans and Chinese, too” (Green, 2012). For the Chinese government, China Daily 
is an important medium allows China to communicate its own stories to the world and 
for the foreigners to understand China (Shambaugh, 2013). 
As discussed above, the reasons behind China’s state-owned media’s global 
expansion are to improve China’s international image and to promote a mutual 
understanding between China and the rest of the world (Si, 2014). Currently, the 
media’s “going out” strategy is still supported and promoted by President Xi Jinping. 
In his inaugural speech, Xi emphasized the importance of media’s role is to serve the 
state’s interests. He explicitly demands all journalists, at home and abroad, must 
introduce positive national image to foreign audiences to confront the Western 
media’s biased representations of China and to promote a mutual understanding 
between China and the rest of the world (Xi, 2012). 
In the past few decades, mass media in China have undergone dramatic 
changes. The media industry has transformed from a purely political instrument to 
one of the most profitable industries in China. This chapter offered a brief overview 
of the important stages of Chinese media development. It examined the impacts of the 
political and economic factors, both internal and external, affected the transformation 
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China's media. It first discussed the media system under the leadership of Chairman 
Mao. During the Mao era, all the media was subsidized by the state. As the state-
owned and party-controlled organs, mass media only functioned as a political tool to 
transmit the CCP's ideologies, to confront western imperialists, and to mobilize the 
public. 
Then it examined media development during Deng’s economic reforms period 
from 1978-1989. The transformation of the Chinese media took place when Deng 
Xiaoping decided to introduce the economic reforms and open to the West in 1978. 
From 1978 to the crackdown on the student pro-democracy movement in the spring of 
1989, the Chinese government reduced it subsidies, most of the media organizations 
were forced to be financially self-sufficient. In order to survive, mass media turned to 
advertising for the profits. As a result, advertising became the major source of funding 
for the media. The decentralization of the government control over media ownership 
also led to dramatic changes in Chinese media. Regardless of the reduction of the 
government subsidies or the decentralization of media ownership; the policy was part 
of the Chinese government’s economic development drive to modernize China.  
There was a setback between 1989 and 1991 right after the Tiananmen 
crackdown. During the student protest, the majority of news media such as the 
People’s Daily and CCTV were sympathetic to the protesters. After the Tiananmen 
crackdown, the Party tightened its control over the mass media because of the 
potential threat to political stability. The crackdown also caused a significant impact 
on the Chinese economy and China’s international image (Y. Zhao & Z.Z. Guo, 
2005).   
After two decades of reform, the structure of the news media was changed. 
For instance, the number of newspapers increased. Print media’s sponsorship became 
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more diverse and decentralized. The number of publicly circulated newspapers grew 
rapidly, with more than 1,600 circulating in 1988 while there was only 200 ten years 
earlier (Polaumbaum, 1991). The second structural change during this period involved 
the emergence of a media market. When the number of the media companies 
increased, information market emerged. The state-owned media and the local media 
began to compete for audiences. The growing advertising business also offered the 
potential for the media’s financial autonomy. The final structural change was the 
personnel structure of the print media. The reason for this change was due to the need 
to hire the millions of rehabilitated intellectuals who had been victims of persecution. 
In 1985, the number of the journalist was 70,000; in 1988, the total number of 
employees in the press and publishing industry had increased to about 600,000 (X. 
Zhang, 1993).  
The process of marketization and commercialization of Chinese media sped 
up during the 1990s and had profound impacts on the media structure and practice 
(Wei, 2000). For instance, the Chinese government consolidated different newspapers 
and other periodicals into media groups and closed down a huge number of 
unprofitable party newspapers to enhance state organs’ capacity to compete with 
international media outlets. In 1998, six national and regional newspapers were 
consolidated by the state (Y. Zhao, 2000; Kuhn, 2001). In addition to media 
consolidation, the Chinese government also initiated a policy to conglomerate 
domestic media industries to strengthen its political control and capital accumulation. 
To compete with global counterparts, the Chinese government combined social 
resources and invested resources into major state-owned media organizations to 
strengthen their ability (Nolan, 2001; Moore, 2002). The processes of conglomeration 
and consolidation had turned the state-owned media organizations into a profit-driven 
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enterprise. Operating under such environment, media conglomerates are given more 
operational autonomy to foster the commercial potential of advertising and 
distribution services and investing in other business sectors (Y. Zhao, 2000; Ma, 
2000).  
The Chinese government views its WTO accession in 2001 as an indication of 
integrating into the global economy. Under the WTO agreement, China opened up its 
domestic market to foreign capital with an attempt to learn the know-how of modern 
media management, marketing mechanism, and advanced technologies. With China’s 
economic growth and a huge consumer population, transnational media corporations 
such as Time-Warner's and News Corp. entered China with the hopes of expanding 
their revenues. 
China realized its rise on the global stage as an economic and political power 
player does not automatically bring a more favorable perception of China in the 
international community. China is constantly depicted by the Western media as a 
rogue and human rights abusing regime that does not play by the international rules 
(Sun, 2010). To counter such hostile media representation, China decided to expand 
its state-owned media overseas to improve China’s national image, to communicate 
its viewpoint to the international community, and to expand its global influence 
(Nelson, 2013).  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINA’s ENGAGEMENTS IN AFRICA 
 
 
The present research seeks to explore China’s expanding cultural influence in 
the age of globalization, particularly in media and communication industries in 
African countries, a continent China has significant investments in. To understand 
how the political and economic factors contributed to current China’s media and 
cultural engagement in Africa; knowledge of its past is essential. The objective of this 
chapter is to provide a historical background of China's contemporary engagement 
with Africa. It will begin with a brief review of Sino-African relations. The purpose 
of this review is to illuminate how Sino-African relation has transformed in the past 
decades from ideology to pragmatic policies (Moumouni, 2006); how the internal 
economic and political forces in both China and Africa contributed to the current 
pattern of China's media involvement and other cultural engagements in Africa.  
 
Early Sino-African Encounters  
China’s involvement in African countries is not a new phenomenon as some 
people perceived. Historical evidence shows that Sino-African relations dated back to 
China’s Tang Dynasty (Northrup, 2002). The economic relationship between China 
and African countries began with the exchange of goods and services, and was 
facilitated by Muslim traders, who transported merchandises such as silk, pottery and 
bronze utensils from China. By that time, the travelers already had knowledge of 
Africa from Muslim merchants (Dathorne, 1996; Snow, 1988). 
 45 
The cultural encounters between China and African countries began 
sometimes around 206BC because of trade brought by the Silk Road. Chinese made 
pottery objects were discovered on the east coast of Africa and the northern part of 
South Africa. Ivory, frankincense, tortoiseshell, and spices were the goods the African 
merchants transported to China. There was no evidence of human contact between 
Africans and Chinese during this time period. In the Tang Dynasty (168-907 AD), 
Chinese porcelain and currency from this period were found in East Africa (A. Li, 
2005; Snow, 1988). 
In 1346, Ibn Battuta, an African explorer who traveled to China, published his 
experiences and introduced Chinese customs, architecture, the legal system, currency 
and politics to Africans (A. Li, 2005). Between 1417 and 1419, Chinese explorer and 
admiral Zheng He took his expedition to Africa and reached the eastern coast of 
Africa, Swahili coast, and Somalia centuries before the Europeans arrival. When the 
Europeans arrived in Africa, Sino-African contact had ceased (Snow, 1988; Shinn & 
Eisenman, 2012). After Zheng He expeditions, China turned inward and the 
Portuguese-mediated the official Sino-African contacts during the mid-1600s.  
During the 1700s, a small number of Chinese people lived in South Africa. 
During the Imperial period, the Chinese who lived in South Africa were treated as 
slaves, same as Africans, by European colonial governments. During the period of 
European colonialism, China and Africa did not have direct contact; their relation was 
facilitated by the colonial powers. Around 60,000 Chinese were sent to work in South 
African mines by the British between 1904 and 1906. By 1910, they were all deported 
due to the European settlers’ resentment and racial intolerance (ibid).  
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Sino -Africa Relationship between 1949 and 1978 
Over the past decades, Chinese and African relations have grown 
dramatically. The expansion of Sino-African relations was the result of a combination 
of major world issues, to which the scale of contemporary China's engagement with 
African states is unprecedented. China's Africa policy has shifted from completely 
political and ideological in the 1950s and 1960s to an emphasis on economic and 
pragmatic today (Liang, 2012). 
Throughout the first half of the 20th century, China was not concerned about 
its relations with African countries. It was until the second half of the 20th century 
when the Chinese Communist Party became the dominant party in China, and China 
needed African countries to support its position in the World War II, China and 
African countries became allies to fight for common causes (Shinn & Eisenman, 
2012).  
Modern Sino-African relations began with the Bandung Conference of 1955 
when twenty-nine countries joined together to promote economic and cultural 
cooperation between Asian and African countries and to fight for their independence 
from oppressing western superpowers. This conference was commonly viewed as a 
landmark in Sino-African history (Muekalia, 2004:6). During the conference, China’s 
former Premier Zhou Enlai addressed the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” 
that “covered mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-
aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual 
benefit; and peaceful coexistence” (Looy, 2006:2). Since then, the five principles 
have become the foundations of Sino-African relations.  
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and until the 
death of Chairman Mao in 1976, China relied on a central plan economy and was 
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isolated from the international community. During the Mao era, China received little 
international support, and its relations with both the US and the Soviet Union were 
tense due to its separation with the Soviet Union. In addition to its tense relations with 
the two superpowers, China also faced serious security threats from other 
international events: the Korean War in 1950, Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958 and the 
Vietnam War in 1961. As a result, China’s international diplomatic influence was 
limited during the 1950s and 1960s (Snow, 1988).  
In order to break through this diplomatic isolation, Chairman Mao turned to 
the Third World countries and asked them to join China’s fight against imperialism 
and colonialism. To advance Mao’s anti-imperial agenda, China provided economic, 
technological, and military support to African countries to help them battle European 
colonialists and imperialists despite urgent development demands and economic 
difficulties at home. Through aid and military supports, China was able to establish its 
diplomatic relations with newly independent African nations (Moumouni, 2006; 
Muekalia, 2004; Shimazu, 2014).  
During the Mao era the Sino-African relations were driven by ideology and 
political interests (Alden et al. 2008). Two main purposes of China’s African foreign 
policy during the 1950s and 1960s were to isolate Taiwan diplomatically, and to 
counter the West’s and the Soviet Union influence on the African continent (A. Li, 
2008). With African countries supported, China has successfully replaced Taiwan as a 
member of the United Nations in 1971, and able to break "imperialism's strategy of 
isolating China" and gained international recognition (X. Yan, 1997).  
Although the Chinese government was facing a very difficult economic 
situation during the Mao era, it still managed to offer substantial resources to assist 
African countries development. From the mid-1950s to mid-1970s, the Chinese 
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government gave about $2.5 billion to 36 African states in aid (Le Pere & Shelton, 
2007). One of the highest-profile examples of China’s assistance to Africa was the 
TaZara railway; a railway that connects Tanzania and Zambia. TaZara railway allows 
Zambia to export copper without having the export to pass through South Africa in 
the years of Apartheid (Antwi-Dans, 2011). In the early period of Sino-African 
relations, China financed projects not only improved industrial development in the 
host countries but also reinforced China’s diplomatic power in Africa (Tu, 2008).   
However, China’s ideology-driven relations with Africa were not without 
conflict. When China broke ties with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, China accused 
the pro-Soviet communist parties in African countries as “revisionists” and treated 
them as ideological opponents. Such political difference intensified China’s 
relationship with these pro-Soviet political regimes. In contrast, many African 
regimes viewed China’s “export revolution” campaign as a threat to their political 
stability; only small group African countries continued their relations with China. It 
wasn’t until China abandoned its "exporting revolution" strategy at the end of the 
1960s that it regained its good relations with African countries (A. Li, 2007).     
 
 
Sino-African Relationship between 1978 and 1989 
Under Mao’s leadership, China’s economy was stagnant, and its economic 
policies were inefficient. In addition to economic stagnation, there was chaos in cities 
and rural areas because of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Chinese people were 
suffering; they blamed the government and the CCP leaders for allowing such a 
disaster to happen. People were praying for changes to occur in the present system of 
government (Goldman, & Goldman, 1987-8). 
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 In the early 1970s, the Chinese government began to design a reform plan to 
modernize the country and integrate its economy into the global economy. It wasn’t 
until the death of Chairman Mao in 1976, Deng Xiaoping, a long-time advocate of 
policy change, assumed control of the party in late 1978. Deng initiated economic 
reforms and opened the country to outside world. As the Party leader, Deng 
understood that for China's economy to improve, and thereby maintain the status of 
the CCP, economic and social reforms were inevitable. China needed to transform its 
economic system, replacing the centrally planned economy with a market-oriented 
economy. The ultimate objective of Deng's economic reforms was to modernize 
China, to strengthen the fields of agricultural, industry, defense, and science and 
technology, known as "the Four Modernizations" in China as first introduced by 
former Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964 (M.H. Chang, 1996; Chow, 2004; Tisdell, 2009). 
The successful economic performances of other market-oriented economies, in 
comparison with the centrally planned economies, such as South Korea Vs. North 
Korea, reinforced Deng and other CCP leaders to reform China’s economic system. 
The huge gap in the economic performance between East and West Germany also 
strengthened Deng’s viewpoint (Chow, 2004). In addition to the reasons stated above, 
the public's hunger for a market-oriented reform also supported Deng's reform plans. 
Since the founding of the PRC, the Chinese people have experienced the negative 
economic results of central planning, including the shortage of consumer products, 
limited selection, and the lack of improvement in quality (Chow, 2004). With the 
stagnation economy and the public’s support, Deng Xiaoping launched economic 
reforms and adopted an Open-Door Policy at the end of 1978 to increase productivity 
and improve the standard of living after three decades of political unrest (Tung, 
2005).   
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Under Deng’s new economic plans, China began to adopt some of the market-
based principles with its distinct ideological characteristics (So, 2011). Unlike Mao 
who perceived the world negatively, Deng had a more positive reading of the world; 
his economic reforms opened China to the outside world for trade and technology 
advancement (Baum, 2010; Moumouni, 2006). One of the major components of 
economic reform was to privatize and commercialize state-owned enterprises. In 
doing so, the Chinese central government gave state enterprises some autonomy in 
production, marketing, and investment decision making to make them financially 
independent (M. Chang, 1996). The core principle of the open-Door policy was to 
relax the government’s control on both foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade to 
attract foreign investment and increase foreign trade.  
Prior to Deng’s economic reforms, China’s economy was basically a closed 
economy. After it witnessed other Asian countries’ success with “export process 
zones” in the 1960s and 1970s, China launched four special economic zones (SEZs) 
on the coast of northern Guangdong. The functions of the SEZs were “to import high 
technology, increase exports, earn foreign exchange, create jobs, assimilate foreign 
managerial and entrepreneurial skills, and attract foreign investment” (Tung, 2005:4). 
These SEZs were designed to increase foreign investment. SEZs promote 
international trade and foreign corporations are granted easy access to China and 
Chinese businesses due to more flexible policies in SEZs. After the successful 
experience of the first four SEZs, China gradually opened all of China to advance its 
economy (Park, 1997; Tung, 2005). As a result, China's trade volume increased 
rapidly year after year (Smart & Hus, 2004). 
After the launch of the economic reforms and the Open-Door policy in 1978, 
the focus of China's foreign policy was shifted from ideological pursuit to trade and 
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economic development (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). The aims of China’s foreign 
policies were to develop its economic capability and expand trade relations with 
developed countries. The Chinese government knew that for the economic reform to 
succeed, China needed developed countries’ technical support and commercial 
connections (Onderco, 2007). By the end of the 1970s, China’s relationship with the 
US was improved and both nations were united against the Soviet Union (Naughton, 
2007).  
The economic reforms changed the priority of foreign policy; the Chinese 
government’s focus had gradually shifted from ideology to economics with a more 
pragmatic approach. As China's economy progressively became market-oriented, it 
needed to attract foreign investment, and China's foreign policy became increasingly 
West-oriented. China turned to the West for advanced technology, know-how, and 
capital. Not surprisingly, China’s political interest in Africa faded during the mid-80s 
(Muekalia, 2004; Snow, 1989).  
Despite China’s political and economic changes at home, the African 
governments faced governmental challenge, instability, economic chaos, and other 
developmental problems during this period. Africa was perceived “as economically 
deficient and technologically ineffective to its domestic policy aims” (Mawdsley, 
2007: 445). The combination of the political and economic factors mentioned above 
led to decreased Sino-African relations. 
When African countries encountered the “lost decade” of the 1980s, China’s 
foreign policy was focused on its cooperation with Japan and the U.S. During this 
period, China’s relationships with African countries declined (Taylor, 1998). 
However, following the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989, the U.S. and other 
Western governments strongly condemned China’s violent actions against peaceful 
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protestors and placed an embargo on weapon sales to China. When the West isolated 
China, African countries, and other Third World nations quietly provided their 
support to China (McGurn, 1990; Taylor, 1998).  
The success of Deng’s economic reforms improved Chinese people’s 
economic conditions. Subsequently, the Chinese public demanded greater political 
freedom. During the 1980s, students and the intelligentsia in China were granted more 
intellectual freedom; this situation stimulated requests for continued political reform. 
In 1989, thousands of students took their demands for democratic reform to 
Tiananmen Square. The CCP was unwilling to negotiate with protestors; the central 
government imposed martial law and ordered military force to solve the crisis. When 
the military forces moved in, student’s demonstrations continued, and violence among 
both the army and protesters caused hundreds of deaths. The Chinese government's 
violent actions led to widespread international condemnation, a package of economic 
and political sanctions were imposed on China. The fragile relations with the West 
forced the Chinese government to reevaluate its relationship with the Third World 
countries, especially African nations. Since then, China focused efforts to develop 
relations with its old African friends. Some of the African countries were perceived as 
China’s important partners against the West (Naughton, 2007; Taylor, 1998).   
Unlike western countries’ harsh sanctions, African countries were silent on 
China’s military actions for several reasons. First, the main issue surrounded 
Tiananmen crackdown was the Chinese government's human rights violation, which 
was the same issue that concerns most African leaders. Therefore, to those African 
leaders, the Tiananmen incident represented a dangerous effect that might also 
endanger their power base (Naidu, 2008). Secondly, African leaders believed Western 
countries’ condemnation over China’s Tiananmen crackdown had less to do with 
 53 
human rights issues and was more focused on weakening China’s rapid economic 
growth (Snow, 1995, cited in Taylor, 1998). The third reason was an economic 
calculation. As the Cold War was nearly ended, Africa’s status in the international 
community was becoming increasingly uncertain. African leaders were forced to 
reconsider their relations with traditional development partners. African leaders also 
did not want to jeopardize the aid and the assistance they have been receiving from 
China although it has declined during the early 1980s. African leaders were afraid that 
if they condemned Chinese government's violent action, China would stop providing 
aid for them. These were the reasons why the African governments were hesitant to 
join the Western nations condemnation of the Chinese government's military 
crackdown at the Tiananmen Square (Konings, 2007; Naidu, 2008). 
 
Post-Cold War Sino-African Relations  
During the Cold War, Africa was a battleground of superpower competition; 
both the United States and the Soviet Union used economic assistance and military 
aid to safeguard African countries' loyalty. China's influence in Africa during this 
period was limited. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early the 1990s, 
Africa lost its geopolitical importance and was marginalized in the diplomatic 
strategies of various superpowers. The West's engagement in African countries had 
declined (Taylor, 1998; Renou, 2012). The Chinese government took this opportunity 
to strengthen its political and economic connections with Africa and renew its interest 
in Africa at end of the 1980s. It launched an intensive campaign to expand its 
interactions with the developing countries to counter and challenge the U.S. 
hegemony and enhance its international position (Payne & Veney, 1998). Between 
1989 and 1992, Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen visited fourteen African 
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countries and sixteen African top leaders of the state or government have been invited 
to visit China. The political relations between China and African countries deepened. 
China and Africa continued to support each other in international affairs and worked 
on establishing a fair and reasonable new international order (Taylor, 2004). 
During the 1980s, China's economic relationship with African countries was 
relatively slow. However, after the Tiananmen crackdown China promised to increase 
its aid and development assistance as a reward for African countries’ support. Before 
the Tiananmen crackdown, only US$60.4 million was distributed by China to 
approximately 13 African nations in 1988, but by 1990s the amount of aid increased 
to US$374 million a year to 43 recipient African countries (T. Lin, 1996, cited in 
Taylor, 2004). 
Like many countries, China’s foreign policy objectives are designed to 
achieve its political and economic agenda. Followed by the introduction of economic 
reforms in 1978, the focus of China’s foreign policy has shifted from Cold War 
ideology to a pursuit of economic self-interest. Four factors motivated China’s 
engagement in Africa during this post-Cold War era. First, China needed raw 
materials and natural resources to fuel its economy. The search for reliable suppliers 
of raw materials and energy resources led China to Africa, a continent rich in the 
natural resources. Secondly, Africa’s huge population represented a huge potential 
consumer market for China’s manufactured goods. Thirdly, many African countries’ 
economic reform accelerated China’s economic collaboration with Africa. Finally, 
resource-rich African states were targeted by China for profitable investments 
(Konings, 2007). In short, the demands for energy resources, consumer markets, and 
investment opportunities were the major factors contributing the rapid expansion of 
 55 
Sino-African relations over the past decades (Alden, Large & Soares de Oliveria, 
2008).  
There were also economic and political factors that motivated the African 
countries to strengthen their ties with China. First, African governments and business 
elites sought new opportunities in China to increase their trade and investment 
opportunities. Collaborating with China in various fields to help stimulate African 
countries’ socio-economic development. Second, African countries were faced with a 
steady decline of foreign assistance after the end of the Cold War. Thus, China’s “no 
strings attached” aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) were warmly welcomed by 
African states. Third, China’s large population, the growth in Chinese per capita 
incomes, and increased spending power, African governments forecasted that Chinese 
tourism would grow as time progressed. China’s outbound tourism market is 
perceived as a valuable asset to many African economies. The Chinese government 
often used its policy to endorse “official approval travel destinations” to the Chinese 
public as a means of rewarding African governments’ friendship. Finally, with 
traditional Western donors interfering in domestic affairs, particularly in the countries 
that violated principles of good governance, Africa leaders were looking for an 
alternative source of foreign support. Unlike Western donors’ “demands for minimum 
standards of governance,” China’s “no strings attached” and “non-interference” 
principles were appealing to African governments (Alden, 2005). These political and 
economic efforts enabled China and African countries to broaden their relations since 
the 1990s (Taylor, 1998). 
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Sino-African Relations in the 21st Century 
At the beginning of the new century, domestic and international circumstances 
brought Sino-African relations to a new stage. For China, after more than two decades 
of rapid economic growth, it needed an international policy to reinforce its status as a 
peaceful rising power. As the largest developing country, China sought to collaborate 
with the continent with most developing countries for mutual development in a world 
controlled by developed countries. As for African countries, since the beginning of 
the 21st century, their national agenda was to achieve stability and promote socio-
economic development. To achieve such objectives, African governments knew that 
they needed to control their fate and to make their own choices; China has become the 
primary choice for them for collaboration. On the international front, as African 
countries sustained their economic growth in the mid-1990s, Western powers started 
to sense their strategic importance. Since the turn of the 21st century, those Western 
power players were constantly modifying their policies toward Africa. As a result, 
African countries regained their strategic importance and moved from the periphery to 
the center of the world stage, becoming the focus of intense strategic debate. Under 
these new circumstances, the Chinese government acknowledged that it needed a new 
operating mechanism to expand Sino-African relations in the new century (Qiang, 
2010). 
It was against this background that the China-Africa Cooperation Forum 
(FOCAC) was established in 2000. The FOCAC is a platform that provides the 
integrated framework for Chinese and African governments to promote a new type of 
strategic partnership. It is based on the principles of political equality, mutual trust, 
economic positive-sum game cooperation, and cultural exchange. Since its 
establishment in 2000, FOCAC has become the official channel for China and African 
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states to discuss and collaborate in economic, political, technical and cultural areas. 
With the mechanism operated by FOCAC, China’s engagement with African 
countries has entered a new period of development and produced better outcomes 
(Hanauer & Morris, 2014; Qiang, 2010). 
In addition to the Chinese government's economic interest, the FOCAC also 
aimed to weaken the US hegemony in the African countries. It operated as an 
instrument for China to disseminate its non-interference approach to counter Western 
moral absolutism. Moreover, the conditionality of Western aid was perceived by 
African countries as an effort to recolonize Africa. Aid was employed by Western 
donors as a political instrument to improve recipient the countries’ governance 
(Condon, 2012; Taylor, 2009).  
The first FOCAC conference was held in Beijing in October 2000. Over 80 
ministers from more than 40 African countries attended the meeting. The goal of the 
first summit was to create and promote a fair international political and economic 
order (a response to the failure of globalization), to promote equal international 
relations, and to strengthen economic, education, and cultural cooperation between 
China and African countries (Cisse, 2012; Peiliang, 2005; Shelton & Paruk, 2008). 
During the conference, the issue of debt relief was proposed by South Africa 
representative, but rejected by China. Three years later, China announced that it 
would provide a total of $1.27 billion USD in debt relief and aid packages to African 
countries (Alden, 2005a). 
The second FOCAC meeting took place in December 2003 in Addis Abba, 
Ethiopia with the goal to enhance political and socio-economic cooperation between 
China and African nations (Shelton & Paruk, 2008; Cisse, 2012). During the meeting, 
China’s Prime Minister Wen Jiabao promised to open China’s market and granted 
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preferential market access for African products to export to China. The Chinese 
government also promised to finance infrastructure projects to help African countries 
boost their economic development (Cisse, 2012). The importance of cultural 
exchanges was emphasized at the second FOCAC meeting (Shelton & Paruk, 2008). 
The year of 2006 was an important year in the Sino-African relations. It was 
the 50th anniversary of formal Sino-African relations; the Chinese government 
declared 2006 as the “Year of Africa”. In 2006, China released an important white 
paper, China's African Policy that covered a comprehensive plan to broaden Sino-
African relations and reemphasized African countries’ strategic importance to China. 
The focuses of China’s African Policy paper were on political equality and mutual 
trust, positive-sum game economic cooperation, cultural exchange, and cooperation in 
international affairs. The aim of China’s African policy paper is to foster a different 
kind of strategic partnership with African countries for the purpose of enhancing the 
interests of both parties. Those principals have become the new foundation of China’s 
policy towards Africa (A. Li, 2007a).  
The third FOCAC summit in Beijing was convened in November 2006. The 
Beijing summit in 2006 enhanced Sino-African collaboration even further, as China 
and African countries decided to accelerate cooperation, especially in joint resources 
exploration and exploitation. At this summit, China committed to provide African 
countries a multi-billion-dollar aid package. President Hu also pledged to enhance 
Sino-Africa cooperation in the area of human resources to help African countries to 
train professionals in different fields. China also agreed to open more markets to 
Africa's commodities, expand tourism cooperation with African countries, and to 
increase people-to-people exchange with Africa (Shelton & Paruk, 2008). This 
summit served as an example of how the Chinese government uses public diplomacy 
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to secure a long-term relationship with the African countries. The African 
governments got more than they requested, and in return China secures the natural 
resources and raw materials it needs from Africa. China refers it as a “win-win” 
relationship (Naidu, 2007).  
Since the formation of the FOCAC in 2000, China has honored its promises to 
assist African countries’ development through its aid, reduced or removed African 
countries' debts, expanded its trade and increased investment in Africa. However, the 
global financial crisis in 2007 slowed down China’s investment in Africa because 
China faced great financial pressure at home. It needed to devote most of its financial 
resources in its domestic economy instead of to Africa or other countries. This global 
financial crisis put huge pressure on the Chinese government to fulfill its old promises 
and to start new ones (Brown & Chun, 2009).  
The fourth FOCAC conference took place at the peak of the global recession 
in November 2009. At the opening ceremony, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao 
announced eight new plans to reinforce Sino-African cooperation. The plans 
comprised of financial assistance in African countries to increase their financing 
capacity, offering $10 billion USD concessional loans to help African countries 
develop their imports, build schools and hospitals, and train African professionals 
(Lucien, 2011). 
The 5th FOCAC conference took place in Beijing in 2012. In his keynote 
speech, President Hu pledges, “In the next three years, the Chinese government will 
take measures in the following five priority areas to support the cause of peace and 
development in Africa and boost a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership” 
(Hu, 2012). Environmental challenges were discussed in this conference. China and 
African countries are increasingly aware of the tensions between industrial 
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development and environmental protection. Both parties agreed to collaborate to build 
a greener and sustainable environment. The two objectives of this sustainable 
development plan are to help China achieve its agenda as a leader in green technology 
and to improve its national image in Africa (Chun, 2013; A. Li et al., 2012). 
Before the 6th FOCAC conference held in 2015, many Chinese observers were 
worried about the impact that China’s economic slowdown would have on Africa’s 
economy because of China’s financial commitments to Africa. As Africa’s largest 
trading partner and major investor, a slowing Chinese economy means China’s 
demands for African natural resources might decline. If Chinese demand declines, 
then Chinese investments in African states’ infrastructure projects might decline as 
well. Consequently, it will affect African countries’ economic development (Rotberg, 
2015).  
China has constantly doubled its financing commitment to African countries 
from $5 billion in 2006 to $10 billion in 2009 and $20 billion in 2012. During the 6th 
FOCAC meeting in 2015, China tripled its financial commitment and promised a $60 
billion USD loan to African countries for infrastructure projects and human resource 
development. The $60 billion aid package is an indication of China’s strong support 
of African countries’ quest for independent development (Guest, 2015). In addition to 
China’s financing assistance, the Chinese government also proposed a ten-point plan 
for Africa’s development that included almost every aspect of Sino-African economic 
relations. China's ten-point plan reflects its new policy of “Industrial capacity 
cooperation” and “strategic complementarity.” The Chinese government’s new 
strategy intentionally downplayed its demands for Africa's natural resources. Rather, 
China focused on the overreaching ten-point plan for Sino-Africa cooperation, 
although statistics show that most of the African exports to China remain were natural 
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resources during the first three-quarters of 2015. The reason that China intentionally 
deemphasized the importance of Africa’s natural resources during the 6th FOCAC 
summit was to the negative national image associated with the role played by African 
natural resources in China’s recent engagement with Africa (Y. Sun, 2015).  
Through the FOCAC mechanism, China-African economic and trade relations 
have evolved from a singular pattern of aid between the governments to a diversified 
cooperation method based on the principle of mutual benefit. Over the past 15 years, 
trade between China and Africa has increased from $10.5 billion in 2000 to over $220 
billion in 2014. China has surpassed the U.S. as Africa’s largest trading partner since 
2009 (Y. Sun, 2015). China’s development assistance also played an important role in 
enhancing China’s cooperation with African countries (W. He, 2013).  
China’s African policy is also motivated by political reasons such as isolating 
Taiwan from the international community and fostering a favorable political 
environment for its strategic agenda. In order to achieve the political agendas, China 
proposed an international political and economic order at the first FOCAC meeting in 
2000. In the second FOCAC meeting, Premier Wen claimed that it is essential for 
developing countries to work together to challenge Western hegemony and to protect 
their own interests in international matters. The regular FOCAC meetings and 
frequent visits from high-level officials articulated a loyal political partnership 
between China and African countries (W. He, 2013). 
Following the principle of non-interference, the Chinese government brings 
aid, trade, and investment opportunities to Africa without interfering the internal 
affairs of African states. Many African states embraced this policy and viewed it as an 
alternative to the West. The policy has been employed selectively to serve Chinese 
interests at different times, starting in its earliest days of implementation in the 1960s 
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and 1970s when China supported Africa’s revolutionary movements. Although China 
insists on non-interference, there is one precondition, the “One China” principle to 
marginalize Taiwan from the international community (Hanauer & Morris, 2014). As 
Robert I. Rotberg, President emeritus of the World Peace Foundation, notes, “the 
reason why China continuously emphasizes its non-interference principle is due to its 
own worries over sovereignty issues relating Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan” (2008).   
 
Cultural Cooperation 
As Sino-African relations deepened, the CCP leadership acknowledged certain 
aspects of its presence in Africa have produced negative perceptions of China among 
Africans and that this situation needs to be changed. Instead of exercising hard power, 
China uses culture is an instrument to enhance its national influence. As former 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao addressed in an article published by the People’s Daily, 
China needs to expand its cultural collaboration with other nations because “cultural 
exchanges are a bridge connecting the hearts and minds of people of all countries and 
an important way to project a country’s image” (People’s Daily, 2007). General 
Secretary Hu Jintao followed Wen's viewpoint and suggested, "culture has become a 
more and more important source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of 
growing significance in the competition in overall national strength" (Xinhua, 2007). 
Premier Wen acknowledges that in order to sustain its growth; China not only needs 
to be "economically strong but more importantly, be cultural strong" (Xinhuanet, 
2010). Based on these viewpoints, the foundation for China’s international influence 
cannot solely depend on economic ability; it also will need a strong cultural force to 
enhance it. Against this background, a variety of cultural exchange and educational 
programs have been carried out to boost China’s international influence (J. Li, 2012).  
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China’s rapidly expanding engagement in Africa has triggered a range of 
reactions in the West and Africa. In order to show the world that China’s presence in 
Africa is for mutual benefit, and not to extract natural resources for China’s own 
economic interests, the Chinese government has invested a considerable amount of 
time and money to foster a positive and favorable relationship with African countries 
through the different kinds of cultural engagement. One of the important strategic 
tools the Chinese government employs to achieve its objective is culture (Wei, 2012).  
Since the first FOCAC meeting initiated in 2000, China has made great efforts 
to broaden its cultural cooperation with African states. For example, culture was an 
important feature of the Addis Ababa FOCAC meeting in 2003(Shelton & Paruk, 
2008). At the Beijing FOCAC summit in 2006, China promised to establish a “new 
type of Sino-African Strategic partnership” on the basis of “political equality, mutual 
trust, economic cooperation, win-win, and cultural exchanges” (People Daily, 2006). 
Since 2006, China has been utilizing its powerful cultural resources in Africa to win 
hearts and minds of African people. 
Education exchange is one important element of China's cultural cooperation 
with African countries. Through short-term training programs offered by the Chinese 
government, Africans have the opportunity to obtain an understanding of Chinese 
culture and its modernization experiences. China has offered scholarships for African 
university students to study in Chinese universities in the areas such as education, 
science, technology, and economics to benefit Sino-African relations. By providing 
training programs and scholarships to African students, China can increase its 
influence and improves its image in Africa (King, 2013). 
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The Confucius Institutes in Africa 
Another crucial component of Sino-African cultural cooperation is the 
establishment of the Confucius Institutes (CIs) in Africa. Like many Western 
countries that establish cultural institutes in foreign states to promote their own 
culture, the Confucius Institute is a non-profit educational and cultural institution 
governed by the Chinese Office of Language Council International and operated by 
Hanban to promote Chinese language and culture to foreign audiences (Hartig, 2012). 
In addition to exhibit the richness of Chinese culture around the world, CIs also 
function as an instrument to present a “correct” understanding of China to a 
“mainstream public that mostly does not have any special China-knowledge” (Hartig, 
2012:63) and to develop “positive opinions of China within a global setting” (Siow, 
2011:1).  
 In the past decades, China has been represented by Western powers and 
media as “threat” because of its authoritarian political system, poor human rights 
record, and the handling of Tibet. The western media’s narrative of the "Chinese 
threat" not only damages China's international image but also forces China to "face a 
tougher complex international environment and withstand more external pressure” 
(People’s Daily, 2012). Facing such biased and negative representations, the leaders 
of CCP realized that it is important for China to present the real China to the 
international community to counter Western media's misrepresentation (Zhou & Luk, 
2016). This is one of the reasons that the Chinese government was motivated to invest 
a huge amount of resources to establish Confucius Institutes around the world. The 
CCP leaders acknowledge, culture plays an important role in national power and “the 
expression of Chinese culture through language will have a strong impact on 
individual language learners and the host nation" (Wheeler, 2014:52). By engaging in 
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Chinese culture, the Chinese government hopes CI students will foster affection 
toward Chinese culture and people, and ease their concerns about China’s rise 
(Schmidt, 2013). In addition to sharing Chinese culture with foreigners, another 
important CI other objective is to cultivate a favorable image of China to counter 
Western negative depiction of China’s rise (Hubbert, 2014; Hartig, 2014). 
The establishment of CIs is affiliated with China’s foreign policy, with the 
objective to influence foreign public opinion (Hoare-Vance, 2010). Thus, the location 
of CIs often reflects China’s political and economic interests in the country. By the 
end of 2011, China founded CIs in countries that it was major trading partners with, 
such as the US and the UK. When China's economic engagement increased in Africa, 
its cultural cooperation expanded as well. After the Beijing FOCAC Summit in 2006, 
the number of CIs increased dramatically from one to ten within six months in 
African countries (Lien, Chang, & Selmier, 2012). During the fifth FOCAC meeting 
in Beijing, both Chinese and African governments promised they “will continue to 
promote the establishment and development of the Confucius Institute and Confucius 
Classrooms in Africa” (FOCAC Beijing Action Plan, 2012).  
As part of FOCAC commitment, the first African Confucius Institute was 
established in 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya affiliated with the University of Nairobi 
(Procopio, 2015). By the end of 2016, China set up forty-eight Confucius Institutes 
and Classrooms in thirty-three African countries with four Confucius Institutes and 
one Confucius Classroom located in Kenya. Kenya has the second highest number of 
CIs in Africa, behind South Africa with three Confucius Classroom and five institutes 
(Hanban, 2016). As Sino-African relation grows, the number of CIs will continue to 
increase in Africa. 
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The objective of CIs is to promote cultural exchange between China and the 
host country. In the case of Africa, CIs are functioning as platforms for the Chinese 
government to create a favorable environment in Africa that enables China to achieve 
its economic and political agenda (Hubbert, 2014). What motivated China to expand 
its cultural influence in Africa its need to strengthen its economic engagement with 
African countries so that it can pursue its economic interests. In this case, economic 
and cultural powers are united as one important component of China's foreign policy 
strategy (Wei, 2012; Wheeler, 2014). 
From African government’s hope that educational and cultural cooperation 
will strengthen their economic ties with China. African governments also know that 
learning Mandarin is a way to make African students become more competitive in the 
job market because China is a major player in the global economy (Wheeler, 2014). 
Like professor Wu Qianlong, deputy director of the Confucius Institute at the 
University of Cape Town, noted, "For those who are really committed to learning 
Chinese, the reward is obvious: this can give them an edge when entering the world of 
an economic powerhouse and exposing them to a mixture of West and East cultures" 
(Makoni, 2010).  
Over the past years, the Confucius Institutes have received criticism from their 
host countries, especially in the West. Most of the criticism comes from the Confucius 
Institute’s political connection with the CCP. Critics argue that the Chinese 
government uses CIs as the propaganda instruments to propagate its policy and 
expand its global influence. They also contend that the CI’s affiliation with foreign 
universities could restrain academic freedom by excluding discussion of sensitive 
topics such as Tibet and Falun Gong. To those critics, China is using Confucius 
Institutes to present a non-threatening China through education on Chinese culture 
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and language; the aim of CIs is to support China's peaceful rise narrative (Brady, 
2008; Chey, 2008; Edney, 2012; Gill and Huang, 2006; Procopio, 2015; Starr, 2009; 
Youngman, 2014).  
While there are concerns over the Chinese government’s political influence on 
the Confucius Institutes, a group of scholars who are involved in CIs operation found 
little evidence of the Chinese government’s political interference on the Confucius 
Institutes academic freedom (Hartig, 2012b; King, 2014; Paradise, 2009; Starr, 2009; 
R. Yang, 2010). They claim that the CIs are the component of China’s strategy to 
influence international public opinion and win hearts and minds of foreigners; their 
objectives are similar to other Western countries that set up cultural institutes in 
foreign countries to promote their own culture around the world. The Confucius 
Institutes help to facilitate cultural cooperation and enhance academic exchange 
between China and the host country (Hughes, 2014). Despite their cultural and 
educational objectives, the Confucius Institutes also involve commercial concerns, 
which is to boost business activities for both countries (Y. Zhou & Luk, 2016).  
Unlike Western critics who are concerned about the Chinese government's 
political influences on the Confucius Institutes, African commentators are concerned 
about practical issues such as financial sustainability because China does not 
guarantee long-term funding (R. Yang, 2010). Initially, the Chinese government or 
Hanban will provide the host university between $100,000 and $200,000 to set up a 
Confucius Institute and promised the same amount for next few years. Although the 
Chinese government covers most of the cost of CIs operations, the host universities in 
Africa worry about the issue of financial stability because of the uncertainty of 
Chinese financial commitment. The issue of financial sustainability apparently 
outweighs concern of losing academic freedom in Africa (Hartig, 2015). 
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Another concern of the African Confucius Institutes operation, is the issue of 
the quality of education provided. Teacher shortages and insufficient teaching 
materials are two critical challenges the African Confucius Institutes are facing. Since 
the establishment of CIs in African countries, recruiting qualified teachers to teach 
Mandarin in Africa became a huge challenge for Hanban. Another practical concern is 
the teaching materials prepared by the Chinese government in Beijing do not always 
meet local demands; they do not reflect the needs of African students (Procopio, 
2015).  
In Addition to the practical worries about the financial sustainability and the 
quality of teaching, there is a general ideological concern among the African 
intellectuals. They claim that the establishment of the Confucius Institutes is a form of 
cultural imperialism; the CIs are the tools the Chinese government and are used for its 
international ascendancy. Affiliating with Africa's most prestigious national 
universities enable China to spread Chinese culture into the minds of Africa's future 
leaders in different fields. One possible consequence is that these future national 
leaders “may increasingly look East, seeking to imitate the master” (Sishuwa, 2015). 
 
Media Cooperation 
In the past few years, China's media collaboration with African countries has 
become an important component in Sino-African cooperation. Sino-African media 
relation dates back to the early 1950s when China's state-owned news agency Xinhua 
developed an African network and the Chinese government supported African 
liberation movement radio in the 1960s (Xin, 2009). The aim of China’s media 
engagement in Africa between the 1950s and 1970s was to assist China established 
diplomatic relations with newly independent African countries. When China opened 
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to the outside world in the late 1970s, repairing China’s international image and 
reinforcing its political connections with developing countries became a major 
priority for China’s media engagement in Africa (Y. Wu, 2012).  
Since the first FOCAC meeting in 2000, media cooperation between China 
and African countries progressed alongside the FOCAC platform. Between the launch 
in 2000 and the Beijing Summit in 2006, the focus of the engagement was mainly on 
China's media infrastructure assistance to African countries. For example, Xinhua 
offered satellite equipment for a Uganda television station in 2000 (Y. Wu, 2014). 
China's media engagement in Africa gained a huge momentum during the 2006 
FOCAC Beijing Summit when the Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) identified media 
cooperation as one of China's top priorities in constructing mutual relations. 
Following the Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009), China will “continue to host 
workshops or African correspondents and invite heads of press authorities and media 
groups as well as correspondents from Africa to China to exchange views, cover news 
and explore ways of conducting effective cooperation”. This plan also called for 
Chinese and African “news media to play a positive role in enhancing mutual 
understanding and friendship” (FOCAC, 2006: 12–13). After the FOCAC Beijing 
Summit in 2006, the Chinese government increased funding to its state media’s 
international expansion and provided huge loans to African governments for them to 
develop media and telecommunication projects (Banda, 2009; Gagliardone, 
Repnikova, & Stremlau, 2010; Nelson, 2013).  
In recent history, China has been negatively portrayed in the Western media 
from an unsophisticated and isolated country under the Mao's leadership, "dark 
China" during the Tiananmen Square crackdown, to a threat to international security 
over the past decades. When the Western media claim to be objective and balanced in 
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their coverage of China, the Chinese government blamed them for their biased 
reporting (Ding, 2011; Ke, 2009). The Chinese government officials strongly believe 
that international media’s narratives are biased and ignored the positive aspects of 
Chinese society. As China rises as an important global power, global media’s 
negative portrayal of China has become one of the major concerns of the CCP leaders. 
Such concerns motivated the Chinese government to support its media’s “going out” 
campaign (Hu & Ji, 2012). 
Most observers of China agree that the constant biased and negative Western 
media towards China has motivated the recent Chinese media’s international 
expansion. In order to contest negative representation of itself by Western media, the 
Chinese leaders recognized the need to take control of their own voice (Jacobs, 2012; 
McKenzie, 2012; Rhodes, 2012). The Chinese government used a variety of 
strategies, including self-promotion through hosting mega-events likes the Olympics 
and internationalization of Chinese state media to achieve the objectives 
(Gagliardone, Repnikova, & Stremlau, 2010).  
The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games was employed by the Chinese government 
as a platform to showcase its rapid growth, its rise as an emerging global power and to 
present a positive image to replace the defensive image of the Tiananmen Square 
crackdown. It is China's "coming out party to signify the country's reinvention for 
world recognition" (Price, 2007:6). Unfortunately, the reality turned out to be quite 
different. During the build up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the Chinese government 
was under extreme pressure from Western activists who condemned China for its 
abuse of human rights, especially in its connection to Sudan and the genocide in 
Darfur (Budabin, 2011; Cha, 2008; Economy & Segal, 2008). They used the Olympic 
spotlight to put intense pressure on China to change undemocratic policies. For 
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instance, Mia Farrow, the actress and UNICEF goodwill ambassador, and her son 
Ronan Farrow, a former U.S. government advisor, published an op-ed article in The 
Wall Street Journal condemning China for not doing enough to address the Darfur 
conflict. They claimed that instead of “One World, One Dream”, the slogan of the 
Beijing Olympics, it should be identified as “Genocide Olympics” (Farrow & Farrow, 
2007). Moreover, eight Nobel Peace Prize laureates wrote an open letter to President 
Hu Jintao demanding China to end its trade and aid to Khartoum regime (Leonard, 
Spencer, & Moore, 2008). Under such massive pressure, the Chinese government was 
forced to play a more active role in resolving the Darfur conflict. It helped the UN to 
negotiate with the Sudanese government to agree to the deployment of UN 
peacekeepers to protect civilians in Sudan (Budabin, 2011). Additionally, China 
initiated correspondence with the international news media and hosted press 
conferences to discuss the issues (Holslag, 2008).  
At the same time, the Chinese government's crackdown in Tibet in March 
2008 led to an international boycott of the Beijing Olympics. In March 2008, on the 
eve of the Beijing Olympics, a group of Tibetan monks marched to the Tibetan capital 
of Lhasa demanding more autonomy and the return of the Dalai Lama, their exiled 
spiritual leader. In the following days, peaceful demonstrations turned to violent 
protests. The Chinese government responded with armed policies squads and 
controlled media reporting. The international community immediately condemned the 
Chinese government's actions and demanded that China engage in direct talks with 
the Dalai Lama. When the Olympic torch made its way across the globe, it 
encountered anti-China protests along its path to Beijing. These wide-ranging 
disruptions of Olympic tradition embarrassed the Chinese government and enraged 
Chinese citizens, who believe that the Western media are biased toward Tibet and 
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disrespectful of China (Economy & Segal, 2008; Grass, 2014). 
China’s leaders recognized the that risks were great and understood that if the 
Chinese government could not resolve these issues peacefully and successfully it 
would jeopardize China’s “credibility as a global leader, its potential as a model for 
the developing world, and its position as an emerging center of global business and 
culture are all at risk” (Economy & Segal, 2008:49). Thereby, the Chinese 
government decided to carry out its state media internationalization plan with an 
effort to repair its public relations and re-brand China.  
In 2009, the Chinese government launched a new round of the media "going 
out" campaigns. The aim of the new media “going out” campaign is to counter biased 
narratives by articulating China's own stories overseas. Another aim of this campaign 
is to enhance China's international media conglomerates' abilities to compete with 
their Western counterparts. A huge budget was committed to this effort, and a small 
group of state-run media conglomerates were selected as forerunners to promote a 
much friendlier environment, enabling China to achieve its agendas (Hu & Ji, 2012). 
The media “going out” initiatives ranging from Xinhua news agency renting a huge 
LED billboard on Time Square in New York City to the establishment of CCTV 
Africa in Kenya (Grass, 2014). 
Like the establishment of CIs, the focus of the internationalization of Chinese 
state media is also focused on the developing countries where China maintains a 
strong presence (E. Pan, 2006). Due to its increasing strategic and economic 
importance for China, and the negative Western media coverage of China's presence 
in Africa, the African continent becomes an important region for China's state media 
global expansion (Mawdsley, 2008).  
As mentioned earlier, China’s increasing presence in Africa has attracted 
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many criticisms within African states. The issues, such as China’s dealing with 
corrupt African governments, imbalanced trade relations, the poor quality of Chinese 
consumer goods, the practices of importing Chinese labors to African infrastructure 
projects, and lack of social responsibility are the major concerns of these critics. 
Facing such harsh criticism, the CCP leaders recognize that China needs to use its 
own media to break the Western media’s domination in Africa and to counter biased 
“China in Africa” narratives that depict China as a neo-colonialist whose presence in 
Africa is to exploit its natural resource and raw materials (Grass, 2014; Nelson, 2013; 
Y. Wu, 2012).   
 
Chinese Media in Africa 
Since the FOCAC Beijing Summit in 2006, the campaign to improve China’s 
international communication capability, to articulate a favorable objective, and to 
balance public opinion in Africa, the Chinese state media initiated a steady expansion 
in African media markets. This expansion covered all forms of media from 
newspapers, to radio stations, to satellite television. Over the past few years, China 
has invested around $2 to $ 9 billion in its state media's global expansion 
(Shambaugh, 2013). Among them, Xinhua, China's state-owned news agency 
relocated its regional editorial office for Africa from Paris to Nairobi, Kenya in 2006. 
This move signified the first symbolic phase of China’s “going out” campaign 
(Gagliardone, 2013). In the same year, China Radio International (CRI) began to 
request that its African partners transmit some CRI content and make it more 
appealing to African audiences (Cooper, 2008). From 2006 onwards, China’s four 
major state media players (Xinhua News Agency, CRI, CCTV, and China Daily) 
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aggressively increased their overseas services to counterbalance increasing anti-
Chinese sentiment (Xin, 2009).  
Xinhua News Agency, a leading news agency in China, was first established 
as an official Party mouthpiece in 1931. The establishment of Xinhua was politically 
motivated. According to its former editors, the major responsibility of the Xinhua was 
to oversee the newspaper Reference News (Cankao Xiaoxi) (Feng, 1991). Within the 
newspaper, Xinhua aimed to legitimize its status and to promote political ideologies 
of the CCP. Before the founding of the People’s Republic of China, it was Xinhua’s 
responsibility to set up and manage the Party’s newspapers. During the anti-Japanese 
War (1937-45) and the Civil War (1945-49) Xinhua established a number of local 
offices to disseminate the CCP’s propaganda and report on local situations. Xinhua’s 
early development in the 1930s and 1940s was generally connected with the 
establishment of the Party’s newspaper (Xin, 2006). In 1944, Xinhua inaugurated 
English-language broadcasts to reach foreign audience. 
Xinhua’s development is parallel to China’s political and economic 
development. In the early 1980s, Xinhua began to participate in diversified business 
practices, partially encouraged by the tax-free policy and partially motivated by 
financial needs (Cai, 1999). Xinhua’s economic information service began in the late 
1980s. The newspapers provided Xinhua access to a huge amount of readership and 
brought Xinhua massive advertising revenue. During this period, Xinhua developed 
as a wholesaler and retailer of news, unlike its original roles as a news agency and 
newspaper (Xin, 2006).  
In the 1980s, Xinhua offered free news services to most of the domestic news 
subscribers. It charged only its foreign clients a small fee. Without an economic 
incentive, Xinhua did not have a specific department within the agency to handle 
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newspapers and other media subscribers until 1994 when Xinhua set up news delivery 
center. In the 1980s, Xinhua began to worry about its economic interests and political 
impact. This business practice also prepared Xinhua for transition during the process 
of marketization (Xin, 2009).  
The media industry changed dramatically in the 1990s. While Western 
scholars labeled the decade of the 1990s as a period of cultural globalization, Chinese 
scholars considered it as a period of media reform (Chu, 1994; Lee, 1994; Pan, 2000). 
In this period, China began to develop a market economy with Chinese characteristics 
to boost economic and social development. After Deng’s famous speech in 1992, 
commercialization and marketization became a predictable trend in China’s media 
sector (Zhao, 2000). Against this background, Xinhua redefined its products as 
“commodities” that could be sold for profits (Lu, 2002a).  
Following the principles of Deng’s economic reforms, Xinhua was 
encouraged to extend its global reach and to become a leading world news agency (J. 
Hong, 2011). Two decades after the reform began, Xinhua stated that it had reached 
its initial goal (D. Zheng, 2002). In 2008, Xinhua became one of the largest news 
agencies in the world, with a total of 33 domestic offices and 123 overseas bureaus 
across 190 nations. Xinhua launched its own international English television network, 
“CNC World News”, on 31 December 2009. Xinhua planned to use the establishment 
of China Xinhua News Network Corporation (CNC), to enhance its status in the 
global television news market (J. Hong, 2011).  
CNC is modeled on CNN and BBC as a 24-hour English-language channel 
that aims to bring China's worldview to emerging markets (Xinhuanet, 2010). The 
launch of CNC was a breakthrough in the history of world news agencies because it 
was the first of the news agencies to have its own platform to broadcast its own 
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stories and footage. In the past, both AP and Reuters have offered television news 
stories and footage to their subscribers. However, they don’t have their own 
broadcasting service. In this part of information war, Xinhua surpassed other leading 
global news agencies and became the frontrunner in this contest (J. Hong, 2011). In 
2011, Xinhua relocated its North America regional headquarters to New York's Times 
Square with services provided in eight languages. These initiatives indicate Xinhua's 
intention to become a powerful international media player (Wu, 2012). 
Xinhua has held a presence in Africa since the 1950s. During the 1950s and 
1960s, Xinhua's presence in Africa was "to help the Chinese government from 
diplomatic relations with recently independent African states" (Wu, 2012:11) by 
providing material aid and journalist exchanges for African liberation movement. 
Xinhua was inactive in the following three decades due to social turmoil in China. In 
1986, Xinhua opened its African regional bureau in Nairobi, Kenya. Since then, 
Xinhua has made great progress in its news service to African countries. It 
collaborated with the local state news agencies and signed cooperation agreements 
with African national broadcasting companies on content sharing. To broaden its 
influence, Xinhua continues to offer free newswires, technical assistance, and 
equipment to local news organizations in Africa. Xinhua also launched its China-
African News Service in 2008 with an attempt to increase news coverage on issues of 
mutual interest (Wu, 2012; Xin, 2009). Consequently, Xinhua became a cheaper 
alternative to Western news agencies such as the Associated Press and other major 
news providers of African news media. Currently, African newspapers adopt more 
news from Xinhua than from other western sources. (Grass, 2014; Shambaugh, 2010; 
Xin, 2009).  
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Another important aspect of the media “going-out” campaign is the expansion 
of China Central Television’s (CCTV) news broadcasting channels. In 2012, CCTV 
launched its African broadcasting center, CCTV Africa, in East Africa with its 
headquarters in Kenya's capital Nairobi, a city where other international news media 
are present. CCTV Africa is the first Chinese media outlet to broadcast from a 
production center outside China (Wekesa & Zhang, 2014). It has also been regarded 
as the leader of the Chinese media expansion in Africa (Rönning, 2014). The function 
of CCTV is to foster a positive image of China, to share "China's view" on the global 
events with the world, and to offer "a real China to Africa and presenting a real Africa 
to the world" (Gagliardone, 2013).  
Motivated by both economic and political interests, the Chinese government 
sensed a strong needs to strengthen its media activities abroad and to increase the 
influence and the competitiveness of its media in an international environment (Wu, 
2012). Within this context, CCTV was determined to win hearts and minds of 
millions of viewers and compete with other media players in Africa. Competing with 
other international media outlets such as the BBC, CNN, and Al-Jazeera for global 
influence is part of media “going out” strategy (Sanchez, 2016). Initially, CCTV 
Africa produced a one-hour daily news program that broadcasts in English. Six 
months later, a program was developed including Africa News, Talk Africa, and 
Faces of Africa. These programs covered political, economic, social, and cultural 
issues across the African continent. Indeed, programs such as Faces of Africa, a 
weekly feature program, and Talk Africa, a talk show that frequently invited African 
elites to discuss current issues, initially formulated to contest BBC's Focus Africa and 
Reuter’s African Journal. Hence, building on its substantial capital, CCTV Africa 
turned out to be the only international news media that aired the one-hour daily news 
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program, Africa Live, that was exclusively focused on Africa and covered a wide 
range of issues (Wekesa, 2014).  
Like Xinhua, CCTV also sought partnership with national broadcasting 
stations in Africa. For instance, it signed an agreement with Kenya Broadcasting 
Corporation (KBC) and authorized KBC to air programs from CCTV's channels. 
According to the Kenyan minister for information, transport, and communication, this 
media cooperation allowed Kenya to have more news sources instead of concentrating 
on Western media (J. Wang, 2001). Additionally, CCTV also contributed a set of 
equipment to KBC to receive satellite signals from CCTV (Chau, 2007).  
China Radio International (CRI) was founded in 1941, as the only Chinese 
state-owned radio station allowed to broadcast to overseas audiences. In the initial 
stage, the sole function of CRI was to repeat the CCP leaders' statements 
(Kurlantzick, 2007). CRI's first overseas broadcast was in 1941 and first English 
broadcast was in 1947 (Kenichi, 2011). Since Deng's economic reforms began in the 
late 1970s, CRI became a more profit-driven media outlet, like other state-owned 
media in China. As the Chinese government replaced pure propaganda with a public 
relation strategy, CRI became a vehicle to make Chinese culture more visible globally 
(Cooper, 2008). 
According to Chen et al, establishing partnership and collaborating with 
overseas media organizations are two successful approaches that helped China to 
enhance its international influence (2010). When CRI relocated its African 
headquarters from Paris to Nairobi, it signed a cooperation agreement with the Kenya 
Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) in 2006 to share its production content. At the same 
time, an FM radio station was launched. It provided 19 hours of daily programing in 
English, Mandarin, and Swahili to the Nairobi listeners (Xinhua, 2006). Since its 
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partnership with the KBC, CRI programming gained a large listenership in Kenya in a 
relatively short period as compared to other African countries and was an example of 
a successful local partnership. Relocating its regional headquarter to Nairobi 
demonstrated China's determination to enhance its influence in Africa (Cooper 2008). 
China Daily, an English-language newspaper, was established in Beijing in 
1981 to target foreigners in China. China Daily’s editorial control is less strict than 
most Chinese language newspapers (Heuvel & Dennis, 1993). China Daily launched 
its online edition in December 1995 and became one of the major online Chinese 
newspapers. As part of “going out” media, China Daily has aggressively expanded its 
foreign editions of the newspaper over the past years. It established a US edition in 
February 2009 and European and Asian weekly editions in 2010 (d’Hooghe, 2015). 
African weekly edition was inaugurated in December 2012 in Nairobi. It is available 
on paper and the Internet as well as an application with video content (Rönning, 
2014). The focus of China Daily is on Sino-African relations, to improve 
communication and cooperation between China and African countries (R. Rotberg, 
2013). As Zhu Ling, China Daily's editor-in-chief addressed at the launch of China 
Daily Africa "the relationship between China and the African continent is one of the 
most significant relationships in the world today. It is growing and complex and not 
always understood not just by those in other parts of the world but Africans and 
Chinese, too" (cited in Green, 2012). Thereby, the purpose of China Daily is to “set 
that straight” (Ibid).  
 
The Challenges of Chinese Media in Africa 
Many Western media observers often perceive the growing Chinese media as 
the rise of Chinese “propaganda”. They are also worried that the presence of Chinese 
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media in Africa poses a threat to African journalism by forcing African journalist to 
avoid controversial issues and only report favorable stories about China and China’s 
involvement in Africa. They are concerned about the issue of censorship, whether the 
Chinese government imposes it, or self-censorship practiced among Chinese media 
professionals in Africa. For those critics, censorship has seriously compromised the 
general public’s ability to access critical information (Wekesa, 2014; Y. Wu, 2012). 
The fear is due to China’s poor record of freedom of the press at home, and its history 
of imprisoning journalists and blocking controversial issues (Rhodes, 2012). In other 
words, “With generally low official credibility, China’s state media have a hard time 
winning over a skeptical audience” (X. Zheng, 2010: 49). 
Zhang Yanqiu, director of the Africa Communication Research Centre at the 
Communication University of China, argued “the generalization of Chinese state-run 
media as a propagandist in Africa might be too reductive”. According to Zhang, 
Chinese media is practicing "constructive journalism" in African countries (Y. Zhang, 
2014). Unlike Western media's "watchdog" role, the purpose of constructive 
journalism is to find solutions, "it can be both positive and negative" according to 
Zhang. The ultimate goal of constructive journalism is to offer "a new kind of balance 
and shine a new kind of light on the continent" (ibid). By practicing constructive 
journalism, Chinese media operations in Africa often ask to offer a solution, not just 
report the stories. The notion of constructive journalism is that providing solutions is 
far more important than just objectively reporting the stories, because if reporting the 
truth of conditions only getting worse, then foreigners will be afraid to travel to 
Africa. Moreover, such coverage is only hurting African countries even more (Ibid). 
Lacking credibility is another challenge Chinese state-owned media face when 
they entered international media markets. Pressures have ascended in African 
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countries where the Chinese government has heavy investments in local media 
infrastructure. Since their inception, Chinese state-owned media organizations are 
constantly accused of editorial bias, no matter how hard the Chinese officials and the 
executives of major Chinese-African media outlets defend the legitimacy of their 
organizations (Cusack, 2015). China recognizes that there is a credibility gap that 
exists in its overseas media initiatives despite its efforts to improve its image. To 
narrow credibility gap, Chinese media needs to develop credible information and 
build media organizations that are “strong, influential and credible” (Xi, 2014 cited in 
Cusack, 2015). Many believe that transparency would improve Chinese state-owned 
media’s credibility globally (Y. Wu, 2012).  
 
Chinese Telecommunication Sector in Africa 
Like its state-run media international expansion, Chinese telecommunication 
firms also expanded their operations in Africa and became key players in Africa's 
telecommunication markets since 2006 (Beebe et al., 2006; Gagliardone, 2013). 
Similar to Chinese state-owned media, the objectives of Chinese telecommunications 
companies' engagement in African states are to enhance China's international 
standing, to counter Western hegemony, and to expand business operations overseas 
(Dumbaugh, 2008).  
In Africa, the telecommunication sector was owned and controlled by the 
States. The majority of African States started to reform their communication sectors, 
through the process of deregulation and convergence in the late 1980s. Under pressure 
from the World Bank and other international organizations, these developments led to 
the privatization of state-owned telecom sectors in Africa and have a significant 
impact on African telecommunication growth (Gilward, 2005; McCormick, 2003; 
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Wallsten, 2001). The growing numbers of telecommunication players in the industry, 
new services and products all have positive effects on the economic growth (Chavula, 
2013).  
Over the past years, telecommunication sectors have become increasingly 
intertwined with the operations of the government departments and other 
organizations (Adam, 1996). This has led to a growing belief within African 
governments "that productivity of the entire economy in a country depends upon the 
efficiency of the telecommunications system" (Chavula, 2013:6). As the 
telecommunications cross-border information flow accelerates and enables easy 
access to knowledge and resources, it becomes a key element of African state’s social, 
economic, and technological development (Cissé, 2012; McCormick, 2003).  
The willingness of African governments to modernize their 
telecommunication sectors has created a favorable environment for international 
investors to invest in Africa’s telecommunication industry. Over the past decade, 
African telecommunication markets have attracted an increasing number of foreign 
investors (Berg & Hamilton, 2002). Among them are two leading Chinese 
telecommunication firms, Huawei Technologies, a private hi-technology company, 
and Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation (ZTE), a State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). Huawei, a leading telecommunication equipment manufacturer in 
China, has achieved great success in internationalization in the past decade. (A. 
Wong, 2015).  
Over the past years, Chinese telecommunications companies have gained 
overwhelming popularity in Africa through low price strategy, responsive customer 
service, and the support from the Chinese government. In order to succeed in African 
telecommunications markets, Chinese telecommunication companies employ a lower-
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pricing strategy to compete with other competitors in Africa. For instance, Huawei's 
price is 5-15 percent lower than its Western rivals. When ZTE later entered, it cut the 
price 30-40 percent lower (A. Wong, 2015). According to Caixin Century Weekly, 
"price remains Chinese companies' biggest competitive advantage" (Zhao & Zhang, 
2012). Although Huawei's price is cheaper, it still manages to generate more profit 
margins than in China. However, the low-pricing strategy has negative effects on 
company's reputation; Chinese products are generally perceived as being of poorer 
quality (Chang et al, 2009). 
Another important business strategy of Chinese telecommunication firms is 
their outstanding customer service; they concentrated on customers’ needs. Both 
Huawei and ZTE are taking their customer service seriously. Huawei’s customer 
service is available “24 hours a day, seven days a week” (Chang et al, 2009). This 
highly responsive customer service earned Huawei a reputation for reliability that 
helps its operations in Africa. This customer-oriented strategy is one of the major 
advantages of both Huawei and ZTE’s success in Africa (Cissé, 2012).  
The Chinese government has played an important role in its 
telecommunications companies' expansion in Africa (Berg & Hamilton, 2001). The 
primary source of government support is through credits that are offered by the 
Export-Import Bank (China Exim) and the China Development Bank (CDB). The 
loans are designed to provide financial assistance to Chinese exporters to obtain 
foreign business deals and to assist foreign companies to import goods and services 
from China (Brautigam, 2011:206). The credit provided by China's national banks are 
loans, not subsidies. The loans from either CDB or China Exim to African states can 
only use to purchase equipment from Chinese companies (Zhao & Zhang, 2012). 
These loans led to guarantee business deals for Chinese telecommunication 
 84 
companies. Since 2004, CDB and China Exim and other Chinese national banks have 
continued to offer huge credit to Huawei, ZTE, and other Chinese 
telecommunications companies. Chinese national banks' strong financial support has 
facilitated Chinese telecommunications companies to speedily extend to most of the 
African states (Marshall, 2011).  
In addition to its strong financial support, the Chinese government also offers 
diplomatic assistance to its telecoms companies. When the top Chinese officials 
visited African states, Huawei and ZTE executives often accompanied them. Such 
diplomatic meetings bring opportunities for both Huawei and ZTE executives to build 
a close relationship with African governments and provided an advantage for both 
Huawei and ZTE in winning the contracts in African states (Cissé, 2012; F. Cooke, 
2011).  
The presence of Chinese telecom companies in Africa benefits African 
consumers, businesses, and governments. For ordinary African consumers, the 
affordable consumer goods and services are the most important benefits of Chinese 
telecommunication’s presence on the continent. For business users, Huawei and ZTE 
offer training courses to train local staff and local network providers. The other 
positive contribution of Chinese telecommunication firms is their partnership with 
local telecommunications operators, such cooperation helped to improve 
telecommunications technologies in African states. 
The lack of telecommunication infrastructure has always been a hurdle for 
African states' socioeconomic development. While Africa’s Western allies hesitated 
to support its telecommunication development, China offered aid and loans to African 
countries with no-strings-attached. China's investment in the African 
telecommunication sector has an important impact on the rapid growth of the African 
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telecommunication market. To counter China's growing presence in Africa; many 
Western countries increased their investments in Africa's ICT infrastructure. The most 
important contribution of Chinese telecoms companies’ engagement in Africa has 
narrowed the digital gap between haves and have-nots (Cissé, 2012).  
Like other Chinese engagement in Africa, Huawei and ZTE's presence 
provoked criticism from both the international community and Africa. Critics claim 
China's engagement in African telecommunications markets pose a cybersecurity 
threat, fearing that Chinese telecommunications companies might engage in 
espionage. Michael Chertoff, the former US Secretary of Homeland Security, told 
Foreign Policy that " There are a lot of concerns about Huawei acting to advance the 
interest of the Chinese government in a strategic sense, which includes not only 
traditional espionage but as a vehicle for economic espionage" (Reed, 2013). By 
building telecommunication infrastructure for African states, Huawei has a great 
opportunity to spy on African information system via technological "backdoor". Thus, 
there is a possibility that each time African customers upgrading their service, there 
are installing spyware on their devices. Critics also fear that the Chinese government 
is using African information networks to spy other nations (Ibid).  
China’s officials and Chinese telecommunication companies have denied the 
spying charges; they claimed the criticisms over spying are baseless allegations. An 
18-month investigation commissioned by the White House found no evidence of 
Huawei involves in espionage (Kauri, 2012). Although there is no evidence of 
Chinese telecommunication company surveillance other nation, evidence shows that 
many African governments like to use Chinese-made telecommunications equipment 
to control communication system for political reasons. For example, China helped the 
Zambian government install Internet surveillance and censorship equipment to 
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monitor its citizens' online behaviors (Reed, 2013). 
Overall, these cultural interactions have fostered cross-cultural understanding, 
as both Chinese and Africans are receiving more Sino-African stories from Chinese 
media. These initiatives enabled the Chinese government to promote its own agenda 
in Africa (Gagliardone et al., 2010; York, 2013). The factors that motivated both 
Chinese media and telecommunications sectors' international expansion, its mode of 
engagement, and the impact on the continent has been briefly discussed in the 
previous sections. The following chapter will detail China’s current cultural and 
media expansion in Kenya.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CHINA’s GROWING CULTURAL INFLUENCE IN KENYA 
 
 
Over the past decade, China has increased its engagement in African countries 
to pursue its political and economic interests. As a result, Kenya has become an 
important hub for China’s operations in East and Central African countries (Patroba, 
2012). For China, the importance of Kenya is not its natural resources; instead, it is 
the geostrategic importance of the country. Kenyan ports, such as Kilindini Harbor, 
have become an important trading and resources transition hub for the Chinese 
government and Chinese companies’ operations in Africa. Chinese companies depend 
on these ports to transfer manufactured goods to East and Central African markets. 
Kenya’s political stability is another important factor behind the Chinese 
government's decision to pour huge resources into Kenya. In comparison to other 
African states, Kenya’s political stability helps China and its companies to safely 
import and export goods and natural resources from Africa (Bergeron-Oliver, 2012; 
Onjala, 2008). 
Over five decades of China’s engagement in Kenya, the relationship between 
China and Kenya has had its ups and downs. Under the leadership of President Jomo 
Kenyatta, Kenya was inclined more towards the West, while his Vice President 
Odinga was in favor of building bilateral relations with the East. Both President Mwai 
Kibaki and his successor Uhuru Kenyatta, especially President Uhuru Kenyatta, 
wanted to maintain the strong diplomatic relations with China and to further 
strengthen and expand the friendly cooperation between the two nations. Both 
Presidents Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta looked for partners in developing countries 
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that could strengthen Kenya’s economic and political position in the international 
community. Political and economic interests pursued by the two countries led to 
cooperation. In other words, the cooperation was largely based on the common 
political and economic interests. 
China’s economic and trade relations with Kenya dated back to the Ming 
Dynasty when Chinese explorer and fleet admiral Zheng He commanded seven 
expeditions to visit many places in Eastern Africa, including Mombasa in Kenya. 
Even though the economic systems in two countries were different, China practices 
communism and Kenya embraces a capitalist system, Sino-Kenya economic relations 
have remained friendly. Bilateral economic and trade relations have been developing 
smoothly. Over the past decades, numerous collaborative agreements in the areas of 
technology, energy, education, media, and tourism were signed to boost cooperation 
between the two countries. The Chinese government has been aggressively 
implementing these signed collaborative agreements by encouraging Chinese 
companies, both private and state-owned, to expand their investments and cooperation 
with the Kenyan government and companies (Onjala, 2008).  
China and Kenya also cooperate in the field of politics. For instance, the 
Kenyan government supports China’s “One-China Policy” to diminish Taiwan’s 
diplomatic presence worldwide; in return, the Chinese government supports the 
Kenyan government position on the International Criminal Court (ICC) trials of 
Uhuru Kenyatta and other Kenyan political leaders. In November 2013, “China voted 
in favor of a draft resolution in the United Nations Security Council, calling for 
deferral of Kenyan cases” (Ongiri, 2014). In order to advance its economic and 
political interests in Kenya, the Chinese government also expands the bilateral 
cooperation to the fields of culture and media for the purpose of cultivating mutual 
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understanding and friendship between both nations and people.  
Nairobi, the capital of the Kenya, is the base of many international news 
outlets’ African operations. Because of its relatively relaxed media environment and a 
growing economy; Nairobi became an ideal place for transnational news media bases 
in the region (Bergeron-Oliver, 2012). A strong economy means more money to 
spend on advertising, which is what a media organization needs to maintain their 
operations. The Kenyan media industry has experienced a rapid growth in advertising 
between 2006 and 2010. The Kenya media industry is expected to grow 16.3 percent 
annually from 2013 through 2017 and expand to the size of $3.1 billion by 2017 
(PwC, 2013). 
The global financial crisis of 2007- 2008 provided excellent opportunities for 
the Chinese government to expand its state-owned media into the global media 
market. Western countries’ economy slowed down by the financial crisis. Faced with 
such financial difficulties, Western media was forced to cut their operating cost and 
reduced the size of international operation, and in Africa in particular. While Western 
media’s operations in Africa were limited, the Chinese government took the 
opportunity and aggressively expanded its media operations in Africa (Farah & 
Mosher, 2010; Grass, 2014). 
China believes the national image of the country presented by foreign media, 
especially Western media, is biased and misleading and that it is comprised of an 
intensive effort to demonize China. Chinese leaders understood that national image is 
a result of “a combination of objective facts about a country, image projection by that 
country, and interpretations and even contractions of facts about that country by the 
mass media and other actors in foreign countries” (Tao & Page, 2013: 855). After it 
lost its national image management battle over the Tibet riot in early 2008, the 
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Chinese government realized that on the international battlefield of image projection, 
winners successfully present a national image that is favored among the foreign 
public, while a loser’s image is defined by others. To be a winner, the Chinese 
government determined to improve its national image. One huge step China took was 
to invest US$8.7 billion in 2009-2010 to improve its international communication 
ability, including international expansion of its state-owned media (Shambaugh, 
2013). 
China acknowledges that there is a connection between culture, politic, and 
economy; the growing cultural influence will help China and its companies to pursue 
their political and economic interests in Africa. This chapter examines the evolution 
of China’s presence in Kenya’s media and cultural sectors, and how the internal and 
external economic and political forces in both China and Kenya helped to establish 
the current pattern of China’s media presence and other cultural engagements in 
Kenya. The first section will briefly review the Sino-Kenyan relations and the internal 
and external political and economic factors, both in China and Kenya that influenced 
the relationship between the two countries in each period. The second section 
examines China’s investments in Kenya’s infrastructure projects and focuses on the 
link between these projects and China’s national rebranding agenda. The third section 
focuses on the penetration of Chinese media and other cultural productions in Kenya. 
The fourth and final section explores the development of Confucius Institutes in 
Kenya. 
 
Brief History of Sino-Kenyan Relations  
China and Kenya relationship dated back to the 15th century when Chinese 
admiral Zhang He reached Mombasa and Lamu, the coastal cities of Kenya, during 
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his seven voyages to the western seas. Modern Sino-Kenyan relations began in 1949. 
China’s African policy during this initial stage was influenced by the ideology of anti-
imperialism and anti-colonialism. In order to battle the hegemony of colonial and 
imperialist powers, China established diplomatic relationships with other Asian and 
African colonies to demand independence from oppressive regimes in 1957. China 
supported these liberation movements because it believed that independence struggle 
across Africa were connected to the socialist movements in East Asia, therefore, they 
could joint forces to fight against imperialism (King, 2010; Snow, 1988). 
 
President Jomo Kenyatta Era: 1963-1978  
 Kenya was formally colonized by Great Britain in 1895. After a long struggle 
against the British for independence, Kenya gained independence on December 12, 
1963. Two days after its independence, its diplomatic relations with China, as 
opposed to Taiwan, were established. China became the fourth country to recognize 
Kenya’s independence (Onjala, 2008). In the early years of President Jomo 
Kenyatta’s era, China’s relations with Kenya evolved smoothly and trade was in 
Kenya’s favor. After 1965, the relationships between the two countries were cold with 
allegations and counter allegations of undermining sovereignty (Enock et al, 2015). 
Jomo Kenyatta, president of Kenya African National Union (KANU), led 
Kenya's delegation in the negotiation for independence. When Kenya gained its 
independence in 1963, Kenyatta was elected as prime minister and became the first 
President of the Republic of Kenya in 1964. When the official diplomatic relation was 
established in 1963, the leaders of KANU were uncertain about building close 
relations with China because the Chinese government closes ties with Vice-President 
Oginga Odinga, who had been a friend to China during the struggle for independence. 
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Because of their ideological differences, Odinga did not agree with the Kenyatta 
government and Kenyatta perceived Odinga as a threat to his leadership. Therefore, 
when Odinga proposed for a close relationship with China, Kenyatta was in favor of 
approaching the Western powers (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012).  
The tension between Kenyatta and Odinga led to a cold period in Sino-Kenya 
relation filled with bad blood. The Kenyatta government accused China of funding 
opposing parties and plotting a revolution in Kenya. A Chinese third secretary and a 
journalist affiliated with the Xinhua News Agency were expelled in 1965. China 
denied the accusations and accused the Kenyatta government of defamation (Chege, 
2008; Larkin, 1971; Patroba, 2012). In response to the Kenyatta government’s 
accusations, Chinese people protested outside Kenya's Beijing embassy. In retaliation, 
Kenya recalled its ambassador to China and initiated a counter-demonstration outside 
the Chinese embassy in Nairobi. Both countries expelled the other’s chargé d’affaires 
in 1967 (Chege, 2008; Enock et al, 2015). 
In addition to the above-mentioned bad blood between the two countries, 
Kenyan media criticized China’s Cultural Revolution. They called for the Chinese 
government trained African diplomats in Beijing to carry out similar revolutions in 
their home countries, resulting in negative impacts on Sino-Kenyan relations (Larkin, 
1971). China denied its involvement, but its reputation in Africa suffered as a result of 
the Kenyan government and its people’s suspicion that China supported an opposing 
party to overthrow the existing government. The Cultural Revolution changed the 
focus and behavior of China’s foreign policy; China’s relationship with Kenya was 
put on hold until Kenya’s second president Daniel Moi assumed power (Chege, 
2008).  
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President Daniel Moi Era: 1978-2002  
During China's Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Sino-Kenyan relations went 
through a dark period. Relations between two countries were revived after Daniel 
Arap Moi came to power as the successor of Jomo Kenyatta as the second President 
of the Republic of Kenya in 1978. Under the leadership of President Moi, Sino-
Kenyan relations were good politically, socially, and economically and the 
collaboration between the two countries reached outstanding achievements in many 
fields. During the 1970s, Kenya experienced a period of domestic, political, and 
economic obstacles that resulted in radical structural changes. On the political front, a 
political divide among the principal members of government led to a period of 
political uncertainty. Kenya's economy performed relatively well in the first decade of 
independence (1964-1973). Then came the oil crisis in 1973 and the economic crisis 
of the 1970s. As a result, the country's GDP dropped, the standard of living declined, 
and there were widespread food shortages. Such circumstance had a negative impact 
on Kenya's economy, and its economic decline forced the Kenyan government to 
depend on China's development support to meet its demands (Rono, 2002).    
Around the same time, China’s national priority also began to change. After 
the death of Chairman Mao, his successor Deng Xiaoping and other leaders of the 
CCP initiated economic reforms in 1978, two years after Mao's death. The economic 
reforms opened China up to the world for the purpose of seeking and receiving 
foreign investment, technology, and know-how, as well as expanding domestic 
markets into global ones (Brandt, 2008). In order to achieve its objectives, the CCP 
leaders established an outward policy to improve China’s relations with other 
countries (Onjala, 2008). Within this context, the two countries started to rebuild 
relations when President Moi came to power in 1978. Soon after he was in power, 
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President Moi visited China to sign the first bilateral cooperation agreement between 
the two countries since the 1960s. Although this agreement covered a number of 
fields, the main focus of the new bilateral agreement was culture (Masta, 2009).  
During President Moi ear (1972-2002), great efforts were taken to promote the 
bilateral relations between the two countries. Frequent high-level state visits between 
Kenyan leaders and prominent Chinese leaders and officials resulted in a number of 
economic and technical cooperation initiatives include projects such as Moi 
International Sports Center, the expansion of Eldoret hospital, Gambogi-Serem 
Highway and Nairobi-Thika Highway. Cultural exchange agreements were also 
signed that included the annual scholarships, provided by the Chinese government for 
African students to study in China, and Xinhua News Agency set up a regional office 
in Nairobi in 1985 (King, 2010; Masta, 2009). 
During this period, China and Kenya also singed many economic cooperation 
agreements. By the mid-1990s the bilateral trade volume had increased significantly, 
though it was mostly imports from China. When President Moi left office in 2002, 
relations between the two countries were better than they had ever been. Both 
President Moi's attitude towards China and China's interested of Kenya as an 
important regional hub were the key factors for this success (Chege, 2008).  
 
President Mwai Kibaki Era, 2002-2013 
In December 2002, the ruling party KANU lost the general election to the 
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), a reform coalition. Mwai Kibaki, the candidate 
of NARC, won the election, took over government leadership, and ended Moi 
regime's influence. Sino-Kenyan relations strengthened and deepened after President 
Kibaki took office (Sheen & Eisenman, 2012). After Kibaki came to power, his 
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administration initiated a comprehensive economic and governance reform program 
that resulted in speedy economic recovery and accelerated growth subsequently. 
Those reform programs also led to the longest period of sustained growth since the 
prosperous Kenyatta era (2003-2007). GDP growth increased from 2.9 percent in 
2003 to 7.1 percent in 2007; poverty level also dropped from 56 percent in 1997 to 46 
percent in 2006. Economic growth was the result of the growth of all sectors 
including agriculture, tourism, trade, manufacturing, telecommunications, 
construction, and financial sectors (Chege, 2008). 
President Kibaki embraced the Chinese partnership approach and was willing 
to strengthen Sino-Kenyan relations (Patroba, 2010). Trade and investment are two 
major areas of the relationship. The relations between the two countries started with 
high-level state visits followed by a series of agreements (Onjalla, 2008). In 2005, 
President Kibaki visited Beijing accompanied by a group of Kenyan trade and 
investment delegations looking for business opportunities between the two nations. 
During his visit, President Kibaki met with Chinese President Hu Jintao and other 
Chinese government officials to discuss economic cooperation. During the meetings, 
China promised to increase its assistance to help the Kenyan government’s 
modernization and development projects (Sheen & Eisenman, 2012). China signed 
five agreements with Kenya that included “official development assistance in grants 
(for infrastructure and energy), extended air services between the two countries, 
technical assistance for assessment and classification of standards in industrial 
products, and modernization of equipment and training at the state-owned Kenya 
Broadcasting Corporation” (Chege, 2008:26).  
The following year, the Chinese president Hu Jintao visited Kenya to 
strengthen the relations between the two states. During the trip, the two countries 
 96 
signed a billion-dollar offshore oil exploration deal that granted Chinese National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) a permission to drill in Kenya’s north and south 
coasts. In return, China donated half a billion shillings to Kenya’s malaria prevention 
programs. President Hu also agreed to help Kenya repair and maintain the Moi 
International Sports Complex and repair Nairobi’s road network from Jomo Kenyatta 
International Airport to the UN Complex in Gagarin (Barber & England, 2006). 
Although China had economic cooperation with Kenya before 2006, it was the 
agreements Hu signed with Kibaki during Hu's trip that strengthened China’s status as 
one of Kenya's key economic partners (Enock et al., 2015).   
Since Kenya gained its independence, the Kenyan government held a close 
relationship with the West, especially the US and the European Union. However, after 
President Kibaki settled into power, he introduced a "Look East" policy to reduce its 
dependence on traditional Western markets and donors. Unlike traditional Western 
donors constantly lecturing Kenya on corruption, good governance, and human rights, 
China practices a non-interference policy. It is a policy that is derived from the Five 
Principle of Peaceful Coexistence, and it does not interfere with the recipient 
countries’ domestic affairs. China’s “non-interference” policy was fully embraced by 
the Kibaki government. China’s aid and assistance, including road construction 
projects and cultural exchange programs, to Kenya were increased (Sheen & 
Eisenman, 2012). 
After engaging in intense battles for powerful positions, the incumbent Mwai 
Kibaki was declared the winner of the Presidential election by a narrow margin over 
the opposition candidate Raila Odinga, on December 27, 2007. After the election 
results were declared, Odinga and his supporters refused to accept the results. They 
insisted the elections had been rigged, a claim that had been confirmed by the 
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international election observers (Gettleman, 2007). Foreign election observers also 
claimed both parties manipulated the elections (Kanina, 2008). The election disputes 
led to a huge violent protest, over 1,500 people were killed, and 600,000 Kenyans 
were forced to escape their homes (Branch & Cheeseman, 2008). Major economic 
activities were disrupted by the post-election violence. Before the elections violence, 
Kenya’s economic growth stood at about 7 percent at the end of 2007; it was suddenly 
dropped to under 2 percent in the first quarter of 2008 (Kanyinga & Long, 2012).  
Given the great impact of the election crisis, both domestic and international, 
former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan arrived Kenya one month after the 
election to lead the mediation between the two parties. After weeks of negotiation, 
Kibaki and Odinga signed a power-sharing agreement called the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act 2008 on February 28, 2008. Under this power-sharing agreement, 
an official position of the Prime Minister was created, Odinga as Prime Minister, and 
founded a coalition government. This agreement terminated the state of emergency 
and foreign investors began to recommence their commitment in late 2009 (Romero, 
Kimenyi & Dercon, 2008). 
Under Moi administration, the country's economic growth had slowed down 
from 4.5% between 1978 and 2001 to 0.6 % in December 2002 when Moi handed 
over power to his successor Mwai Kibaki. When President Kibaki come to power, 
economic recovery became the top priority of his national agenda. During President 
Kibaki tenure (2003-2007), Kenya experienced the longest period of economic 
growth in its modern history. It was also a period that attracted many foreign 
investors, such as China, to take advantage of this promising economy. President 
Kibaki also made the significant improvement in other areas, for instance, by the end 
of his first term in office, many infrastructure plans were being executed, poverty 
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levels dropped, and HIV rate declined (Chege, 2008). However, this growth rate 
dropped in 2008 because of the global financial crisis, and post-election unrest and 
deterred foreign investment (Wallis & Manson 2011). 
In 2008, the Kenyan government launched Vision 2030 development plans to 
achieve Kenya’s Millennium Development Goals to “transform Kenya into a newly 
industrialized middle-income country” by 2030. Vision 2030 called for political, 
economic and social reforms so Kenya could reach an annual growth rate of 10% over 
twenty years and become an industrialized nation with a high living standard. 
Attracting foreign investments from other developing countries, such as China, were 
an important part of President Kibaki’s development strategy. The expansion of 
infrastructure in transportation and telecommunications are two important 
components for Kenya to achieve the goal of Vision 2030 (Government of Kenya, 
2008). 
In order to improve its economic productivity, the Kenyan government 
recognizes the need to build and upgrade its infrastructures. Since 2004, the Kenyan 
government began to rebuild its road system, with a focus on the important trade 
routes from the coast to inland. Because of its financial difficulty, Kenya turned to 
international donors and institutions for its road construction and infrastructure 
projects. China became a major donor of such projects (Chege, 2008; Onjala, 2008). 
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, China has contributed 
significantly to assisting Kenya's large infrastructure projects such as upgrading the 
national airport, construction railways, roads, building new seaports, etc. These 
projects were completed quickly and cheaply with minimum bureaucracy (Chege, 
2008; Onjala, 2008). These infrastructure projects not only created more employment 
opportunities for Kenyans, they also improve Kenya’s economic performance, 
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therefore, making Kenya a strong competitor (Chege, 2008).  
In addition to the positive contributions of Chinese investment in Kenya’s 
infrastructure projects, its companies’ operation in the country’s infrastructure sector 
generated controversy in the Kenyan media. One controversial infrastructure project 
is Mombasa-Kampala Railway Project; a railway project that runs from the busy port 
city of Mombasa, Kenya, inland to the capital Nairobi and extends onwards to 
Kampala, the capital of Uganda. This is an important railway network that will better 
integrate East African markets. The Kenyan government and Uganda signed an 
agreement to build a high capacity standard gauge railway within their territories. 
Under the agreement, each state is responsible for the cost of the construction; each 
government can seek joint financing from different investors. The deal was signed on 
October 2, 2009.  
During the first two years, both Kenya and Uganda tried to find a consultant 
firm to conduct a feasibility study for the project. The research process was delayed 
by bidders' objections. Initially the Kenyan Railway Corporation (KRC) planned to 
reward the project to an Italian firm, Italferr SPA, however, the Ministry of Transport 
dismissed the process. In the end the China Road and Bridge Corporation replaced the 
Italian firm because the Chinese construction company convinced the Kenyan 
Ministry of Transport to undertake a new proposal for the railway, and to accept 
Chinese concessional loans (Kisero, 2011). When the Kenyan Minister of 
Transportation changed their plans, it did not inform its Ugandan counterparts; the 
Ugandan government accused both Kenya and China of making side deals. This 
incident shows how both the Chinese government and its companies use their power 
to further their own economic interests (Randall, 2010). 
In addition to its heavy investment in the railway sector, the Chinese 
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government also financed two major road projects in Kenya, the Nairobi Eastern and 
Northern Bypasses (Bonyo, 2010). Exim Bank, a Chinese state-owned bank, also 
signed a deal of Sh 16.9 billion loans to build the southern bypass road project 
(Mugwe, 2011). Chinese companies’ involvement in Kenya’s infrastructure projects 
has attracted criticism from local construction companies. They have expressed their 
anger over the increasing number of construction projects awarded to Chinese and 
other foreign companies. In response to this resentment, the Ministry of Transport 
arranged a meeting to discuss strategies to increase local construction company’s 
chances to win more infrastructure contracts. At this meeting, Kenya’s Prime Minister 
Raila Odinga demanded local construction companies to improve the quality of their 
work saying, “You have to be more competitive vis a vis the Chinese in terms of 
costs, quality and speed” (Reuter, 2010). Local contractors did not agree with 
Odinga’s comment. Instead, they argued that the reason they cannot compete with 
foreign construction companies is because of the Kenyan government’s 
underinvestment in the construction industry over the past years (Ibid).  
Another issue that concerned the Kenyan public was the labor issue. Among 
them are Chinese prisoners working on Kenya’s construction sites and Chinese 
companies bring their own workers from China. Chinese companies have been 
criticized for not honoring their promise to create jobs for local people. Many 
Western scholars have dismissed the assertion as false and proposed it is part of 
“China threat” narrative created by the competitors. Two of the leading scholars on 
this issue, Barry Sautman of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology 
and Yan Hairong of Hong Kong Polytechnic University conducted an extensive 
research project to uncover these misunderstandings. After they conducted research in 
10 African countries that claimed to be affected by Chinese worker imports, the 
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researchers did not find any evidence to support such claims. They believed rumors of 
Chinese companies importing convicted labors to work on construction sites are due 
to "cultural difference in work and living habits" (2010). 
Another study conducted by Sautman & Yan on localizing Chinese initiative 
in Africa, learned that most of the Chinese company’s operations in Africa have a 
high percentage of local employee rates. In the study, they surveyed 75 Chinese 
companies in Kenya; local employees do 78% of work. The study indicates that the 
major dissatisfaction is in management positions, and the media's stereotypical 
discourse plays an important role (Sautman & Yan, 2015). The success of Chinese 
construction companies operating in Kenya help China to enhance its image and 
influence in Kenya. 
Another public relations nightmare the Chinese government facing in Kenya is 
ivory smuggling, the poaching problem continues to damage China’s image in Africa, 
where Chinese consumption of elephant tusks and rhino horns has driven two species 
ever closer to extinction. Chinese nationals smuggling ivory out of Kenya has been 
regularly reported in the Kenyan media (Kuo, 2017). As one of the largest illegal 
ivory markets of the world, China is under extreme pressure from conservation groups 
to shut down the illegal ivory trade. To highlight its determination to stop poaching, 
the Chinese government announced its “commitment to phase out legal, domestic 
manufacture, and sale of ivory products” to support international action against 
elephant poaching and illegal ivory trade in 2015 (Mathiesen, 2015). China also 
signed an agreement with the US government to fight poaching in Africa, the 
agreement “almost completely” banning ivory trade in China (Mutambo, 2016). 
Facing such criticism from the Kenyan media and public regarding their 
presence in Kenya, the Chinese government feels the need to improve its national 
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image in Kenya to achieve its economic and political interests in the country. To do 
so, China has invested heavily in its state-owned media and telecommunication 
companies’ international expansion, the establishment of Confucius Institutes and 
cultural exchange programs in Kenya to articulate a favorable environment in the 
country. The reason that China chosen culture was as its instrument to create a 
favorable environment and influence the Kenyan public, was based on a belief that 
culture “lays a foundation of respect and tolerance by foreign actors, who, over time, 
may help to shape an international environment conducive to China’s growth” (Li & 
Worm, 2011: 75). The rest of this chapter will examine the presences of Chinese 
media, telecommunication companies and the construction of Confucius Institutes in 
Kenya; how these sectors have been used by China as a means to improve its national 
image and enhance its influence in Kenya. 
 
Penetration of Chinese Media and Cultural Productions in Kenya 
As China's economic and trade relations with Kenya evolved, so had the 
Chinese media engagement in Kenya. The Chinese government's interest in 
expanding its media oversee is a response to the painful experience of the 2008 
Beijing Olympics torch relay. Initially, China was intended to use the Olympic games 
as a platform to showcase its rise in a positive light (Budabin, 2011). It turned out 
foreign activists used the media focus on Beijing Olympic Games to condemn 
China’s connection with Sudan and its passive stance on the Darfur crisis. Within this 
context, the Chinese government recognized the need to consolidate different 
perceptions, both domestic and global, of the country (Sun, 2010).  
One specific concern that motivated China’s media expansion in Africa is the 
narrative of China’s engagement in Africa told by third-party media. Especially 
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concerning the Western media that often depicts China’s engagement as “grabbing 
land, extracting resources and neo-colonialism [force] in Africa” (W. Chen, 2013). 
The Chinese government acknowledged that its involvement in Africa is 
misrepresented by the third-party voices. Such misrepresentations have created a gap 
between public perceptions and the realities of the events. In order to narrow this gap, 
China should utilize its own media platforms to engage with audiences in strategically 
important countries. China expanding its media operations in Kenya is an example of 
how China uses its own media as strategic communication tools to serve multiple 
goals, from advancing its influence in the international community to the profit-
seeking enterprise (Ibid). 
Since 2009, Africa has been one of the main target destinations for Chinese 
media’s ambitious “going out” campaign. Since the campaign launched in 2009, 
Chinese media engagement in Africa, especially in Kenya, has covered all media 
sectors and platforms. For instance, Xinhua News Agency relocated its Regional 
Editorial Office from Paris to Nairobi in 2006. It was the first symbolic step of 
Chinese state-owned media’s expansion in Africa to break “the Western media 
monopoly” (Shambaugh, 2015). 
In addition to its function as China’s mouthpiece overseas, Xinhua's global 
expansion was also motivated by economic interest. Xinhua believes that expanding 
its operations in Africa would strengthen its ability to compete with the major 
Western news agencies, such as the Associated Press, United Press International, 
Reuters, and Bloomberg. The aim is to become a "real world international news 
agency" (Shambaugh, 2015) and a multimedia conglomerate, competing with other 
media conglomerate such as News Corporation.  
As for its economic interest, Xinhua targeted emerging markets, such as 
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Africa, where there is no domestic competition for international news, and where 
there is a limited presence of Western media. In Africa, one of the effective business 
strategies Xinhua employs is to offer African media outlets free or extremely low-cost 
news wires and photos when compared to Western news agencies (Jacob, 2012; Wu, 
2012; Xin, 2009). While other African media outlets did not use of Xinhua’s news 
wires frequently, due to those outlets standards and editorial policies, Kenyan media 
adopted more news images and wires from Xinhua and CNC (China Xinhua News 
Network Corporation World) (Jacobs, 2012). The lower cost of Xinhua news wires fit 
the budget of Kenyan media outlets as the news wires and photos from Western news 
agencies were nearly prohibitively expensive (Xin, 2009). Although Xinhua delivered 
an ever-increasing number of stories enhancing its public presence, African media 
markets were still dominated by Western news agencies (Wekesa, 2013).  
Even though Kenyan media embraces Xinhua's news wires and photos, 
Xinhua staff’s constant phones call, emails, and visits to Kenyan media newsrooms 
have been perceived as "overbearing". As editors at the Daily Nation noted, since its 
organization signed the news-sharing agreement with Xinhua, Xinhua’s officials are 
constantly contacting the Daily Nation office to push them to publish articles and 
photos (Jacobs, 2012). Woka Nyagwoka, a managing editor of The Standard, also 
complains about the editorially bias of Xinhua’s news wires. According to Nyagwoka, 
“Kenyans are skeptical of a free lunch, especially when it’s made in China” (Ibid). 
In 2011, Kenya's leading newspaper signed a partnership agreement with 
Xinhua. According to Eric Shimoli, a senior editor at the Daily Nation, “You would 
have to be blind not to notice the Chinese media’s arrival in Kenya,” it is an 
overpowering charm offensive (Jacobs, 2012). Some China experts suggest that 
Chinese media expansion to the East African media markets is mainly motivated by 
 105 
the economic incentives such as advertising revenue potential (Bergeron-Oliver 2012; 
Rhodes 2012). On top of pursuing a "charm offensive" agenda, the Chinese media 
inroad has been viewed as an investment; it is no different than other Chinese 
investments in Africa (Rhodes 2012).  
The launch of CCTV Africa has been considered an important move in 
China’s state-owned media’s international expansion. CCTV Africa was launched in 
January 2012 and became the first broadcast production center outside China and the 
biggest “non-African TV initiative in Africa” (Gagliardone & Geall, 2014:2). The 
mission of CCTV Africa is to compete with other international media channels in 
African media markets and to expand “English and Chinese broadcasts with footage 
from the continent to China, Africa and the rest of the world” (Burning Spring, 2011).  
The focus of CCTV Africa is mainly on news and interviews with leading 
newsmakers and documentaries. CCTV Africa also launched a mobile application "I 
Love Africa" six months after test broadcast (P. Zhang, 2012). Currently three major 
programs are broadcasting on CCTV Africa channel. The first is "Africa Live", a one-
hour daily news program that focuses on current affairs, business, and sports. Second 
is "Talk Africa", a weekly half an hour talk show discussing important events of the 
week. Third is “Faces of Africa", a half an hour weekly program devoted to 
extraordinary people in African history and to everyday African who has 
accomplished the extraordinary (Gagliardone, 2013).  
CCTV Africa is planning to extend its coverage to establishing a 24 hours 
African news channel concentrating on the African affairs similar to other 
international news channels such as France 24. CCTV Africa aims to broadcast a 
combination of special features programs and the routine newscast with a clear 
African identity. The fundamental goal of CCTV Africa is to become a great 
 106 
competitor to the international news channels such as CNN, BBC and Al Jazeera 
(Rönning, 2014). 
According to Helge Rönning, professor of media and communications at the 
University of Oslo, CCTV Africa's approach needs to be viewed within the context of 
the Chinese government's media strategy for Africa that contains three major 
components. First, it is related to China's growing presence in Africa and the way it 
has been portrayed and analyzed by the Western media over the past decades. China's 
business and political engagement on the continent have been critically reported and 
analyzed in both international and African media. Often, there is negative media 
coverage about Chinese companies' business practices and labor relations in African 
states. Within this context, the Chinese government felt the need to establish the 
alternative image of its engagement in Africa to advance its investments and other 
interests (Rönning, 2014). 
The second aspect is the Chinese government's attempt to offer an alternative 
style of journalism to counter Western-dominant international media's negative 
coverage of the continent that often focused on famine, poverty, conflicts, and war. 
Although it is impossible to avoid conflicts in journalism, the studies conducted by 
Western media scholars uncovered that coverage of Africa has been tilted towards the 
negative and with clear Western perceptive (Rönning, 2014). CCTV applies a 
different approach to journalism. Chinese media are trying to provide a “positive 
reporting,” a style of journalism that “focuses on collective achievements rather than 
divisive issues like political crisis or sensational negative news like famines” to 
Africa to prevent critical political investigation (Verhoeven & Gagliardone, 2012). 
Even though Chinese media’s method may be understood as a new method of 
reporting African stories, it also raises concerns regarding Chinese style of 
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journalism. It has been seen as holding journalists back from reporting the real issues 
and problems (Rönning, 2014). 
The third perspective is about the journalism practiced by CCTV Africa as a 
way of testing different journalistic standards and practices than those traditional ones 
coming out of Beijing (Gagliardone, 2013). CCTV Africa has been used as a 
journalistic laboratory for trying out new methods of news dissemination with a 
Chinese viewpoint. If this is the case, Rönning notes, “it also represents a challenge in 
the struggle over how to understand not only Chinese but also other countries’ 
interests in African markets and economies” (2014:32). 
Unlike other western media organizations downsizing their operations and not 
employing many foreign correspondents on the African ground, Chinese media, 
CCTV in particular, receive vast financial support from its central government (Shek, 
2013). The Chinese government’s funding allows CCTV Africa to commission Africa 
24 Media and many other local Kenyan media houses, to produce segments for the 
“Faces of Africa” (Wekesa, 2013). Moreover, there was enthusiasm within Kenyan 
journalistic circles when CCTV Africa announced its recruitment plans to employ 
highly competent African journalists and reporters. In its inception, CCTV Africa 
recruited more than 100 employees working for its Nairobi office. The majority of 
those employees were African journalists and news anchors from local television, and 
about 30 to 40 Chinese journalists and technicians. Losing talented journalists, 
anchors, and media professionals caused negative effects on local television station’s 
rating and advertising revenue. In order to complete with CCTV Africa, local 
broadcasters began a process of reform to enhance their position in a highly 
competitive media market (Bergeron-Oliver 2012).  
Although CCTV's African expansion has caused some negative consequences 
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to the Kenyan media outlets, its entry had a positive impact on local media 
professionals. On one hand, it offers alternative job opportunities for well-trained and 
talented native broadcast journalists. On the other hand, television stations that lose 
talented journalists to the Chinese need to recruit talent from other radio or television 
stations or hire unemployed media professionals, as a result, it creates more job 
opportunities (Rönning, 2014). Many media scholars agreed that localization of news 
production, such as hiring African reporters and anchors, is an effective way to win 
the hearts and minds of the African people (Wekesa 2013; Gagliardone 2013). 
Perhaps it is too early to assess CCTV penetration in the African news market 
because it takes a time to build a stable audience base. Some studies conducted by the 
Kenyan research institutes indicate that from April to June 2013, CCTV Africa had 
not reached any significant audience in Kenya. CCTV Africa was not among the top 
ten most popular channels list, indeed, its lowest rating commanded only 1 percent 
viewer base. However, there may be a sense of relief for CCTV Africa because none 
of the other international news channels are on the list (Rönning, 2014). Furthermore, 
only a few studies have been conducted that focused the issue of Kenyans' perception 
of CCTV in Africa. One of the studies indicated that only a small group of audiences 
who have access to the channel found it attractive (Gorfinkel, Joffe, Van Staden, & 
Wu, 2014). Again, it may be too early to determine whether African audiences view 
CCTV Africa as a critical news source for the understanding of Sino-African relations 
or global affairs. One thing is for sure, the competition for viewership and for cultural 
and ideological influence in the area of a broadcaster is intense in the Kenyan media 
market (Rönning, 2014). 
CCTV Africa is an important example of Chinese media penetration in Africa. 
Its major task is to enter the African media landscape to offer and disseminate a 
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Chinese perspective of Africa and international politics. The key challenge of Chinese 
media’s African operation is the practice of censorship by the Chinese government 
and media’s self-censorship. The successes of CCTV penetration in the Kenyan news 
media will depend on its capacity to provide Africans with objective and reliable 
content (Rönning, 2014).   
China Daily, the largest English-language in China, is another Chinese state-
owned media company that expanded its operation in the African countries. In 
December 2012, China Daily opened new news bureaus in Johannesburg, South 
Africa, and Nairobi, Kenya and chose to locate its lead editorial office in Nairobi. It 
also launched an Africa Weekly edition at the same time, with the goal of enhancing 
China’s influence over local power elites, opinion leaders, and the urban middle-class 
across the African continent (Shi, 2015). The function of the China Daily in Africa, 
like other Chinese state media operations in Africa, is to promote China’s interests in 
Africa. In order to achieve this agenda, it is necessary to build the favorable national 
image of China and to improve the African readers understanding of China because 
China's presence in Africa has created tensions between Chinese investors and local 
citizens. Therefore, the Chinese government and companies need the channel to tell 
their side of the story. Indeed, they have already used the China Daily to 
communicate with the African public; a weekly publication gives them a regular 
presence on the street corners (Green, 2012).  
African Weekly is available in print and digital format, and as an application 
with video content. China Daily partners with the Kenyan’s private media group, 
Nation Media Group, the largest media group in East and Central Africa, to print and 
distribute the weekly China Daily Africa Daily. This deal helps NMG to boost its 
profits (Wekesa, 2013). The hard copies of the China Daily are available on 
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newsstands in Nairobi area together with other Kenyan major newspapers such as the 
Daily Nation and The Standard.  
China Radio International (CRI), China’s major state-owned radio station, was 
established in 1941 with an objective to function as an international broadcaster with 
programming that simply broadcasted the CCP leaders’ announcements (Kurlantzick, 
2007). It is the only Chinese state-owned radio station authorized to broadcast to the 
overseas audience. CRI's first English broadcast was in 1947 to target overseas 
listeners (Kenichi, 2011). The transformation of CRI began when Deng introduced the 
economic reforms and Open-door policy in the late 1970s. Like other state-owned 
media in China, the economic reforms and open-door policy shifted CRI's priority 
from an ideological struggle to economic development (Sun, 2010). After China 
joined the WTO, its communication strategy has changed from pure propaganda 
towards a public relation strategy. A key component of this strategy is the global 
expansion of Chinese state-owned media under the "going out" policy that aims to 
enhance China's cultural influence globally. The main objective of Chinese media's 
international expansion is to win international public opinion and build a favorable 
environment for China's rise, especially after the public relations disaster of the 
Beijing Olympic Games (Chen, Colapinto, & Luo, 2010).  
In March 2006 CRI officially launched its first international FM station in 
Nairobi. CRI Nairobi FM station offers 19 hours programming daily in English, 
Mandarin, and Kiswahili. It estimated that it had about two million listeners in the 
capitals of the East African countries. CRI programs cover topics on China's 
economic, social and cultural development, China's cooperation with African states, 
and major events around the world. The mission of CRI’s FM station in Nairobi is “to 
promote mutual understanding and friendship between the Chinese and Kenyan 
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people”, and to offer “the best programs to meet Kenyan listeners’ needs”, CRI 
director Wang Gengnian stated during the launching ceremony (China Daily, 2006).  
In 2009, CRI formed a partnership with the Kenyan Broadcasting Corporation 
and other local stations and added six new languages to its broadcasts. Eastern 
African governments, especially the Kenyan government, offered their airwaves to 
Chinese media such as CRI to air their programs. Critics criticized local governments 
for indirectly providing a platform for the Chinese government to an extend its 
cultural influence (Jacobs, 2012). The cooperation with local radio stations and the 
governments not only helped CRI gain a larger listenership in the region, but also 
promoted understanding between China and African countries because African people 
have more access to China-related stories (Banda, 2009). 
StarTimes is a privately owned enterprise founded in Beijing in 1988. It 
represents one of the most successful stories of Chinese media’s expansion in Africa. 
In the beginning, StarTimes was focused on domestic broadcasting; however, it soon 
became “the largest digital television integrator, technology provider and network 
operator in China” (Rönning, 2014:24). StarTimes began its African operation in 
2002 with an attempt to establish the company as a key international player. In 2007, 
StarTimes founded a company called Star Africa Media Co. Ltd. in Rwanda that 
specialized in digital terrestrial television (DTT).  
The company benefited greatly from the television signal migration from 
analog to digital. During the digital migration process, StarTimes employed different 
business strategies, such as offering cheaper set-boxes, and signed agreements with 
African governments and public broadcasters to obtain digital migration contracts. 
Currently, StarTimes is doing business with 23 African countries and has network 
operations in 12 of these states. In the case of Kenya, StarTimes has succeeded to 
 112 
place itself in the leading position by offering cheaper subscription fees; cutting deals 
with the Kenyan government, and partnered with Kenyan public broadcasters 
(Rönning, 2016).  
The International Telecommunication Union’s digital migration agreement has 
changed the Kenyan media landscape dramatically. At an international conference 
convinced in Geneva, Switzerland in 2006, the ITU members signed an agreement to 
switch from analog to digital broadcasting signals by June 17, 2015. The purpose for 
changing broadcasting signals from analog to digital is to bridge the gap of the 
“digital divide”. The “digital divide” is the gap that exists between privileged people 
who have access to information and digital technology, and those who have limited to 
no access to information and digital technology. By converting to digital signals, it is 
believed that the quality of life will advance for citizens, not only of Kenya, but also 
other parts of the world. Many believe that an informed public is more likely to 
contribute to the economic development in any society than an uninformed public. 
Other benefits of the digitalization of broadcasting include advancements in 
technology that make it possible to integrate with various types of network 
communications, enriching audience’s experience, and improving the quantity and 
quality of programs (Ochieng, 2015). 
Even though the deadline the ITU sets for digital migration is 2015, there is no 
guarantee that all the nations can complete the transition before the agreed date. 
Kenya commenced its digital migration in December 2009 and set to switch off 
analog signals and complete migration process by June 2012. The migration project 
was incorporated into the Vision 2030 program. The migration process led to great 
changes and has resulted in significant challenges to the government, local media 
houses, and the ordinary media consumers (Biwott, 2015). 
 113 
The process of migration from analog broadcasting to digital broadcasting is 
quite comprehensive. It requires a substantial amount of capital in its preparation and 
operation. This process brought various challenges for all the players involved. One 
of the challenges for Kenyan government is the citizens’ understanding of digital 
migration program and the associated benefits. In other words, to educate the public 
on the meaning and technical issues of digital broadcasting, and to convince the 
public that it is necessary for them to invest in digital equipment in order to enjoy the 
benefits of digitalization (Biwott, 2015). According to a Daily Nation report, many 
citizens were not aware of the necessities of a digital platform and the benefits of 
digitalization of broadcasting (Musa, 2014). Despite the lack of knowledge of digital 
migration, affordability is another major obstacle for the transition. In Kenya, huge 
numbers of people are living below the poverty line. Indeed, the majority of Kenyan 
citizens cannot afford to purchase the necessary digital broadcasting equipment 
(Agwata, 2015; Nyabuga, et al., 2013). This is one of the reasons local media houses 
used to protest against the government's decision to switch off the analog signals 
(Agwata, 2015). 
Kenyan media houses also faced critical challenges during the migration 
process. They faced unfair distribution or allocation of broadcast signal distribution 
licenses. Most of the Kenyan media houses supported digital migration program until 
they learned that only limited Broadcast Signal Distribution licenses (BSD) were 
offered. The first signal distribution license was granted to Signet, a subsidiary of the 
Kenyan Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), in 2009. Since Communications 
Commission of Kenya (CCK) gave Signet, owned by the Kenyan government, the 
first BSD license, it received harsh criticism from local media houses because they 
believed Signet received preferential treatment from the government (Sihanya, 2012). 
 114 
On the same note, critics also argue that this unfair BSD bidding process negatively 
affected the media market because it compromised the principle of private 
competition (Ochieng, 2015). Based on their study of the Kenyan media, Peter Oriare, 
Rosemary Okello, and Wilson Uganda found that the Kenyan government has granted 
many broadcast licenses to individuals and organizations whose identity remained a 
secret (2010). 
After what Kenyan media houses indicated as biased procurement processes, 
the Communication Authority of Kenya (CA) issued second BSD license to Pan 
Africa Network Group-Kenya (PANG) and the African Digital Network Consortium 
(ADN) made up of local broadcasters, the Nation Media Group, Royal Media the 
owner of NTV and Citizen TV, and QTV (Asuelaa, 2016). ADN’s BSD license was 
granted after local media houses challenged the legitimacy of the result of BSD 
license bidding in the high court. Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) 
granted a BSD license to local broadcasters, under a condition that requires them to 
form a consortium. ADN rewarded a BSD license on November 26, 2014. However, 
the license was suspended on January 21, 2015, on grounds of misleading 
advertisements broadcasted by three media houses against customers purchasing 
GOtv and StarTimes Set Top Boxes (STBs) (Wahito, 2015). The suspension was 
lifted on February 13, 2014, the same day the Communications Authority of Kenya 
(CAK) ordered that all analog signals must be terminated by midnight (Ochieng, 
2015).   
In Kenya, the process of digital migration sparked controversy and a series of 
high-profile court battles. The Chinese company, PANG, owns StarTimes TV and is 
the only company that has a license to distribute media content. This is the center of 
Kenya’s digital broadcasting signal distribution controversy. The Kenyan 
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government’s decision to give a Chinese company a sole license to distribute media 
content in Kenya has led to a bitter war in court between the Kenyan government, the 
Communications Authority of Kenya (CAK), and the three leading media houses 
(National Media Group, the Standard Group, and the Royal Media Service). These 
three leading media houses “were eventually shut out of the Broadcast Signal 
Distributors (BSD) procurement process. They then lost the appeal to the Public 
Procurement Administrative Review Board (PPARB) and to their chagrin, the 
Communications Authority of Kenya authorized their rivals to carry their content 
without their consent” (Wachira, 2015). After several lost court battles at Kenya’s 
Supreme Court, the three leading broadcasters (Nation TV, Kenya Television 
Network, and Citizen) were forced the off air on February 14, 2015 by the CAK after 
the digital migration deadline passed. The only local news choice for Kenyans was 
the Kenyan Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) and President Kenyatta family's K24TV 
(Ibid). 
After they lost their BSD license bids, the media houses challenged the 
Kenyan government and argued the CCK should not grant media content distribution 
rights to a foreign company, especially a company from a country that does not have 
the free press and has a long history of suppressing media freedom and freedom of 
expression. What is troubling these media houses is that the Chinese companies have 
been granted too much space in the local media market, especially in the process of 
the digital migration. Critics worry that the dominance of Chinese companies in 
Kenya’s digital migration process could be utilized to suppress freedom of press. 
They argued that it is not a common practice to allow foreigners to have such a huge 
share in media ownership in other nations. PANG was awarded 120 frequencies out 
of the existing 211 frequencies that are close to 60 percent of national digital 
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spectrum. For perspective, the KBC's affiliate Signer was allocated 54 frequencies, 
and the AND consortium was granted only 21 frequencies (Ohito, 2015). The AND 
consortium frequencies were withdrawn after they ran "misleading and illegal 
infomercials" that alleged StarTimes and GOtv illegally broadcasted their content, 
therefore, violating copyright (Mwenesi, 2015). 
 The local broadcasters also challenged the credibility of PANG. They argued 
that PANG has no experience in Kenya and only registered in Kenya a week before 
the BSD license bidding was opened. They claimed the government should have 
issued the second license to local companies to promote local businesses instead of 
issuing lucrative media contracts to Chinese companies. Most importantly, the local 
media houses argued that unlike the Chinese company who needed to build new 
infrastructure, they already have the infrastructure. In response, the Communications 
Commission of Kenya (CCK) stated that the three local broadcasters ignored the fact 
that digital broadcasting infrastructure will soon replace the existing analog 
broadcasting infrastructure, thus, anyone who won the bid will need to build new 
infrastructure to distribute digital signals (Wanjiku, 2011). 
What concerns the Kenyan critics is that Chinese who have never been known 
for supporting freedom of press at home, is now gaining the opportunity to control 
Kenya's television channels. They argued, air frequencies are national resources and 
should remain in the hands of Kenyans, not controlled by the foreign company. They 
viewed the tendering processes, in which local broadcaster lost due to poor technical 
details, as biased, unfair and lacked transparency and accountability. Like SK 
Macharia, chairman of Royal Media Services recalled how the local media houses lost 
in the digital distribution tendering in the process, “As it stands, only StarTimes will 
be able to broadcast to all parts of Kenya with the preferential allocation of many 
 117 
frequencies. It is not comprehensible why the government would want to give 
Chinese this chance and deny Kenyan investors or even KBC such as reach” 
Macharia said. “This is a scheme that reflects the frustration of locals as the 
government converts Kenya into a compulsory pay TV society dominated by Chinese 
profiteers targeting the middle-class who are able to pay and watch and black out the 
rest of the people who are poor and cannot afford monthly subscription costs” 
(Macharia, cited in Ohito, 2015). 
As discussed above, StarTimes, the newest player in the Kenya television 
market, has benefited greatly from Kenya's migration from analog to digital television 
broadcasting. It emerged as one of the leading companies in the market by providing 
affordable services and cheap set-top boxes. During the launch of StarTimes in Kenya 
Leo Lee, the chief executive officer of StarTimes Media Kenya, stressed that the aim 
of the company is "to meet the needs of varied subscribers who have not been able to 
access pay television in Kenyan and handle competition, we are going to offer low 
monthly subscription fees for our content" (cited in Itosno, 2012). 
Despite employing a lower price marketing strategy, other factors also helped 
StarTimes’ penetration in the Kenyan media market. StarTimes’ ability to negotiate 
deals with ministers of communications, telecommunication regulators, and powerful 
political brokers in Africa helped the company to become an important power player 
in the digital migration process in most African countries. StarTimes are often 
criticized for making opaque deals with local governments and taking over the local 
broadcasters in African countries (Kisero, 2015).  
Though StarTimes is a private company, its African operations are also 
supported by the Chinese government as a "Cultural Exports Key Enterprise," and are 
authorized by the Minister of Commerce to participate international media projects. 
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The most important advantage that StarTimes has is the significant financial 
assistance from the institutions such as the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim 
Bank) and the China-Africa Development Fund, the second largest stockholders in the 
StarTimes, to help the company expand its operations in Africa. While many African 
state broadcasters are facing financial troubles and struggle to compete with other 
international players, China Exim Bank and China-Africa Development Fund are 
offering huge of loans for StarTimes' African operations. Thus far, China-Africa 
Development Fund has offered $220 million to StarTimes' African operations 
(Olingo, 2014; Rönning, 2016). 
As part of localization plans, StarTimes announced on July 14, 2014, that the 
company plans to build a Sh6.9 billion new Kenyan headquarters and broadcasting 
center in the Nairobi suburb of Karen. This broadcasting center will produce both 
television and film programs and increase the airing of Chinese soap operas in Kenya 
and other African countries. This 20,000 square meter center serves as production 
studios and distribution center in African countries. It will also employ local talent to 
produce cultural materials and to construct the building. StarTimes' extension plan 
was a response to the Kenyan government's plan to increase the local content share 
for broadcasters from 40 percent to 60 percent. One of the major tasks of the center 
would be to dub its content in African languages. It would also set up a digital 
television research center, development unit, and a training facility. The ultimate goal 
of the center is to increase local content and meet the demands of the African 
audiences (Ochieng, 2014), as well as to introduce more Chinese programs to African 
audiences, an objective also emphasized at the launch of the Beijing Television Series 
Exhibition the same year in Nairobi. The goals of the exhibition were to enhance 
cultural exchange between China and African states and to promote Chinese 
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television drama, films and documentaries to African media and audiences. The 
selected programs were expected to air in Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, and Nigeria 
from July to the end of 2014 on StarTimes’ channels dubbed in English. In order to 
meet African audiences’ demands of Chinese television programs and films, 
StarTimes has set up a professional dubbing team in 2011. By 2013, StarTimes had 
dubbed over 900 episodes of Chinese television series and over 40 Chinese films and 
documentaries (Mutegi, 2014). 
According to Rönning, the marketing strategies of StarTimes in Africa can be 
analyzed by the following method. First, when StarTimes entries an African media 
market, the company will partner with local broadcasters and often in minority 
situation. The business started by offering cheap subscriptions and set-top-boxes to 
enable more African consumer to access higher-quality digital television and more 
channels than the existing analog broadcasting providers. While the company 
executes its lower price marketing strategy, StarTimes also negotiates with local 
public broadcasters and governments with an attempt to acquire the BSD license 
before the deadline of the switching off of analog signals. Thus far, this business 
model has produced profitable results for the company's African operations (2014). 
StarTimes represents an example of how economic power can be used to 
achieve China’s economic interests and national agenda in Africa. Financial support 
from the China Exim Bank and China-Africa Development Fund enabled StarTimes 
to set up a national infrastructure for digital transmission and offer lower service fees 
to attract more subscribers. The digital migration process provided an opportunity for 
Chinese companies to foster strong partnerships with local broadcasters to introduce 
Chinese media content to Kenyan audiences. StarTimes’ African operations have 
been viewed as an important component of Chinese media international expansion. 
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Serving as a channel for Chinese media, StarTimes has great ideological and symbolic 
power to help its government to enhance its cultural influence in Kenya. 
An important objective of China’s “Going out” campaign is to enhance the 
competitiveness of Chinese companies through their investments and operations 
overseas and to explore overseas markets for their products and services (Dumbaugh, 
2008). The telecommunications sector is one of the important parts of “Going out" 
campaign. Along with the Chinese media's huge investment in Africa, Chinese 
telecommunications companies are heavily engaged both "in the production of 
content meaning and in the infrastructure on which African information is being built" 
(Gagliardone & Geall, 2014: 3). The Chinese government believes that "social and 
mobile media development will pave the way for increased interaction and 
engagement between Chinese media outlets and local communities in Africa" (Shi, 
2015:138). The success of Chinese telecom companies’ operations will also enhance 
China’s international status and counter Western influence in Africa (Executive 
Research Associates, 2009). 
Since the 1990s, many African governments recognized that the 
telecommunication industry is an important sector for economic development because 
the industry is closely linked to services trade, the most vibrant component of the 
international trading system. In order to modernize and boost their economy, many 
African countries, including Kenya, began a process to loosen the telecom policies to 
develop and modernize their telecom sector. The liberation of telecommunication has 
made the African telecom industry attractive to overseas investors, like Huawei and 
ZTE (Berg & Hamilton, 2001). 
Huawei, the leading Chinese telecommunication company, has successfully 
operated in the African telecommunication market, the world’s fastest-growing 
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telecommunication markets for telecom investors (Thussu, 2016). Since Huawei 
started its African operations in 1997 in Kenya, the company has invested billions in 
the African telecommunications sector and heavily involved in building towers, fiber 
optics and cell phone networks (Gagliardone & Geall, 2014: 3). In 2012, it has 
become the biggest telecommunications equipment provider in African (The 
Economist, 2012). Currently, China is the biggest provider of telecom equipment and 
service in the African continent (Wekesa, 2016) and Huawei is one of the powerful 
players dominating the African telecommunication markets (A. Li, 2016).  
Huawei is one of the Chinese private companies that have been successfully 
expanding its operations in Africa, including Kenya. According to Anshan Li, 
Director of Center for African Studies at Peking University, Huawei’s global 
corporate social responsibility programs played an important role in its success in 
Africa (A. Li, 2016). Since the beginning of its African operations in the 1990s, 
Huawei has paid special attention to inform the African public that the company is 
operating in a socially responsible manner on the continent (Lu & Li, 2011).  
Huawei is proud of its contributions to the ICT development of the African 
community. In Kenya and other African countries, its mission is to accelerate ICT 
development in the host country (Xinhua, 2016). In order to achieve this objective, 
Huawei employed different business strategies, such as offering technical training to 
local engineers, to its African customers and donated educational communication 
equipment to local schools. Huawei’s training programs not only help improve the 
local economy by creating more jobs and localized management, but also contribute 
to local communities’ sustainable development. Huawei also contributes to the 
development of ICT education in African countries by donating computers and 
funding to schools and offering college scholarships to local engineering students. 
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The underlying principle of Huawei’s engagement in the local community is the 
notion that these programs will help economic development in African nations. 
Apparently, Huawei’s corporate philosophy on social responsibility in Africa reflects 
China’s vision of co-development that strengthens Sino-African relations. Huawei’s 
success and its contributions to technological development in Africa built a favorable 
corporate image in local communities and potential partners. The company’s positive 
contribution also enhanced China’s image and influence in African countries (C. 
Chang et al, 2009; Lu & Li, 2011).  
To help African countries to enhance their ICT skills and development, 
Huawei developed a program called the “Telecom Seeds for the Future” to help train 
local ICT engineers to, “transfer knowledge, promote a greater understanding of, and 
interest in, the telecommunications sector and encourage regional building and 
participation on the digital community” (Huawei, 2013). In Kenya, the “Telecom 
Seeds for the Future” initiative was launched in June 2011 through a partnership with 
three leading Kenyan universities, Moi University, Jomo Kenyatta University of 
Agriculture and Technology, and the University of Nairobi, and Safaricom Ltd. Under 
the agreement, Huawei provided modern ICT skills to the engineering students from 
these universities to meet the current industry standard. Huawei also provided the 
latest ICT technologies training at its Nairobi training center (Marks, 2011).  
In 2013, Huawei signed an agreement with Kenya's SlumCode Group, a non-
profit organization founded by local young people. The objectives of SlumCode 
Group is to encourage technological innovation, to develop tech capabilities among 
Kenya’s youth, and to bridge the digital divide gap between disadvantaged groups in 
the country. Under an agreement, Huawei provided training programs for Kenya’s 
youth who are “underprivileged but innovative and creative” (Nalika, 2013). In 2014, 
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Huawei signed a three-year partnership agreement with Kenya’s ICT Authority to 
promote ICT literacy and awareness and enhance ICT skill development in Kenya. In 
this partnership agreement, Huawei promised to offer a total 100 internship 
opportunities to top engineering students from Kenyan universities between 2014 and 
2016. The top 10 students were given an opportunity to travel to China to further 
develop their professional and practical skills in technology. In addition, regular 
workshops were set up in an effort to teach different local groups about modern 
technology and how can benefit them (Buba, 2014). Huawei’s Nairobi training center 
also provided training courses for their clients. At this training facility, Kenyan 
engineers did the majority of the training, the Chinese specialist taught very few 
training courses. Over the years, Huawei contributed over Kshs160 million to 
programs such as the “Telecom Seeds for the future” in Kenya (PC Tech, 2014).  
Thus far, Chinese telecom companies’ investments in Kenya have contributed 
to Kenya’s ICT development at various levels, such as technology and skills transfer. 
They have a positive influence on job creation, human capital development, and 
corporate social responsibility in Kenya by creating employment, training facilities, 
and offering low-cost equipment and products to Kenya's telecom market. Moreover, 
with the presence of Chinese telecom companies in Kenya, its citizens are benefiting 
from up-to-date technologies and faster customer services at affordable prices. The 
skills and technologies transfer from Huawei’s training center benefit from local 
network providers and staff members. The collaborations and partnerships with 
Kenya’s telecom companies and ICT authority have contributed to Kenya’s 
development in many ways. The establishment of telecom networks and equipment 
by Chinese companies has assisted Kenya in modernizing its telecom technology. 
Additionally, the widespread telecom network coverage contributed to the country’s 
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transmission technology innovations. Thus, Chinese telecom companies are playing 
an important role in expanding the telecom infrastructure in Kenya.  
Although Chinese telecom companies have brought opportunities to Kenya 
and helped its ICT development, the Chinese companies’ presence in Kenya raised 
many concerns. Chinese investments in Kenya have always lacked transparency. For 
instance, state-owned Telkom Kenya awarded a wireless network contract to expand 
its CDMA wireless network to Huawei without public tender. By law, this project 
needed to be put out for public tender because of Telkom Kenya’s state-owned status. 
Instead, the Kenyan government quietly and exclusively awarded the contract to 
Huawei (Malakata, 2011). Another problem that concerns the Kenyan critics is that 
the Chinese telecom companies are buying politicians to achieve their agenda. In 
2010, Safaricom purchased equipment from Huawei, and Huawei only delivered half 
of the equipment promised in the contract. This situation forced Safaricom to cancel 
the contract. After the contract had been canceled, Michael Joseph the CEO of 
Safaricom, received multiple phone calls from different Kenyan ministers and 
members of parliament lobbying on behalf of Huawei (Marshall, 2011).  
All of Chinese telecom companies’ engagements with the Kenyan 
communities are based on the notion that those corporate engagements will help 
Kenya speed up its economic development and sustain China’s long-term economic 
and political interests in the country. In other words, Huawei and other Chinese 
telecom companies’ success and their contributions to ICT development in Africa, 
and Kenya in particular, not only help the companies establish a favorable corporate 
image in the eyes of local consumers and partners, but also help to promote China’s 
international image and enhance its influence in Africa (C. Chang et al, 2009; Lu & 
Li, 2011). 
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The Confucius Institutes in Kenya 
The Confucius Institutes are another key component in Sino-Kenyan cultural 
cooperation. The objectives of the Confucius Institutes are to promote Chinese 
language and culture to help Kenyans gain a better understanding of China. They are 
important platforms for the Chinese government to “present a kinder and gentler 
image of China to the outside world” to counter the Western media’s negative 
representation of the country (Gill & Huang, 2006:18). In other words, Confucius 
Institutes play an important role in enhancing China’s cultural influence and are 
designed to foster international cooperation and to advance China’s relations with 
other countries (Wheeler, 2014).  
In Africa, the first Confucius Institute was established in Kenya at the 
University of Nairobi in 2005. Because of the success of the first Confucius Institute 
in Kenya, the Confucius Institute has been greatly welcomed by its host country. 
Since then, the number of the Confucius Institute grew rapidly around the Africa. By 
the end of 2015, there were 46 Confucius Institutes and 23 Confucius Classrooms 
across the continent, including four Confucius Institutes in four universities in Kenya 
(Hanban, 2017).  
As China’s economic and political engagement in Kenya increases so does its 
ability to shape the images and perceptions of China (Starr, 2009). Over the past 
years, both China and Kenya are keenly engaging in cultural collaboration to promote 
a mutual understanding between Chinese and Kenyans. The Chinese leaders believe 
that language and other forms of Chinese cultures are the effective tools to win the 
hearts and minds of Kenyan people and cultivate a favorable image among the 
Kenyan public. The Kenyan government sees the Chinese language as a professional 
tool, by learning to speak Mandarin and learning Chinese culture, Kenyan students 
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will obtain a certain professional skill in order to get jobs and participate in a 
competitive market. In other words, Kenyan leaders assume that there is a direct 
connection between the having the skill to speak Mandarin and opportunities for 
social and economic development. Moreover, learning Mandarin will help Kenyan 
students engage with Chinese people and companies in Kenya, and give their students 
a competitive edge in the job market and will ultimately lead to the growth of the 
country’s economy (Hartig, 2011; M.W. Lai, 2012).  
Against this background, China and Kenya signed an MOU agreement in June 
2004 to set up a Confucius Institute at the University of Nairobi. The Confucius 
Institute at the University of Nairobi officially launched in December 2005. It was a 
collaboration between China’s Tianjin Normal University and College of Humanities 
and Social Science of the University of Nairobi. Since its inception in 2005, with 
strong financial support from the Chinese government, Confucius Institute at the 
University of Nairobi has the capacity to build the finest Chinese language laboratory 
with high-quality equipment, a library, and can offer different levels of Chinese 
language and culture programs. As one of the most developed Confucius Institutes in 
Africa, the Confucius Institute at the University of Nairobi not only offers language 
and culture programs, but it also functions as teaching resources for other local 
Chinese schools. Due to increasingly close economic relations and personal 
exchanges between the two nations, the number of students and the size of classes at 
Confucius Institute at the University of Nairobi grew. More and more Kenyans 
wanted to learn the Chinese language so that they could seek development 
opportunities in the future (Wheeler, 2014). In June 2016, China invested $20 million 
in the University of Nairobi’s Confucius Institute to construct a complex to host 
lecture halls, offices, and a student dormitory. This project is one of the largest 
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Chinese education investments in Africa and the biggest in any Kenyan university 
(Business Daily, 2016).  
Due to the increase in bilateral trade and an increase in Chinese companies’ 
presence in Kenya, the demand and interest in Chinese language and culture merited a 
second Confucius Institute that was launched at Kenyatta University, through a 
jointed collaboration between China’s Shandong Normal University and Kenyatta 
University in 2010. The institute provides free one-year certificate courses to any 
students who are interested in learning the Chinese. The programs have been 
welcomed by students, local businesspersons, and tour operators who took the 
opportunity to enhance their professional skills (Xinhua, 2010). The Kenyan leaders 
hope that learning Chinese will open opportunities for Kenya’s tourism industry. If 
many Kenyans can speak Chinese, then they can provide travel services for tourists 
from China. Thus, the language courses offered by the Confucius Institutes are an 
incentive for a boost in tourism from China. In order to boost the country’s tourism 
industry, the Kenyan government asked the Chinese government to encourage its 
citizens to visit Kenya to help boost Kenya’s tourism industry (Wheeler, 2014). 
In 2014, the Chinese government partnered with Egerton University to launch 
its third Confucius in Nakuru, Kenya. The establishment of the Confucius Institute at 
Egerton University was also part of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the 
founding of diplomatic relations between the two countries (Damary, 2013). Unlike 
the Confucius Institutes at the University of Nairobi and Kenyatta University, the 
Confucius Institute at Egerton University not only offered language and culture 
lessons and scholarship opportunities, it also offered agricultural training and research 
to local students and community members (Mwangi, 2014).  
In March 2015, China launched fourth Confucius Institute in Kenya’s western 
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region at the Moi University. The Institute is the Shanghai-based Donghua 
University’s collaboration with Moi University. It was the first Confucius Institute 
featuring the textile and fashion design course, as Donghua University is famous for 
its expertise in textile and costume design. Moreover, the Confucius Institute at the 
Moi University to help train students and local professionals skilled in textile design 
and trade. As Zhu Min, the chairman of the Donghua University Council said at the 
launching ceremony, “The institute will help the local textile and costume design 
industries to learn about China’s textile technologies and experience. Donghua 
University will organize professors specializing in textile and costume to give lessons 
at the Confucius Institute” (N. Wu, 2015). Chinese counselor Yao Ming attended the 
ceremony, saying that he hoped that this institute would be an example for future 
Sino-Kenya industrial collaboration, to provide a platform to promote cultural and 
people-to-people exchange between China and Kenya (Mo, 2015).    
Since the launch of the first Confucius Institute in Nairobi, the Confucius 
Institutes in Kenya have made an important contribution to strengthen cultural and 
economic connections between China and Kenya. Through the special courses they 
offered, Kenya's Confucius Institutes accelerated educational and cultural exchanges, 
smoothed trade cooperation, and strengthened the friendship between the two 
countries. However, there are concerns of some university faculty and administrators 
about the study of Chinese language and culture in Kenya. One of the concerns is that 
the teaching of foreign language, including English and Chinese, received from the 
Kenyan government is places the indigenous language speakers at a disadvantage. 
The Chinese government subsidized Institutions operating in Kenya public 
universities without the critical oversight of the host university administrators is 
another issue they was concerned with (Wheeler, 2014).     
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CHAPTER 5 
MEDIA REPRESENTATION OF CHINA IN KENYAN MEDIA  
 
China has ascended as a major power player in the international community. 
However, its rises to power in the twenty-first century surprised and provoked 
significant media attention around the world. The emergence of China as a great 
power is under the scrutiny of both the Western nations and their media (Ding, 2011). 
Some commentators portrayed China’s rise in a positive light, while others painted 
the same stories in the cynical ways, and perceived China as “harmful” and a threat to 
global stability (Deng, 2006). A similar situation occurred when Sino-African 
relations intensified, the international community began to be concerned about 
China's growing interests and presence on in Africa. Proponents view China's 
investment in Africa as a partnership both parties are benefiting from. Critics have 
accused the Chinese of pursuing a neo-colonialist policy in the continent (Large, 
2008).   
Since the 1990s, The Chinese government acknowledged the importance of 
building up a favorable image in its foreign relations. Over the past years, the Chinese 
government has invested a huge amount of resources to improve its international 
communication capacity. The previous chapter reviewed China’s tremendous efforts 
to enhance its influence in Kenya by intensifying its media and cultural cooperation in 
the country. The Chinese media’s global expansion was the Chinese government’s 
effort to dismiss neocolonialist criticism, to improve its international image and to 
enhance its influence in Africa. Although these initiatives might lay a solid foundation 
for China to enhance its image in Africa, they do not automatically translate into 
favorable perceptions. The aim of this chapter is to examine the Kenyan media’s 
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coverage on China’s engagement in the country and to gain an understanding of how 
China has been perceived in the Kenyan media. Whether that perception is that 
China’s involvement has been depicted in a positive light and that both parties benefit 
from its partnership, or in negative lens that portrays China as a neo-colonialist whose 
presence is to exploit Kenya’s resources.  
Regardless of the introduction of modern technology, the majority of people in 
the world have limited personal contact or information with other countries and 
people. Therefore, individuals depend on the media to provide them with information 
about foreign countries (Potter & Baum, 2016). The social and political reality of a 
society is often constructed by the mass media, especially in a setting that is “out of 
reach, out of sight, out of mind” (Lippmann, 1922:21). In other words, “it is based 
largely on journalism that we make up our national mind” (Zelizer & Allen, 2002:1). 
The mass media can contribute to people’s perception or misperception of each 
other’s nations and have a significant impact on the relations between countries. Mass 
media also can be viewed as "society centric" that reflects the economic and political 
forces of a society (McQuail, 2010). The way the media frames issues and events 
certainly can influence or change the meaning people received (McQuail, 2010). It is 
within this context that the Kenyan news media's coverage of China’s engagement in 
the Kenya is analyzed. To put the analysis of the Kenyan media coverage of Chinese 
presence in the country into perspective, this chapter starts with a summary of China’s 
image both globally and in Africa. Followed a brief review of the media development 
in Kenya.  
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The Images of China  
China’s engagement with Africa has been under scrutiny from African media 
over the past years. Stories reported by the African media about the Chinese 
involvement in African countries have created a mixture of positive and negative 
perceptions of China. Proponents view China’s engagement with Africa as a “win-
win” relationship, where China acquires natural resources for its growing economy 
and finds new markets for its manufactured goods, while African countries need 
China’s assistance for their socio-economic development (Carmody, 2011; Fergus, 
2013; Kofi, 2014). Other observers suggested that China offers an alternative to 
Western hegemony in Africa. Traditional Western power players are being challenged 
by China because most of the African governments found China’s non-interference 
approach to be more appealing than Western countries’ “good governance” agenda 
(Alden & Davies, 2006).  
Sino-African relations do not hold a favorable, positive image in most of the 
Western media. China’s increasing interest in importing natural resources from Africa 
has been depicted by Western media and critics as “the new scramble for Africa” 
(Carmody, 2011). Critics are skeptical about China’s motivation. One accusation is 
that the Chinese government uses aid to receive special treatments from corrupt 
African leaders (Power & Mohan, 2008). Their concern is that China’s engagement in 
Africa is motivated primarily by economic interests (Carmody & Taylor, 2009; Infed, 
2014).   
 
Perceptions of China in Africa 
Several studies indicated that the majority of Africans perceived China in a 
positive light unlike Western media’s depiction of the Chinese presence in Africa 
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(Rebol, 2010; Rossouw et al., 2014). Based on the findings of his study on South 
African media’s coverage of China, Herman Wasserman dismissed binary notions of 
China's presence in Africa, either an exploitative, predatory force or a benevolent 
development partner. Wasserman found that the coverage of South African media 
presented a more balanced perception of the Chinese presence. It was neither plainly 
positive nor plainly negative but cautiously optimistic. The findings of Wasserman’s 
study showed a balanced representation among positive, negative and neutral 
(Wasserman, 2012).  
Kitta Hirvensaloor in a comparative research of media coverage of Chinese 
aid and cooperation with Africa found a similar pattern. The study identified a pattern 
of increasing bias in both the Chinese and Western news coverage. The tone of the 
Chinese media was overwhelmingly positive, while the Western media news coverage 
portrayed a negative bias in Sino-African cooperation, and African media’s coverage 
was neutral (Hirvensaloor, 2012).  
In his study “The Role of China in the Portuguese Speaking African 
Countries: The Case of Mozambique”, Fernanda Ilhéu argues that even though there 
are problems, such as the illegal cutting and exporting timber, that arose from in 
China’s engagement Mozambique, both the people and government welcomed the 
Chinese presence. Ilheu’s findings indicated that these illegal activities did not alter 
the positive perceptions of China’s engagement and the mutual collaboration between 
the two nations was viewed as mutually beneficial (2010).  
A study conducted by Fei-Ling Wang and Esi A. Elliot analyzed the 
perception of eight sub-Saharan African countries of China’s involvement in Africa, 
including Kenya. The study found diverse African perceptions about China’s presence 
and Chinese business activities (F. Wang & Elliot, 2014). According to the 
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researchers, there is a contrasting perception about China’s presence in Africa. In a 
positive light, China was perceived as a valuable business partner, investor, and donor 
that contributed significantly to many host nations’ economic development. However, 
there was an increasing number of Africans that criticize the opportunistic, even 
predatory, conduct of the Chinese companies in Africa, whose actions damaged the 
local business environment and weakened labor rights. Wang and Elliot concluded 
that even though China had received considerable support in Africa, it is still facing 
increasing number of obstacles. Amongst them was that some Chinese officials and 
businesspersons tried to bribe the governments of the host countries to accept deals 
(Wang & Elliot, 2014). 
While most of the studies' findings showed positive perceptions of China in 
Africa, a survey of three African countries (Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa) 
perceptions of Chinese companies conducts in Africa uncovered that the perceptions 
of African people were more negative than positive in 42.4 percent of responses. This 
study shows that, although Africans recognize some positive contributions of Chinese 
investments and trade in Africa, they still are concerned about the social, 
environmental, and labor reliability of Chinese companies in Africa (Rossouw et al., 
2014). After a brief review of perceptions of Chinese presence in African countries, 
the next section reviews the media development in Kenya. 
 
Media Development in Kenya 
To obtain a better understanding of the influence of the media in Kenya’s 
society today, it is necessary to review the historical situations and the economic, 
political and social environment in which the current Kenyan media developed. 
Because of the capacity of the study, the evolution of print media will be the main 
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focus of this review. The historical review of the print media development in Kenya 
provided a better understanding of how the development of print media was shaped 
by the political and socio-economic changes in Kenya (Kareithi, 1996). In Kenya, the 
development of the print media can be divided into three periods: the colonial period 
(1895-1962), the post-independence period (1963-1990), and the multiparty period 
(1991-present) (Ireri, 2012).   
The development of the print media has been influenced by the country’s 
political and socio-economic changes since the first publication of the Taveta 
Chronicle in 1895 (Ochilo, 1993). There were three systems in the Kenyan print 
media during the colonial era, the European, the Indian, and the African print media. 
The European print media was the most prestigious, followed by the Indian, and the 
African print media at the bottom (Faringer, 1991). The objectives of the European 
print media were to function as a vehicle for delivering government information to the 
white settler communities. They served as an instrument for the colonial masters to 
maintain their status quo, to rule, and to function as a platform for social 
communication within the settler community in Kenya (Mshindi, 2008). In 1901, 
Indian trader Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee established The East African Standard. Later, 
the paper would be sold to people who would use it to serve the settler community’s 
interests. The Indian media made a huge contribution to end colonial rule in East 
Africa after WWI (Abuoga & Mutere, 1988).  
During the colonial period, the African print media was motivated by a 
political cause and mostly focused on the issue of political independence (Ali, 2009). 
From the mid-1920s to 1950s, the indigenous African people developed several 
African language publications in Nairobi (Makali, 2003). With increasing discontent 
among Africans and Indians, fueled by the “blatantly discriminative policies of the 
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colonial regime,” almost all the nationalist leaders launched their own newspapers to 
propagate their visions and express their fears (Karanja, 2000:33). These papers 
became important instruments for disseminating liberation messages among African 
communities. The key role the print media played during this period was to mobilize 
people to pursue independence from the colonial powers (Oriare et al., 2010). 
Worrying that a free press would advocate for independence, the colonial 
government passed the Penal Code of 1930 to ban anti-colonial publication and 
criminalized people who possessed the same material. In 1951, the government 
initiated a Declaration of Emergency to respond to the Mau Mau revolution. Under 
Declaration Emergency, all indigenous publications were banned and propaganda 
against nationalist movement was intensified (Makali, 2004). In addition to the law 
enacted to silence anti-colonial voices, the colonial government launched Habari 
(News) in 1921 to stop the African press from gaining readership among literate 
Africans and to boost loyalty to the colonial government (Abuoga & Mutere, 1988). A 
weekly newspaper printed in Swahili, Baraza, was established in 1939 by the colonial 
government (Ali, 2009).  
The first newspaper owned by the African people was Mwigwithania (“work 
and pray” in Kikuyu ethnic language), established in 1928 by the Kikuyu Central 
Association. The editor of the newspaper Jomo Kenyatta, was Kenya’s first President 
after independence. According to William Hachten, there were over 40 African 
vernacular newspapers in the 1940. The colonial British authorities suppressed all the 
newspapers when the liberation struggle began (1993). In 1952, the colonial 
government founded the Kenyan vernacular press, another effort to minimize the 
African press’s influence. This led to the closing of African vernacular newspapers 
(Bourgault, 1995). There were fifty newspapers in Kenya in 1952, most of them 
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closed after the country gained independence in 1963 because their mission to see 
Kenya's independence was accomplished (Ainslie, 1966). During the colonial era, the 
mass media was strictly controlled and censored by the government and were used as 
anti-nationalist propaganda instruments (Mshindi, 2008).   
 
Kenya's media development is closely connected to its political history. The 
political transition from British colony to independent nation also transformed the 
mass media in Kenya. Following independence in 1963, the newly independent 
government faced difficult political, economic, and social challenges. Under such 
harsh circumstance, the Kenyatta government constantly used state machinery to 
alienate political rivals. Oftentimes, the media was employed to achieve this objective 
(Ajulu, 2000). One important piece of influence the Kenyan government had was to 
repress the freedom of expression. This was Kenyatta's "ideology of order" (Adieno-
Odhiambo, 1987). The media was expected to collaborate with the government and 
honor national unity narrative (Ochilo, 1993). The mass media were controlled by the 
Kenyatta administration for propaganda purposes and to mobilize the public to 
participate in Kenyatta's nation-building project (Mbeke, 2008). Through this nation-
building ideology, the Kenyatta administration was able to create a coercive nation, 
where opposition was systematically crushed, normally by violent force (Hyden, 
2006). By employing the institutions such as the media, the Kenyatta regime 
guaranteed that any opinion challenged the Kenyatta’ rule was censored because this 
kind of disagreement conflicted with national development. Therefore, the media was 
transformed from liberation tools to propagandists to propagate the Kenyatta 
government’s nation-building project (Ireri, 2012).  
During the 1970s and the 1980s, a number of African governments adopted 
 137 
the concept of development journalism for the purpose of national development 
(Bougalt, 1995; Nyamjoh, 2005). The concept of development journalism was first 
introduced in Asia in the late 1960s. The term is used to refer to "journalism was 
believed and excepted to play a key role in facilitating and fostering national 
development" (Xu, 2009:357). In the case of Africa, development journalism means 
close cooperation between the media and the states, rather than critical reporting on 
development efforts. While it can be a powerful tool for nation building, it is also a 
means suppressing information and restricting journalists. Oftentimes, the state-
owned media and the government will work together to compete with private media 
(Barton, 1979). In Kenya, the government that found development journalism was a 
perfect match for its nation-building project (Ogola, 2011).  
Most of Kenya’s alternative printed media was closed when the country 
gained independence. Only two mainstream newspapers the Daily Nation and the East 
African Standard (after this referred to as The Standard) survived. Both newspapers 
took a different position on the country's self-determination. The Daily Nation was 
opposed to Kenya's independence, however, its support of independence was a clever 
move by the newspaper's principal shareholder, the Aga Khan, to safeguard his 
business interests in the Islamic communities in Kenya (Winsbury, 2000). In contrast 
with the Daily Nation, The Standard took a hostile position towards Kenya's self-
determination. An Indian businessman, A.M. Jevanjee, as the African Standard in 
Mombasa, established the newspaper the paper then relocated to Nairobi under new 
owners who renamed it the East African Standard. Later, the East African Standard 
became the voice of the white settler community; it was viciously against the 
country’s independence. The reason the Standard supported the government was to 
give the new government favor. When the new owners, Roland Rowland's Lonrho 
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Plc., bought the newspaper in 1967, this support increased (Bougalt, 1995) 
The newly independent government acknowledged that the control of 
information flow was a necessary precondition for consolidating political power and 
maintaining political stability (Amutabi, 2013; Hachten, 1993). The control was done 
both directly and indirectly through its control of advertising revenue because the 
government was the largest advertiser for these newspapers during this period. In 
other words, the government used its advertising buying power to support the media 
that followed its policies and censored the voices that were against it. The Kenyatta 
government also indirectly supported major media houses to eliminate the alternative 
media. Most of the regional and local-language media collapsed, only a few survived. 
For those that survived, they increasingly expressed their discontent with the pace of 
change. For the government, they are a threat to the nation-building project (Ndegwa, 
1997). 
During the Kenyatta era, both the Daily Nation and The Standard directly and 
indirectly participated in fostering the government's nation-building project. In order 
to help the government to achieve its agenda, both newspapers intentionally framed 
the president, Jomo Kenyatta, as the father of the country and the whole country as a 
family. These framed references were chosen by design and were part of a grand 
strategy designed to help Kenyatta deliver his message and executed his power. In 
Kenya, "Father of the Nation" represents a hierarchy of relations. The title was used 
to enhance Kenyatta's political legitimacy. Both newspapers employed references to 
deliver their messages and to make sure their implications were greatly observed. 
Under this circumstance, the Daily Nation and The Standard became an informal 
publicity instrument of the government (Ogola, 2011). 
After the death of Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi became second President 
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in 1978 (Ogola, 2011). When he took over the presidency, Moi inherited the worst 
economy and a major political challenge; a challenge that came from the leader of the 
ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KAUN). This group of leaders became 
known as the “Kiamba Mafia” that had organized themselves into the Change of the 
Constitution Movement (W. Ochieng, 1995). The goal of the movement was to 
prevent Moi becoming the President. The movement failed, primarily because of the 
resistance it encountered from President Moi’s supporter, Attorney General Charles 
Njonjo. In order to overcome the political challenges and reconstruct the stumbling 
nation-building project, Moi was forced to consolidate his political positions. In doing 
so, Moi began to centralize power and to institute “an authoritarian and oppressive 
one-man state rule” (Adar & Munyae, 2001:2). When the Moi government started to 
institutionalize, centralize, and personalize the presidency, the government used state 
machinery to restrict and limit political freedom, especially the freedom of press and 
expression. Independent and critical publications were banned completely, and 
journalists and editors were constantly intimidated and detained by the Moi regime 
(Ogola, 2011). Foreign news media also restricted, foreign wire services were 
forbidden, and many foreign correspondents were deported (Mshindi, 2008).  
The history of the media during the Moi era was filled with stories of 
government intervention, arrest and imprisonment of journalists because the 
government viewed alternative voices as a threat to its status quo. Instead of using the 
mass media for the national development agenda, President Moi employed the media 
to obtain and sustain his power. Under the Moi dictatorship, the oppositional voices 
were eliminated from media discourse and only those in power had a chance to 
broadcast their opinions on national television and radio. Gradually, the state-owned 
media were transformed into propaganda tools for the ruling party. Such media 
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function was totally departed from the development objective that was supposed to be 
a channel to fight against poverty and disease (Mbeke, 2010). In order to avoid 
government's abuses, media workers began to self-censure where journalists gave 
certain stories a pass if they felt the stories would upset the government or officials. 
During this period, the government tightly controlled media ownership. There were 
only a few media companies that were privately owned, and these private investors 
knew how to survive under such harsh circumstance (Oriare et al., 2010). 
The media practice during the Moi regime was an authoritarian model that 
assumed the mass media are influential forces of persuasion (Ellul, 1965). Like other 
authoritarian regimes, the media was employed by President Moi as an important tool 
to achieve his political agenda. During the Moi era, the media environment was harsh, 
and the media restricted from performing any democratic role. There was no 
breathing space for the media to criticize the ruling parties. For instance, the Daily 
Nation was suspended in 1989 from reporting parliamentary proceeding because the 
newspaper was viewed "disloyal" to the country. During the end of Kenyatta's era and 
beginning of Moi's era, the media gained some autonomy, and several newspapers 
were established, unfortunately, the poor market made it difficult to sustain. During 
the Moi presidency, the Kenyan media operated in a very harsh environment. It was a 
very dark period for the Kenyan media, the media was suppressed, censored, 
intimidated, and journalists were prosecuted and detained (Mbeke, 2010). The 
Kenyatta government (1963-1978) was marked as having less rigorous controls over 
the media (Obonyo, 2003), media freedom during the Moi era remained 
incomprehensible (Ireri, 2012).   
President Moi recognized the impact of the media on the society. Therefore, 
he tried to take control of the Daily Nation and The Standard. He acquired a huge 
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amount of The Standard’s shares with an attempt to control the newspaper. His also 
planned to gain direct control of the Daily Nation but failed. Although Moi failed to 
gain the direct control of the Daily Nation, his relationship with the newspaper was 
enhanced through his business connections with the Nation Media Group's principal 
shareholder, the Aga Khan. The government's relationship with big media houses has 
always been friendly during the Mio era. A significant amount of both the Daily 
Nation and The Standard shares are held by the country's ruling elites. This affiliation 
accelerated both newspapers' progress, with minimum state intimidation (Ogola, 
2011). The Aga Khan also benefited greatly from these relations. Similarly, the 
Standard Group also had good relations with President Kenyatta and Moi. Such close 
connections also benefited The Standard. Powerful members of Moi’s and KANU’s 
regime acquired significant shareholding and became major shareholders before the 
general elections in 2002. As the major shareholders of The Standard, the Moi and 
KANU regime openly interfered with the newspaper’s editorial view. Additionally, 
the newspaper’s dependence on government advertisements made it vulnerable to 
government control. In order to survive, the newspaper was deeply compromised. The 
Standard’s campaign for Moi in the 1997 presidential elections was an example of the 
government’s involvement in the newspaper’s editorial choice. The Standard 
published an infamous headline on the eve of the elections that requested its readers 
to vote for the incumbent. The paper’s endorsement was unprecedented in Kenya’s 
political and media traditions (Ogola, 2011).  
The lack of direct control of major newspapers forced Moi to establish a new 
newspaper, the Kenya Times, to function as a government propaganda instrument and 
to counter the influence of established newspapers such as the Daily Nation and The 
Standard. The Moi administration's awareness of the increased influence of the media 
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on the political process made control of the media even more important (Iraki, 2010). 
According to Ben Bagdikian, the majority of political leaders and parties understand 
the importance of news media control because how they are portrayed to the public 
will have great impact on people's perception of them and the agenda they want to 
achieve, therefore, the news media need to be influenced or controlled (Bagdikian, 
2004).  
During the Moi's ear, the government exercised a tight control of political 
expression in the media until the late 1990s. Moi regime also criminalized important 
journalists and the media outlets through sedition trials (Kalyongo, 2011). To make 
sure that the privately owned newspapers always promoted the government's agenda, 
the Moi regime demanded the private newspapers select their news sources, 
especially regional news, from the government, owned news agency, Kenya News 
Agency (KNA) (Ogola, 2011). In fact, on a daily basis, both The Standard and the 
Daily Nation carried several news stories from KNA, even when they could obtain the 
same news stories from their regional networks located in different provinces of the 
nation. The Moi regime also had great influence over the editorial agenda of Kenya 
Broadcasting Corporate (KBC) and expanded its role in the Kenyan society. As public 
media, the main function of KBC was to propagate the interests of the ruling elites not 
the interest of the Kenyan public. The government employed the KBC Act to control 
broadcasted content and other interrelated concerns because this law clearly indicated 
that no broadcasting license could be issued without KBC's authorization (Heath, 
1997).  
While Kenya attained its independence in 1963, the independence constitution 
offered a multiparty political system with democratic structures. However, this system 
only lasted a very short period of time. Soon after independence, the government was 
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determined to make Kenya a one-party nation. In 1982, President Moi forced the 
parliament to pass a law to make establishing another political party other than the 
ruling party (KANU) illegal. This law was done due to fears that some Kenyans were 
planning to organize an opposition party. By law, Kenya became a one-party nation in 
1982 (Wanyande, 1995). 
Between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the Kenyan media continued to 
report the socio-political issues that concerned the public. These reports were mainly 
focused on the pursuit of multi-party politics. The objective was reached in 1991 after 
the reintroduction of multiparty politics. Since then, the media plays an important role 
in Kenya's multiparty politics. In fact, the media, especially the press, has been 
playing the role of political educator. To educate the Kenyan public on the concept of 
democracy, on what it means to belong to different parties in one nation and the 
importance of the individual's right to vote. Furthermore, after the birth of multi-party 
politics, the print media became a platform for vigorous political debates. These 
debates often took place in harsh environments for the journalists and were often 
unstructured (Mbeke, 2008).  
Better freedom of expression led to the liberation of the media sector, 
ownership of media expanded, and a number of new publications and broadcast 
programs were launched in an attempt to provide more diversified media content to 
the public. Prior to the multi-party politics introduced in 1991, the Moi regime 
controlled both the political environment and the airwaves. Under the Moi 
government, the television and radio functioned as mouthpiece and propagandists for 
the government. The media was forced to report on any events Moi and his ministers 
participated in, even the events were not newsworthy. The circumstance changed after 
the media liberation process took place in the early 1990s. Many new television and 
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radio stations emerged and began to compete with the state-controlled media, the 
KBC. For the first time, the public opinion was not only shaped by the ruling elites, 
but also by the independent media as well (Wasserman, 2013).  
For a long time, Kenya's television and radio market were monopolized by 
KBC. As state-owned media, KBC enjoyed monopoly status for over six decades. The 
liberation of airwaves in the 1990s introduced competition in the media industry by 
allowing the licensing of more broadcasting stations. The liberation of media led to 
intense competition in the media sector and diversified the content of the media. 
When the Moi regime ended in 2002, the media were allowed to openly criticize the 
government and became the major information providers on the current political, 
economic and social development in the country (Somerville, 2011). 
Under the Moi regime, the media silenced general public's opinion on the 
current events. Since the 1990s media liberation, the newly emerged television and 
radio stations became a platform that citizens could communicate with each other via 
interviews and they called into the news programs to talk about their views. Under 
such circumstances, the media helped the Kenyan citizens understand and appreciate 
the concepts of freedom and democracy by giving them a voice and platform to 
express themselves. Not only the ordinary people used media to discuss current events 
with others, the Kenyan politicians and officials also began to call in to comment on 
the issues posted by media, defend their positions and safeguard reputations. The 
content of news became more diversified from the 1990s onwards as a result of the 
market competition (Amutabi, 2013). However, many obstructions to media freedom 
continued with the criminal libel laws and the Official Secrets Act, in particular. Also 
distressing was the Kenyan media’s tendency to lobby on behalf of political parties 
and being a mouthpiece for government and opposite parties instead of a watchdog to 
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keep an eye on the government’s wrongdoings (Ogola, 2011). 
In 2002, opposition leader Mwai Kibaki unseated President Moi and became 
the third President since the independence in 1963. After Kibaki succeeded Moi, he 
guaranteed the Kenyan public a new constitution within the first hundred days of his 
presidency. However, the new constitution was approved eight years later in 2010. 
The media were given more autonomy and allowed full freedom of expression during 
President Kibaki’s first term (2002-2007). The print media continued to have great 
influence over the Kenyan elites. In 2007, three other dailies were established, 
increasing the total number to eight. Nation Media Group launched The Business 
Daily that focused on economic affairs and finance. Soon after the establishment of 
The Business Daily, The Daily Metro developed. The owner of numerous commercial 
radio stations Patrick Quarco also launched The Nairobi Star, like The Daily Metro, 
The Nairobi Star is a tabloid that provided the young Kenyans a less political and 
more lifestyle, music, sport and brief news content (Rambaud, 2008). 
Since the liberation of the airwaves began in 1996 and with the Kibaki 
government giving many radio and television frequencies to private investors, the 
number of television and radio stations grew rapidly. There were fifty new privately 
owned radio stations that emerged between 2003 and 2007. The television market also 
crowded with new players during the same period. The growth in both television and 
radio sectors created a new dimension to the Kenyan political environment. Even 
though KBC still enjoyed the majority share of the market, the Kenyan public seemed 
to prefer the privately owned Kenya Television Network (KNT) and Nation TV 
(NTV). Kenyans can now acquire the information from different media sources, 
unlike previous period the print media was their only source of information 
(Somerville, 2011).   
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With the highest degree of independence, the media has uncovered 
government misconduct, political corruption, and accountability. The media now can 
challenge the government publicly and safeguard a degree of public responsibility 
unlike the media environment before, which was previously manipulated by elites and 
could not be the voice of the general public. Thus, this new constitution that ensured 
media’s independence is no doubt the greatest achievement in the Kenyan's media 
development since the independence in 1963 (Allen & Gagliardone, 2011). 
There were number incidents of press repression that occurred under the 
leadership of Kibaki (Ibelema & Bosch, 2009). In May 2002, a new unpopular media 
law, The Book Newspaper Act, was passed that requires publishers to post a costly 
bond to be deposited prior to publication. This bill frightened a number of publishers, 
particularly in the magazine sector because they could not afford the security bond 
(Amutabi, 2013; Okoth, 2009). Attacks on the media continued during the Kibaki era. 
Two isolated incidents occurred that had a great impact on press freedom. In 2005, 
First Lady Lucy Kibaki, accompanied by her security detail, stormed the Daily Nation 
production center to protest at the paper’s depiction of a quarrel she had with a 
neighbor. Lucy Kibaki stayed in the newsroom for five hours, confiscating notebooks, 
mobile phones, tape recorders, cameras, and other equipment. The first lady was 
enraged over the reports of how she had disrupted a farewell party for the outgoing 
World Bank Kenya director, who lives next door to the president’s private home. She 
said the Daily Nation’s reports were unkind to her and her family. She destroyed 
equipment and assaulted some journalists. The Kenyan government offered no 
comment on this incident and no charges were offered against her (Vasagar, 2005).  
The tension between the government and the media reached its peak on March 
2, 2006, when the government authorized the raid on The Standard and the KTN for 
 147 
“publishing and broadcasting news stories that undermined the legitimacy of 
President Kibaki’s regime” (Kalyongo, 2011: 99). Groups of masked police raided 
The Standard printing plant in the industrial area and the KTN television. Ten of 
thousands of newspapers were burnt and production equipment confiscated. The 
damage was so severe KTN had to suspend broadcasting for 13 hours until the 
following day (Lacey, 2006). In addition, the Kibaki government asked all public 
organizations to boycott the Standard Media Group and channeled their advertisement 
to the media companies that were supportive of the government (Rambaud, 2008). 
This raid was the first time in Kenya's history the government has shut down a major 
media outlet. It was the most aggressive assault on a mainstream media outlet since 
Kenya's independence in 1963 (Nguyen, 2006).  
The Kenyan media play a critical role in multi-party politics. Indeed, the 
media, especially the print media, have played an increasingly significant role in the 
political, cultural, and economic transformation in the country. They have done this 
by educating and informing the public about various important issues as well as 
offering a platform for collective discussion and evaluation of choices to allow the 
public to reach thoughtful decisions (Ogenga, 2008). The Kenyan media played an 
instrumental role both during the campaigns to the nation’s general election in 2007 
and the aftermath. In both circumstances, the media performed dual missions: to keep 
the public informed of the current political events and to condemn the elites’ 
wrongdoings. The media also functioned as a civic educator to provide a platform for 
debate, where politicians and the general public engaged each other in discussing 
major political issues (Rambaud, 2008).   
During the election campaign, Kenya’s mainstream newspapers, the Daily 
Nation and The Standard demonstrated professionalism. These papers continued to 
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inform the public on the election’s progress after disputed results of the presidential 
election were announced. When the post-election violence began, two leading 
newspapers continued performed their role to inform Kenyans of progress. They 
wanted to help the public understand the reasons behind the violence. They 
condemned both Party of National Unity (PNU), the Kibaki government, and Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM) led by Raila Odinga for their involvement in the 
campaigns and urged Kenyans to stay peaceful and be united for the welfare of the 
nation (Ojwang, 2009). 
When the post-election violence broke out in Kenya because of a delayed 
announcement of results. The government used Kenya Broadcasting Corporation 
(KBC), a state-owned media to declared Kibaki as the winner of the presidential 
election on December 30, 2007, three days after the vote took place. Only KBC was 
allowed to run the footage of the announcement, the rest of media could only 
retransmit the KBC signals to broadcast the announcement (Rambaud, 2008). 
Moreover, the Ministry of Internal Security decided to suspend live broadcast of all 
news bulletins in “the interest of security and public tranquility” (Rambaud, 2008:94). 
This move sparked outrage and led to protests across the country. The government 
justified the decision in a statement “in the present atmosphere, some people are using 
the media in inciting violence" (Reporters without Borders cited in Rambaud, 
2008:94). A ban on live news broadcasting imposed by the government was designed 
to defuse public anger. Any media organization violating this rule would be shut 
down indefinitely. Despite the public outrage, the chairman of the Media Council also 
strongly resisted government's action and announced that the media owners had 
decided to disregard the government's ban on live coverage (The Standard, 2008). 
The media's coverage of the 2007 elections has become an intense debate in 
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Kenya’s media industry. It was the first time the media witnessed police brutality and 
was shocked by the unexpected violence and domestic conflict. The media was 
terrified, and newsrooms were filled with the tension. Under this circumstance, they 
chose to censor themselves. The media intentionally censored certain news and didn't 
investigate much about the truth of the voting results to not to feed hatred and to calm 
the situation. During the entire month of January 2008, the media tried to bring the 
message of peace to the nation. 
In the aftermath of the crisis, the Kenyan journalists and the editors of 
mainstream media sensed they had failed in their watchdog role to defend the public 
interest. As Frank Ojiambo, an editor of the Editor's Guild of Kenya expressed in a 
report, “I wish we could have done a better job…had we played our role as media, 
perhaps hundreds of people would not have died” (Ojiambo, 2008:4). David Makali, 
director of the Media Institute criticized the Kenya media houses for not challenging 
the government's live reporting ban because of media practiced self-censorship. 
Moreover, Makali argued that the reason why journalists did not report the truth was 
that they were afraid both the government and the public might turn their outrages 
against them (2008, cited from Reporters Without Borders). 
 
 
The Political Economy of the Kenyan Media 
In the past decades, the ownership of the Kenyan media has been 
concentrating on a few corporations and individuals. Media owners are profiting from 
the concentration of ownership. These powerful media houses have successfully 
rejected government plans to regulate cross-ownership (Mbeke, Ugangu, & Okello-
Oriale, 2010). Although Kenya has more than seven daily newspapers, over 100 radio 
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stations, 17 television stations, and 13 weekly and monthly papers, the media market 
is dominated by four groups: The Nation Media Group, the Standard Group, the 
Royal Media and Radio Africa. Each media group owns print and broadcasting media 
station and has their own platform to distribute and publish their content. A few 
powerful players shape the media ownership structure. In order to monopolize the 
market, they employed of different methods to block new players from entering the 
market. The methods they use ranged from interfering with licensing processes and 
monopolizing advertising and distribution networks (Allen & Gagliardone, 2011). 
Even though major media houses have been reinforcing barriers for media 
entry nationally, their efforts to control media ownership in the region have been 
ineffective to date. Powerful media players used their political power to influence the 
government’s registration process and the Kenya Communications (Amendment) Act 
of 2008. President Kibaki issued an order to review elements that major media houses 
thought were restrictive. This was a result of an aggressive lobbying campaign carried 
out by the Kenya Media Owners Association (Allen & Gagliardone, 2011).  
In spite of progress in media freedom and development, the Kenyan media is 
still influenced by institutional, economic, and political forces. As discussed above, 
Kenya's unique history of colonialism, political competitions, and political and 
economic liberalization has had a great impact on the pace of media development. 
Kenya's political history raises barriers to its media independence. For instance, print 
media continues to switch their support from one party to the other. The quality and 
credibility of their reports are also compromised. Kenya's economic liberalization 
encouraged and promoted by the international donor community has helped the 
Kenyan media grow to an extent. Through following a neoliberal economic 
liberalization model, Kenya is facing potential crises of media ownership 
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concentration because there have been no ownership regulations imposed or proposed 
on corporate interests (Allen & Gagliardone, 2011).   
Unlike many of Kenya’s neighboring countries, widespread violence and 
governmental repression are not major concerns to the country’s independent media. 
Instead, Kenya faces its own unique political, cultural, and economic challenges such 
as the political corruption that remains a critical socio-cultural issue in Kenyan 
society. Despite the issue of political corruption, the concentration of media 
ownership also restricts the voices of the Kenyan media and the choices of the 
Kenyan public (Allen & Gagliardone, 2011). 
 
News Framing of China in Africa 
According to Herman Wasserman, “China's presence in Africa is usually 
viewed as a controversial one and often portrayed as a Manichean binary – either 
‘predator or partner’” (cf. Le Pere, 2006), “friend or foe’, ‘comrade or colonizer’” 
(Nullis, quoted in Zeleza 2008: 173). Questions are frequently asked in terms of 
"either-or". China’s engagement in Africa is often framed in the questions such as: “Is 
China just the latest in a line of exploiters of Africa's rich natural resources who put 
their own economic interests above humanitarian, environmental or human rights 
concerns, or is China's engagement an extension of ‘South-South solidarity’?” (Manji, 
2012).  
Olorunnisola & Ma's study examined newspaper's framing of China's presence 
in Nigeria, South Africa, China, and the United States found that China's engagement 
with Africa was framed as “controversy”, “partner”, and “new power” by South 
Africa and Nigeria newspapers, “partnership” and “refutation” by Chinese newspaper, 
and “competitor” and “watchfulness” by the US newspaper. The controversy frame 
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presented China’s engagement with Africa as complicated, including both positive 
and negative consequences of Chinese presence in Africa. One of key controversy 
frames was the negative portrayal of China’s no-strings approach. The partnership 
frame depicted China’s engagement with Africa as a cooperation and collaboration 
relationship and China as an investor in Africa’s railways and infrastructure 
development. The new power frame presented China as a new economic power and a 
model for Africa’s development (2013).   
Two major frames in China Daily’s coverage of Sino-Africa relations were 
partnership and refutation. The partnership was the frame China's state newspaper 
employed to promote and strengthen Sino-Africa relations. China Daily also 
employed refutation frame to explain its presence in Africa and refuted the Western 
allegation of neocolonialism. The competitor frames in the Wall Street Journal 
emphasized China’s contest with Western powers for Africa’s natural resources and 
markets. Another frame frequently used in the Wall Street Journal was the 
watchfulness frame. The watchfulness frame highlighted the need to be cautious of 
China’s engagement with Africa and the concern that China might surpass Western 
influence in the Africa (Olorunnisola & Ma, 2013). The findings in Olorunnisola and 
Ma’s study mirror the popular narratives of Chinese presence in Africa. On the one 
hand, China is framed positively as a partner. On the other hand, China’s motives are 
questioned. Olorunnisola and Ma note that there is an important element missing from 
the media frames, which is African countries’ counter approach to the Chinese 
involvement.  
 
Methodology 
Like other countries, where media outlets depend on elite media to set their 
 153 
news agenda (Castell, 2009), in Kenya, most of the media houses get their news 
agendas from the daily newspapers report of the major events and issues. Therefore, 
the two most influential dailies—the Daily Nation and The Standard are the suitable 
representations of the Kenyan media and the general public’s perception of Chinese 
presence.  
 
Sample Collection 
News articles that published by the Daily Nation and The Standard between 
January 1, 2016, and December 31, 2016, were retrieved from the LexisNexis 
Academic database and The Standard website for the current study. While the 
LexisNexis Academic database included articles for The Daily Nation, The 
Standard’s articles were obtained from the publication’s official website. The 
timeframe selected was based on the accessibility of the news articles in the library 
database. The units of analysis were the individual newspaper articles and the 
sampled articles were read in their sums.  
Kenyan news media plays a key role in shaping the Kenyan people’s 
perception of China’s engagement in the country. Although there are seven daily 
newspapers in Kenya, the press was dominated by two powerful media houses, the 
Nation Media Group (NMG) and the Standard Group (SG). There were no ideological 
preferences that could clearly distinguish these two newspapers (Obonyo, 2003). 
Instead, the key factors that influenced these two newspapers’ political preferences 
are the issues of ownership, ethnic considerations, and business interests (Esipisu & 
Khaguli, 2009). 
The Daily Nation was first published in 1960 in Nairobi on the verge of 
independence. It was founded by the NMG with Aga Khan as the principal 
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shareholder. The Daily Nation was established after the founder Aga Khan purchased 
the Kiswahili paper Taifa (now Taifa Leo) in 1958 and decided to launch an English-
language newspaper called the Nation to support Kenyan independence and protect 
the owner’s interests (Loughran, 2010). According to an Open Society Foundation 
report, the Daily Nation is the most widely read and influential newspaper in Kenya 
(Nyabuga & Booker, 2013). It is also “arguably The New York Times of Kenya’s 
newspaper industry” (Onyebadi, 2008: 20).  
The Standard is the oldest newspaper in Kenya, established in 1902 as The 
African Standard by Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee. The Standard Group Limited whose 
primary shareholder is SNG Holding Limited owns the newspaper. Over the past 100 
years, The Standard’s circulation was mainly focused on the Kenyan market. In 1905, 
British businessmen Rudolf Mayer and A.G.W. Anderson purchased the newspaper 
from Jeevanjee and renamed it into the East African Standard. The objective of the 
new owners was to make the newspaper the “most influential and widely read 
publication in colonial East Africa” (Karanja, 2000: 29). When The East African 
Standard dominated the Kenyan press, it continued to represent the “voice of the 
largely conservative white settlers and opposed African nationalist aspirations” 
(Faringer, 1991: 11). Because of its status as the voice of conservative white settlers, 
The Standard’s shift to “identify with the aspirations of Africans was painstakingly 
slow even after independence” (Obonyo, 2003: 530).  
Keywords used in this data search were “China”, “Chinese” and “Chinese 
media”. Only articles that directly related to China's engagement in Kenya were 
included in the analysis. The results of the search were screened in order to eliminate 
duplicate and irrelevant results. The initial keyword search of articles found 127 
articles of the Daily Nation and 50 news articles of The Standard. After removing 
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duplicated and not relevant articles, 85 articles were identified and focused on the 
topic of China’s engagement in Kenya. Among them, 45 articles published by the 
Daily Nation and 40 articles appeared in The Standard.   
The specific data analytic steps employed conducted the framing analysis are 
as follows: first, retrieved the most relevant news articles used the combination of 
search words mentioned above. Then, each news article was read carefully to 
underline aspects of the texts that were relevant to China’s current engagement in 
Kenya. Next, a second immersive reading was conducted to take notes of recurrent 
themes of China’s presence in Kenya that were selected and narrated by the 
newspapers. Finally, a repeated reading of each text was done where frames were 
clarified, and important meanings were distinguished. News texts from both 
newspapers were constantly compared to distinguish the similarities and differences 
between their coverage.  
 
News Framing of the Chinese Presence in Kenya 
This analysis seeks to answer two key questions: How China's engagement in 
Kenya was framed and represented in the Kenyan newspapers and how was China 
being represented in their reports? After a close reading of all retrieved articles 
focused on China’s engagement in Kenya from the Daily Nation and The Standard, 
this study finds that the focus of both newspaper’s coverage falls into three categories: 
diplomatic visits and meetings, business deals, and cultural cooperation. Business 
investments were an essential feature of Kenyan newspapers’ coverage of Chinese 
presence in the country during the study period.  
China’s growing engagement with Kenya has drawn extensive attention and 
triggered heated debates about the impact of its presence in Kenya. This study was 
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particularly interested in determining how China’s engagement with the country was 
framed in Kenya’s two leading newspapers. The findings indicated China’s 
involvement in Kenya was framed as “development partner”, “economic competitor”, 
and “controversy” by Kenyan newspapers. The findings show that the main focus of 
85 articles in the two newspapers was on economic engagement between two 
countries. Among them, 52 articles focused on economic engagement, 17 focused on 
culture and media, and 16 focused on diplomatic involvement. The findings also 
indicated that there was a similar tendency in the key focus of both newspapers. The 
majority of the reports focused on China’s economic engagement in Kenya. The Daily 
Nation had 27 articles and The Standard had 25 articles. The focus of both 
newspapers’ coverage of China’s economic involvement was on Chinese investment 
in large infrastructure projects such as the construction of the Standard Gauge 
Railway.  
The majority news articles framed China’s involvement as a development 
partner highlighted the positive aspects of China and Chinese companies’ 
contributions to the country’s industrialization. The frame focused on the potential 
benefits of Chinese engagement to boost Kenya’s economic development. The Daily 
Nation and The Standard used recurring words such as “spurring”, “progressive”, and 
“beneficial” to frame Chinese presence as an important solution to the country’s 
current economic condition. The majority of the sources quoted under the partner 
frame were the Kenyan officials who strongly praised China’s involvement, 
presenting Chinese presence as a means to help Kenya improve its social and 
economic standing.  
Statistical evidence was frequently used to illustrate China’s positive 
contributions to the country’s economic development. For instance, a news article 
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from the Daily Nation cited statistical evidence from a policy research paper 
published by the World Bank to indicate Chinese companies' contribution to 
increasing employment opportunities in Kenya. The World Bank report found that, 
unlike the popular belief that Chinese companies bring their own workers to work in 
their Kenya sites, “93 percent of companies report hiring Kenyan employees" (Okoth, 
2016). The Daily Nation published another article that also used statistical evidence to 
indicate a positive impact of China's loans on Kenya's social and economic 
development. China’s engagement with the country was framed as the strategic 
partnership. 
When the Kenyan media framed Chinese presence as the country’s 
development partner, not as an exploitative foe, the narratives focused on China’s 
solid economic contribution and assistance to infrastructural development in Kenya. 
By framing China as a “development partner,” the readers were encouraged to view 
the engagement from a mutual benefits perspective and downplayed the potential 
negative impact of China's involvement in Kenya's industrialization process. Even 
though readers can still exercise their own judgment to make sense of China's 
involvement in the country, there is still a strong possibility the dominant news 
frames still have a great impact on readers' perceptions of the events and issues.    
While China’s engagement with Kenya has been framed in favorable 
narratives as a “development partner”, the Kenyan media also expressed their 
concerns regarding the economic consequences of the increasing Chinese 
involvement. For instance, in the Daily Nation’s commentaries on China’s economic 
engagement with the country, the economic competitor frame was represented in a 
cautious manner such as “cheap Chinese imports may hurt Kenya’s bid to 
industrialize" (Okoth, 2016) and "if we are not careful, the idea of Chinese 
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engagement with us could lead to deindustrialization may not be far-fetched" (Otuki, 
2016). The focus of the coverage on the Chinese manufactured goods import is 
concentrated on the competition aspect of China's involvement in the country. It is 
clearly perceived in the newspaper that local industries have lost business and are 
facing serious business competition from China in both domestic and foreign markets. 
The concern expressed in these news commentaries is the fear that Chinese 
competitions might have a negative impact on Kenya's economy because if the 
manufacturing sector stagnates, Kenyan workers might lose their jobs. Under such 
circumstances, it is difficult to move people out of poverty and to improve Kenyan's 
living standard (Sanghi & Johnson, 2016). 
In addition to the concerns over the impact of cheap Chinese imports on local 
manufacture sector, Chinese construction companies won Kenya’s infrastructure bids 
is another key feature that was frequently reported and commented in both 
newspapers’ coverage of China’s involvement in the country. A variety of concerns 
about China and Chinese companies’ involvement in Kenya’s infrastructure projects 
have been raised. 
The need for infrastructure development in Kenya has forced Kenyan 
government to open its infrastructure sector to foreign investments. It made easy for 
China and Chinese companies to invest in Kenya's infrastructure projects. Since the 
FOCAC summit in 2000, China has become a major player in Kenya’s infrastructure 
sector. The majority of current Kenyan construction projects were done by Chinese 
companies (Enock et al, 2015). 
Economic competitor frame depicted China’s investment as potentially 
harmful to local business sectors. The negative representation of Chinese engagement 
with Kenya’s infrastructure is often associated with corrupt practices by Chinese 
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construction companies, as an editorial in the Daily Nation states, “it is a statement of 
growing power and influence of a certain group of Chinese constructors, who have 
learnt the art of patronage politics and how to play different factions in government 
against one another” (Kisero, 2016). Similarly, The Standard reports, after a local 
construction company SS Mehta & Sons Limited won a construction tender, "the 
tender committee is unable to execute the award after instructions from high-ranking 
officials in Government demanded that the tender be awarded to Chinese firm China 
Wu Yi Construction Company Limited, giving a glimpse into Chinese influence in 
major infrastructure projects in Kenya” (Omondi, 2016).  
The main sources quoted under this frame where local business operators. In 
the Daily Nation and The Standard, the articles that framed Chinese presence from 
the competitor perspective indicated China’s involvement is hurting local business, 
for instance, "Chinese constructors rule the roost in Kenya" (Kisero, 2016) and 
"Chinese firms' dominance in major projects jolts Kenyan constructors" (Omondi, 
2016). The words and phrases used to emphasize this perspective are " jolt" "edge 
out" "pushed out" and "gobbled up" to frame Chinese companies as strong 
competitors to local enterprise. 
The surge in Chinese investment and China’s growing influence in Kenya has 
sparked controversy, mainly through questions about cheap Chinese imports, Chinese 
companies' misconducts and Chinese loans. Over the past two years, China's loans 
have attracted a heated debate, concerns of China's loans intensified after the World 
Bank warned the Kenyan government that it's "appetite for Chinese loans risks 
choking the economy on the huge repayment burden" (Ngugi, 2016). 
News articles used the controversy frame depicted China's involvement in 
terms of disagreements with Kenya's practices. For example, there are multiple 
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articles about the debate over the impact of the Chinese loans. In an opinion piece, the 
Daily Nation columnist criticized loans the Kenyan government borrowed from China 
are expensive and “poorly-negotiated,” and these loans would pose risks to Kenya’s 
future generations (Kisero, 2016). On April 6th, 2016, the Daily Nation opinion piece 
warned “China’s loans can bring debt to unsustainable levels. Some of China’s loans 
are non-concessional, which can raise debt-to-gross domestic product levels quickly” 
(Ngugi, 2016). On May 25, 2016, the Daily Nation article headlined “In looking at 
‘friendly’ Chinese loans, the devil is in the detail” also questioned the intention of 
these Chinese loans. In this article, the Daily Nation's columnist Jaindi Kisero 
highlighted the terms of the loan agreement and explained why the Chinese loans are 
controversial. A few months later, the Daily Nation published another article 
headlined, "Why Chinese Loans are a recipe for huge debt burden on Kenya" (Okoth, 
2016). In this article, a Kenyan economist Gitau Githogo warned that "Kenya risks 
choking in the heavy loans whose ‘no strings attached’ outlooks are deceiving given 
the way the country gives into various economic benefits during the implementation 
of the projects done by the Chinese" (ibid). Githogo said that the Chinese government 
is using its financial leverage to win Kenya's infrastructure projects and successfully 
deny local companies’ opportunities to contribute to local economy. The biggest 
controversy of China's loans is that Chinese companies performed the projects' 
feasibility research, won the tenders, and were financed by China Exim Bank. 
Apparently, it is contradictory. This article ended with a quote from another economic 
analyst Robert Shaw indicating that Chinese loans are very expensive. Undoubtedly, 
Chinese loans would burden Kenyans for generations and the situation can be avoided 
if the Kenyan government borrows from other alternatives (ibid).   
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Articles with controversy frames related to China’s involvement often 
revolved around unfairness or secrecy over contracts. On July 4th, 2016, The Standard 
published an article headlined “Chinese fish floods Kisumu markets” reports about 
controversial sentiments between the Chinese company and Kenyan fish farmers over 
Kenyan fish markets. It showed how cheap Chinese fish retailing in local markets and 
“killed the fishing industry” around Lake Vitoria regions (Ogutu, 2016). This news 
report has opened a debate and led to local “leaders protest over fish imports from 
China" (Ayaga, 2016). According to the PMs from affected regions, China fish 
imports have caused serious economic damage on local fish production. As a result, 
"hundreds of local fishmongers have been pushed out of business”. These leaders also 
argued, "lack of guarantees on the safety of the fish has exposed consumers to lead 
posting and cholera, among other health effects" (Ibid). They demanded the Kenyan 
government "to protect local fish farmers and these communities that stand to lose out 
in any competition with large Chinese fish imports" (The Standard, 2016). 
 
 
Representation of China in the Kenyan Newspapers 
Another objective of this news analysis is to uncover how China has been 
represented in two leading Kenyan newspapers. The articles were grouped into three 
broad categories: positive, negative, and neutral. The majority of articles portrayed 
China in neutral terms, 8 articles portrayed China positively, and 14 articles portrayed 
China negatively. There were 32 articles in the Daily Nation that portrayed China in 
neutral terms, 5 portrayed China positively, and 8 articles with a negative portrayal. 
For The Standard, there were 31 articles that portrayed China in neutral terms, 3 
articles depicted China positively, and 6 articles represented China in a negative light.  
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Most of the articles that gave positive portrayals were about China's financial 
assistance and Chinese projects to Kenya. Other articles focused on cultural 
collaboration between the two countries. China's benevolence in giving economic 
assistance to Kenya was reflected by several stories. The story, "Future is bright for 
China-Kenya cooperation" highlighted the positive results of mutual and pragmatic 
cooperation between the two countries (Liu, 2016). Another article framed China 
provided the loans with its successful experience in which Kenya could benefit. In an 
opinion piece headlined "Chinese loans useful for Kenya's progress", the writer noted 
that the Chinese loans and projects would boost Kenya's economic and social 
development significantly if the Kenyan government deployed them properly. Three 
decades ago, China experienced a similar economic situation. China was in need of 
capital to support its social and economic development, just like Kenya's current 
circumstance (Guo, 2016). 
In addition to China’s economic assistance, another positive presentation of 
Chinese presence in Kenya is that the Chinese increased employment opportunities 
for ordinary Kenyans. For instance, a story headlined “Chinese firms hire more locals 
than foreigners” reports that Chinese companies running in Kenya employ more 
locals than other foreign countries, contrary to popular belief that Chinese firms are 
importing workers from China and hire less local workers as they promised (Okoth, 
2016). Other articles focused on the cultural aspects of Chinese support to Kenya. In 
an article headline, “Chinese experts train farmers on modern farming methods”, 
indicated that the Kenyans have benefited from China’s advanced agricultural 
technology (The Standard, 2016). 
The negative portrayal of China was mostly related to the controversy 
surrounding the standard gauge railway (SGR) and the cheap Chinese manufactured 
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goods. The SGR projects are one of many of Kenya’s infrastructure projects financed 
by China. China’s state-owned Export-Import Bank loaned Kenya $3.6 billion for the 
project. Kenya is expected to use its revenues to repay the debt. However, some 
analysts are raising concerns that the SGR will be a huge financial burden for 
generations of Kenyans. Some of the media coverage depicted China in a negative 
light and criticized the Chinese government using its economic assets to advance its 
geostrategic interests. Critics condemning Chinese loans have left Kenya stuck in a 
debt trap that makes Kenya vulnerable to its influence. In the articles headline “In 
looking at ‘friendly’ Chinese loans, the devil is in the detail” the columnist wrote that 
“the Chinese are worse than the merchants of Venice—overloading us with high-
priced loans and viciously promoting their exports by giving us more and more 
expensive export credit financing” (Kisero, 2016).  
In another article headline, “Why Chinese loans are a recipe for huge debt 
burden on Kenya”, the reporter quoted Nairobi-based economic analyst Gitau Githogo 
indicates that China "attaches the financing to its participation in the projects and 
effectively denies Kenyan firms a chance to bring about more economic impact 
locally" (Okoth, 2016). In the same article, Okoth interviewed another economic 
analyst Robert Shaw. According to Shaw, "Unlike the conditions are given by the 
IMF and other multinational lenders, China is simply looking for business and the 
more projects they get, the easier they lend Kenya. They are very costly loans through 
and Kenya is definitely connecting its feature generations in heavy indebtedness that 
could have been avoided by taking other options" (Shaw cited in Okoth, 2016b). 
The impact of cheap manufactured goods imported from China raised great 
concern in Kenya. Even though cheap Chinese imports have helped improve the 
standing living for many poor Kenyans who could not afford costly Kenyan-made 
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products, China has been blamed for the decline of the local manufacturing sector. 
For instance, an article headlined “Cheap Chinese goods threaten to dim Vision 
2030", reported that Chinese manufactured goods are edging out local businesses. 
China was portrayed negatively as a threat to local manufacturing sectors (Okoth, 
2016a). The article warns that increasing flow of cheap Chinese manufactured goods 
will undermine “Kenya's status as an exporter of products to the East African market” 
and weaken the country’s industrial growth (Ibid).  
The analysis of portrayals of China's engagement in Kenya in the selected 
newspaper articles found that most of the news articles portrayed China neutrally, 
rather than positive or negative. The perceptions were not at the positive end or 
negative end but fell between the two extremes. Despite the perceived smooth 
relationship, voices of individuals critical of China have raised concerns about cheap 
imported Chinese goods undercutting local traders and are driving the local 
companies out of business, and that controversial Chinese loans might burden future 
generations.  
This chapter uses Kenya media’s response to China’s increasing engagement 
with the country as a case study to gain a better understanding of how China’s 
engagement with the country was perceived by the Kenyan media after it invested 
huge amount of resources in its media’s international expansion. The literature review 
shows that the general perception of China’s involvement in Africa in the West is 
predominantly negative and that China is depicted as a neocolonialist, therefore Sino-
African relations are exploitative. Unlike Western media’s representation of Chinese 
presence in Africa, the present study found that the Kenyan media’s perceptions of 
China’s involvement in the country are generally neutral rather than negative or 
positive. However, China’s growing influence in the country should not be viewed as 
 165 
stagnant because there are many factors at play, including Kenya’s relations with 
traditional Western donors and other countries like Japan and India.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION  
 
 
Over the past three decades, China has gradually ascendant as an important 
power player and its rise has attracted considerable attention from scholars and media 
around the world. In just few decades, China has transformed itself from a massively 
impoverished agricultural country into an impressive economic powerhouse. The 
economic reforms had lifted half of its population out of poverty and became the 
world’s second-biggest economy. Along the way, China’s economic rapid growth 
also stimulated other countries’ development, due to the country’s demand for raw 
materials, energy and capital flows. As China’s economic power strengthened, the 
Chinese government gained the resources to create and enhance its cultural influence 
over other nations (Zhang, 2010).  
China’s rise has become a hot topic in international media narratives, 
especially its relationship with African countries. Many conflicting views that have 
emerged to interpret China’s increasing engagement with African countries, some of 
them see China’s engagement as win-win cooperation that benefit the parties 
involved. Others view China as a new colonial power, whose purpose is to exploit 
Africa’s natural resources and new consumer markets. Sino-Africa relations are far 
from mutual, Chinese presences are to exploit African countries’ wealth for their own 
interests (Chin, 2014). Such criticism damages China’s national image and has the 
negative impact on Chinese companies’ operations in Africa (Large, 2008). Against 
this background, the Chinese government initiated a “going out” campaign to 
encourage its state-owned media to expand their operations overseas (Xin, 2009; 
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Gagliardone, 2013; Zhang, 2010).   
The concept of a political economic of communication is applied in this study 
to uncover the impacts of political and economic forces on the transformation of the 
Chinese media. This concept connects the media to a broader political economy; it 
examines the influences of both economic and political forces on media and how 
social power is exercised in shaping media (McChesney, 2008). For the political 
economy of communication, the changes in media are often caused by changes in the 
country’s economy and politics. The transformation that occurs in media is both a 
cause and result of societal changes. In the current study, the theory of political 
economy of communication was used to understand how internal and external 
economic forces and political power in both China and Kenya influence the media 
system.  
An analysis of the transformation of media in China from the perspective of 
the political economy of communication explains how the internal and external 
economic and political forces have transformed Chinese media from a pure 
propagandist to media conglomerates that serve two masters: the Party and the 
market. The notion of political economy of communication also helps to unpack the 
current development of the Kenyan media, how the economic and political forces in 
Kenya shifted its media landscape. A historical review of the transformation of the 
media in both China and Kenya is conducted to offer essential background 
information and to show some of the major changes that have occurred in the process 
of the media transformation. 
Before the introduction of the economic reforms and Open-door policy in 
1978, most of the Chinese media companies were owned and fully subsidized by the 
state. Party organ such as the People’s Daily did not need to worry about circulation 
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because they were supported by compulsory subscriptions from public office. News 
media and media professionals were perceived as mouthpieces of the Party and the 
news media was tightly controlled by the state (He, 2006). After the death of 
Chairman Mao in 1976, his successor Deng Xiaoping adopted an Open-door policy to 
modernize the country and improve Chinese people’s living standard. Deng suggested 
a change from a planned economy to a market economy and modernization. In doing 
so, he launched the economic reforms and partly privatized its state-owned companies 
and encouraged them to initiate joint ventures with foreign capital (Wei & Pan, 1999).  
During the reforms, market principles were introduced and adopted by the 
Chinese media. The media began to practice multi-channel financing methods such as 
advertising and sponsorship to make up for the loss of governmental subsidies. Such 
multi-channel financing policy was designed to enhance and modernize China's media 
without the need to increase the state's financial burdens (Lynch, 1999). Between the 
different channels, advertising has become the major non-governmental method of 
financing since its reintroduction in 1979 (Y. Zhao, 1998).  
The economic reform in 1978 also expanded the role of the state in the media 
system. The Chinese media system was moved from complete state regulation to 
partially deregulated industry. This deregulation of the media industry was carried out 
through four developments: commercialization, privatization, liberalization, and 
internationalization. These actions are what political economists called the most 
important examples of the "state's constitutive role" (Mosco, 2009). 
Commercialization took place when the Chinese government replaced state 
regulation with the market mechanism. The Party’s top leaders adopted a capitalistic 
media reform experience to promote a greater market reform and mass media’s 
serious financial obstacle (Winfield, 2005). As previously mentioned, the media in 
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China was completely subsidized by the state before the economic reform. However, 
after the introduction of economic reforms, the government gradually cut the media 
companies’ subsidies and forced them to be financially independent. Under such 
circumstances, media companies were forced to establish close connections with 
advertisers. By the end of the 1980s, advertising revenues had become the major 
source of income for China’s newspapers and broadcasting companies. In 2003, all 
the newspaper's subsidies were terminated except three Party newspapers and a 
journal (Moro & Aikat, 2010). As a result, advertising revenues became media’s 
means of support. Chinese media’s functions and structure have become increasingly 
diversified since the reforms (Y. Zhao, 1998, 2008).  
The process of commercialization has depoliticized the media and made them 
more responsive to their audiences’ need (He & Chen, 1998). Although media 
commercialization has some positive impacts on the media sector, many studies 
suggested the negative impacts of media commercialization on media content. They 
criticized that the media has to give too much space to entertain and neglects public 
welfare content, such as education. The pursuit of commercial interests may lead to 
the vulgarization of media content. Too much advertising is another common 
complaint of media consumers; some newspapers even sell their entire front page to 
an advertiser for a day (Lian et al., 2010). As Y. Zhao claimed, “advertising is itself a 
form of propaganda for the market system, and it reveals . . . political propaganda as 
the dominant form of mobilization speech and subjective making” (2008:85). With 
increasing market forces and deregulation, media transformed themselves into the 
mouthpiece of market forces.  
The media commercialization not only changed the relationship between 
media and market, it also altered the relationship between state and media, even 
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though the government still strictly controls media. The only difference is before the 
launch of the economic reform; the media was controlled by ideological means for the 
purpose of strengthening the political power and sustaining social stability (Q. He, 
2008; Stockmann, 2012). After media commercialization, the Chinese government 
perceived media control as the way to control public opinion that is extremely 
important for social stability. Media control is an important element for the Chinese 
government to increase China’s international influence and strengthen its global 
status. A controlled media would faithfully deliver the Chinese government’s message 
and to present China as a peaceful rising power to their international audience (Q. He, 
2008). With intensifying economic reform, speedy market liberalization, increasing 
commercialization, technological advancements and the influence of globalization, 
media has become one of China's important social agents that help the country boost 
its economic, political, cultural, and social development.   
Since China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), it 
has been recognized as an emerging superpower in the international community. 
Foreign media tends to be extremely selective in their reporting of China by focusing 
on human rights issues, environmental degradation, government corruption, or the 
potential threat to international stability posed by China's growing economic and 
military power. From China’s perspective, foreign media's coverage of the country, 
especially Western media is biased and constitutes a concerted effort to “demonize” 
China. In order to counter foreign media’s negative representations, promoting a 
favorable national image on the global stage has been a top priority of the Chinese 
government. Between 2009 and 2010, the Chinese government reportedly invested 
US$ 8.7 billion to enhance its international communication capabilities (Xie, & Page, 
2013).  
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In the information age, people’s perceptions of other countries are 
unquestionably influenced by the news stories they read and how these nations are 
depicted in local and international media (Brewer, Graf & Willnat, 2003). The image 
of a nation is important in the conduct of international relations because a favorable 
image plays an important role in emphasizing a country’s international influence 
(Benoit & Brinson, 1994). On the international battleground of image projection, the 
winners effectively project images that are embraced by the foreign public, while 
others define a loser’s images (Xie, & Page, 2013). This explains why the Chinese 
government tries to use its economic power and cultural influences to improve its 
national image in Africa.  
China’s increasing presence in Africa has drawn enormous attention and 
concern from around the world. Some scholars interpreted China’s engagement in 
Africa as part of China’s new international approach for power and influence that may 
benefit African countries’ economic development (Kitissou, 2007). Others view 
China’s engagement in Africa as a neocolonial predator acting aggressively for 
influence and wealth (Bangui, 2011). Those critics argue China has entered a new 
“scramble for Africa” and started “new Chinese imperialism” that has great impacts 
on the continent (van Dijk, 2011). 
There is great dichotomy in African perceptions about China’s involvement in 
Africa. Proponents perceive China as a non-confrontational economic partner, 
contributing significantly to the economic development in many host African 
countries. Many Africans perceive China as an alternative influence in Africa that is 
different from the role the West played in the past, as resource-extractors and 
political-nanny (Wang & Elliot, 2014). Despite the favorable perception of Chinese 
presence, China’s involvement in Africa also receives criticism from Africans. 
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Certain business practices by the Chinese companies have created resentment over the 
issues such as labor rights and employment opportunities. For those critics, the 
Chinese companies who invested in Africa are for quick-profits, resource-extraction, 
and not treating Africans as their equal business partners, such perception lead to a 
huge gap between Chinese approaches and African perspectives (Harneit-Sievers et 
al., 2010; Shelton & Kabemba, 2012). Such resentment led to resistance and China is 
depicted as an economic and cultural imperialist power. In order to narrow such a 
perception gap and articulate a favorable image, the Chinese government invested 
massive resources to enhance its media and cultural influence in African countries.  
A nation’s outreach reflects the purposes and domestic situations of that 
country. This is true in the case of China’s media and cultural engagement in Africa. 
In China’s early media engagement with African countries, media was used to 
achieve China’s desires to establish diplomatic relations with newly independent 
African nations. During the 1980s and 1990s, media collaborations were used to 
repair China’s international image, strengthen its political ties, and engage audiences 
in the important regions (Wu, 2012). As Sino-African relations evolved, so has the 
nature of China's media and cultural engagement in African countries. Currently, 
Chinese media and cultural engagement in Africa is a component of China’s “going 
out” campaign that is aimed at strengthening diplomatic and economic relations. Mass 
media, the Confucius Institutes, scholarship programs, and exchange of academics 
have been employed to engage audiences and shape their perceptions of China in 
strategically important countries in Africa.  
The expansion of China’s media operations in Africa is widely read as China’s 
“charm offensive”, an attempt to use the media to make China more appealing to its 
international audiences (Kurlantzick, 2007). However, Anbin Shi, professor of media 
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and cultural studies at Tsinghua University, suggests that China’s “going out” 
campaign to improve its image abroad should be viewed as “charm defensive” that is 
a response to the negative representation of China in the international media and an 
attempt to counter such misrepresentations (2015).  
China’s current media expansion is intertwined with its heavy investment in 
the growing African media markets. Today, African cable audiences have access to 
CNC World, the English-language television channel of the Chinese state news 
agency. CNC has reached 6.7 million subscribers to DStv, Africa’s biggest digital 
satellite television platform. Xinhua News Agency relocated its editorial office from 
Paris to Nairobi in 2006. The objectives of the relocation are to provide news 
portfolios to African subscribers and compete with Western news agencies. Today, 
Xinhua’s news wires are published by African leading newspapers (Jacobs, 2012). 
Xinhua also launched a mobile application in 2011 to offer its news services to 
millions of mobile phone users in Africa (Shi, 2015).  
In the broadcasting sector, CCTV Africa was launched in Nairobi in 2012 to 
cover news on the continent and offered daily news programs from a Chinese point of 
view. As Iginio Gagliardone, who studies CCTV's Africa operations, suggests that the 
Chinese government is using CCTV Africa to influence Africans' perceptions of 
China. CCTV Africa's presence on the continent is not only to present positive images 
of China, but also to develop new ways of looking at Africa. By showing a positive 
image of Africa and framing a "Africa rising" narrative, CCTV Africa can position 
China as a partner of African countries, a continent who is also a victim of Western 
media’s negative representations (2013). Also, in 2006, China Radio International 
(CRI) moved its African broadcasting headquarter from Paris to Nairobi and 
partnered with Kenya Broadcasting Corporation. CRI broadcasts on various platforms 
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from shortwave, to the Internet, and apps. It covers all kind of programs, news, and 
entertainment, telling China and Africa stories in different ways (Rønning, 2014). 
On the print media sector, China Daily, China’s leading English-language 
newspaper, has extended its reach to English-language readers in major African 
countries, as well as online. China Daily has been publishing its African edition plus a 
special supplement of African Weekly and a magazine titled China Africa since 
December 2012. China Daily can be purchased in the newsstands together with 
Kenya’s leading newspapers such as The Daily Nation and The Standard in major 
African cities (Shi, 2015). 
StarTimes represents one of the most remarkable Chinese success stories in 
Africa. It began its African operations in 2002 with a specialization in Digital 
Terrestrial Television. The company has benefited greatly from the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) decision to switch television signals from analog to 
digital television broadcasting by 2015.  During the migration process, StarTimes 
successfully placed itself in the lead by providing cheap subscriptions through set-top 
boxes that provide access to digital broadcasting and negotiated digital provider 
contracts with governments and public broadcasters (Rønning, 2014). 
In addition to Chinese media’s expansion, the Chinese government also 
invited African journalists and media professionals to China to attend workshops or 
training programs. The topics of these workshops and training programs included 
Chinese political, economic, social, technological and cultural development. The 
participating Chinese media companies also provide internships to these African 
participants. The African visitors and trainees were not limited to Marxist journalism, 
but also given access to market-oriented media outlets and invited to join in debates 
on topics such as objectivity, professionalism, citizen journalism, and media 
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management (Shi, 2015).  
Among African states, Kenya was selected as an important cultural and media 
hub where China has established a strong media presence. For example, CRI 
developed more partnerships with local radio stations and added six new languages to 
its broadcasts since 2009. CNC World was established by Xinhua television in 2010, 
later it partnered with Safaricom, Kenya’s leading mobile operator, to launch their 
first mobile newspaper in Africa in 2011. The most recent move of Chinese media 
engagement in Kenya was the launch of CCTV Africa and China Daily Africa 
Weekly in 2012. Both media companies chose Nairobi as the headquarters of their 
African operations (Zhang & Mwangi, 2016). 
Currently, China’s media functions as alternative media in Africa and is 
embraced by the Kenyans for the positive and constructive reports on African affairs. 
Despite their positive contributions, Chinese media still faces numerous challenges in 
Africa. The issues such as editorial independence, reliability, and freedom of 
expressions are major concerns of both the Western and African scholars (Zhang & 
Mwangi, 2016). Additionally, Kenyans might have difficulty to accept China's top-
down media model due to their strong tradition of independent and critical media 
power (Harber, 2013). Although the Chinese media's positive reporting will help 
position China as an ally of Africa, it will take time for the Africans to accept this 
approach and build trust. Thus, Chinese media needs to find more balanced strategies 
for their operations in Africa to be favorable and sustainable. The influence of 
Chinese media depends on how much they have been accepted by the African public 
and media markets (Y.S. Wu, 2012).  
Understanding African media’s responses on China’s engagement with their 
homeland have become essential in comprehending China’s growing influence in 
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Africa. As the literature review shows, the general perceptions of China-Africa 
connections discussed in the West are predominantly negative. China is often 
portrayed as a neocolonialist, and Chinese presence in Africa is depicted as 
exploitative. Unlike the Western media’s negative portrayal of the Chinese presence 
in Africa, the present study found that the Kenyan media’s depiction of China’s 
involvement in Kenya are generally neutral rather than negative or positive. In most 
of the articles analyzed, China was portrayed in neutral terms. Although this media is 
not determinative of how Kenyans think, however, the influence of the news framing 
cannot be ignored because media forces often mobilize the public.  
The Kenyan media’s framing of China’s engagement in the country should not 
be viewed as stagnant because China-Kenya interactions are rapidly evolving. It 
would be useful to take a wider range of media platforms to get a broader insight to 
obtain a better understanding of China’s growing cultural influence in Africa. 
Moreover, a large-scale survey might help to collect Kenyan people’s perceptions 
about China’s state-driven cultural and media investment in Africa.  
A case study of China’s increasing culture and media involvement in Kenya 
can provide a general picture of China’s expanding cultural influence in the age of 
globalization. However, this selection is less than perfect because Kenya is only a 
small, if a highly influential nation of the African countries. Additional studies are 
required to conceptualize how cultural, political, and economic forces, both at home 
and aboard, contribute to China’s growing cultural influence in different countries.  
  
 177 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 
Abuoga, J. B., & Mutere, A. (1988). The History of the Press in Kenya. Nairobi, 
Kenya: African Council on Communication Education. 
 
Adam, L. (1996). Electronic Communications Technology and Development of 
Internet in Africa. Information Technology for Development, 7(3), 133-144.  
 
Adar, K. G., & Munyae, I. (2001). Human Rights Abuse in Kenya Under Daniel Moi, 
1978-2001. African Studies Quarterly, 5.  
  
Adebajo, A. (2008). An Axis of Evil: China, the United States and France in Africa. 
In K. A. a. S. Naidu (Ed.), Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and 
China (pp. 227-258). Scottsville: KwaZulu-Natal Press. 
 
Adieno-Odhiambo, E. (Ed.) (1987). Democracy and the Ideology of Order. New 
York: Praeger. 
 
Adisu, K. (2010). The Impact of Chinese Investment in Africa. International Journal 
of Buinese and Management, 5(9).  
 
Agwata, J. (2015). Digital Migration Nightmare. Kenya Legal Magazine. 
 
Aidoo, R. (2012, October 25, 2012). China's "Image" Problem in Africa. The 
Diplomat. 
 
Ainslie, R. (1996). The Press in Africa: Communications Past and Present. London: 
Africana Publishing Company. 
 
Ajulu, R. (2000). Thinking through the Crisis of Democratization in Kenya: A 
Response to Adar and Murunga. African Sociological Review, 4, 133-157.  
 
Akhavan-Majid, R. (2004). Mass Media Reform in China: Toward a New Analytical 
Framework. The International Journal for Communication Studies, 66(6), 553-
565.  
 
Alden, C. (2005). Leveraging the Dragon: Toward an Africa that can Say No. Yale 
Global Online. 
 
_______. (2007). China in Africa. London: Zed Books. 
 
Alden, C., Large, D., & Soares de Oliveira, R. (Ed.) (2008). China Returns to Africa: 
A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
 
Alden, C., & Davies, M. (2006). A Profile of the Operations of Chinese 
           Multinationals in Africa. South African journal of international affairs, 13(1), 
           83-96. 
 
 178 
 Ali, M. (2009). Globalization & the Kenyan Media. Nairobi, Kenya: Image 
Publications. 
 
Andrain, C. F. (1994). Comparative Political Systems: Policy Performance and Social 
Change. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc. 
 
Antwi-Danso, V. (2011). Sino-Africa Relations: The Myth and Reality, the 
Conjectures and the Refutations. Retrieved from Bejing, China. 
 
Asuelaa, O. M. (2016). Missing Links in Kenya's Digital Migration. Standard Digital. 
Retrieved from Standard Digital website: 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000215220/missing-links-in-kenya-
s-digital-migration 
 
Ayaga, W. (2016). Nyanza and Coast Leaders Protest Over Fish Imports from China. 
The Standard. Retrieved from 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000207669/nyanza-and-coast-
leaders-protest-over-fish-imports-from-china 
 
Baah, A. Y., & Jauch, H. (2009). Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labor 
Perspective: Windhoek, African Labor Research Network. 
 
Babe, R. E. (1995). Communication and the Transformation of Economics. Boulder: 
Westview Press. 
 
Bagdikian, H. B. (2004). The New Media Monopoly. Boston: Beacon Press. 
 
Banda, F. (2009). China in the African Mediascape: A Critical Injection. Journal of 
African Media Studies, 1(3), 343-362.  
 
Bangui, T. (2011). China: A New Partner for Africa’s Development—Are We 
Heading for the End of European Privileges on the Black Continent? 
Hauppauge, NY: Nova Publication. 
 
Barboza, D. (2010, 15 Aug.). China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy. The 
New York Times.  
 
________. (2010, July 3–4, 2010). With New TV Channel, China to Air its 
Perspectives Globally. International Herald Tribune.  
 
Barker, C., & Galasinski, D. (2001). Cultural Studies and Discourse Analysis: A 
Dialogue on Language and Identity. London: Sage. 
 
Barnett, A. D. (1979). The Communication System in China: Some Generalizations, 
Hypotheses, and Questions for Research. In G. C. Chu, & F. L. K. Hsu (Ed.), 
Moving a Mountain: Cultural Change in China (pp. 387-395). University 
Press of Hawaii: Honolulu, HI. 
 
Barton, F. (1979). The Press in Africa: Persecution and Perseverance. New York: 
African Publishing Company. 
 179 
 
Baum, R. (2010). The Fall and Rise of China, Good Reads. Chantilly, Va.: The 
Teaching Company. 
 
Beebe, A., Hew, C., Yueqi, F., & Dailun, S. (2006). Going global: Prospects and 
           Challenges for Chinese Companies on the World Stage. New York: IBM 
           Institute for Business Value-School of Management at Fudan University. 
 
Behar, R. (2008). Special Report: China Storms Africa. Fast Company, 128. 
 
Bejing Review (2008). China–Africa Seeking Equality. Beijing Review. 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2008-05/10/content_115935.htm  
 
Bello, W. (2007). China Eyes Africa: the New Imperialism? Multinational Monitor, 
28(1).  
 
Benoit, W. L., & Brinaon, S. L. (1994). AT&T: Apologies are not enough. 
Communication Quarterly, 42, 75-88.  
 
Berg, S. V., & Hamilton, J. (2000). Institutions and Telecommunications Performance  
            in Africa: Stability, Governance, and Incentives. Private initiatives in 
            infrastructure: Priorities, incentives and performance, 203-26. 
 
Bergeron-Oliver, A. C. (2011). Want a Future in Journalism? Move to Kenya. 
            Huffington Post. 
 
 Bettelheim, C. (1988). Economic Reform in China. The Journal of Development 
Studies, 24(4).  
 
Bishop, R. L. (1989). Qi lai!: Mobilizing One Billion Chinese: the Chinese 
            Communication System. Iowa State Press. 
 
Biwott, S. (2015). Drop Analogue, and Digitize: The Parctical Challenges in Kenya's 
Digital Migration Programme. The International Journal of Humanities & 
Social Studies, 3(12), 270-275.  
 
Bourgault, L. (1995). Mass media in sub-Saharan Africa, . Bloomington, IN.: Indiana 
University Press. 
 
Brady, A. M. (2007). Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in 
Contemporary China. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 
 
Branch, D.,& Cheeseman, N. (2008). Election Fever: Kenya's Crisis. Journal of 
Eastern African Studies, 2(2).  
 
Brandt, L. (2008). China's Great Transformation. In Brandt, L., & Rawski, T. G. 
(Eds.), China's Great Economic Transformation. Cambridge University Press.  
 
 180 
Brautigam, D. (2007). Is Chinese Investment Good for Africa?  Retrieved April 10 
2013, from Council on Foreign Relations http://www.cfr.org/china/chinese-
investment-good-africa/p12622 
 
__________. (2009). The Dragon's Gift: the Real Story of China in Africa. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
__________. (2010). Africa’s Eastern Promise. Foreign Affairs(January).  
 
__________. (2011). Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, Where, Why and 
How Much? In J. S. Golley, Ligang (Ed.), Rising China: Global Challenges 
and Opportunities. Canberra, Australia: The Australian National University 
Press. 
 
Brent, W. (2000). Chinese Wary of WTO Entry. Variety, 76. 
 
Brewer, P. R., Graf, J., & Willnat, L. (2003). Priming or Framing: Media Influence on 
            attitudes Toward Foreign Countries. Gazette (Leiden, Netherlands), 65(6), 
            493-508. 
 
Broadman, H. G. (2009). China-African Trade and Investment: The Vanguard of 
South-South Commerce in the Twenty-First Century. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), 
China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence. Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
 
Brook, T. (1992). Quelling the People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing 
Democracy Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Brown, K., & Chun, Z. (2009). China in Africa: Preparing for the Next Forum for 
            China Africa Cooperation. Asia Programme Briefing Note ASP2009/02. 
            Chatham House. London. 
 
Brown, S., & Sriram, C. (2008). China’s Role in Human Rights Abuses in Africa: 
            Clarifying Issues of Culpability. China Into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence,  
            250-71. 
 
Burgh, H. (2004). The Chinese Journalist: Mediating Information in the World's most 
            Populous Country. Routledge. 
 
Burning Spring (2011). China Central Television to Expand its Nairobi, African 
Office. Burning Spring. Retrieved from 
http://theburningsplint.blogspot.com/2011/06/china-central-television-to-
expand-its.html. 
 
Bryman, A. (1988). Doing Research in Organizations, . New York: Routledge. 
 
Buba, A. G. (2014). Kenya Students to Benefit from ICT Skill Training in China.  
Retrieved from http://techatlast.com/news/kenyan-students-ict-skill-training-
in-china/ 
 
 181 
Budabin, A. (2011). Genocide Olympics: how Activists Linked China, Darfur and 
Beijing 2008. In D. P. Large, Luke A (Ed.), Sudan Looks East: China, India & 
the Politics of Asian Alternatives (pp. 140). Oxford: James Currey. 
 
Business Daily. (2012). Kenyan Traders March to Prime Minister’s Office in Protest 
Against Chinese Dealers. Business Daily. 
 
___________. (2016, June 24, 2016). University of Nairobi Inks Deals for Sh2 billion 
Chinese Center. Business Daily.  
 
Cai, M. Z. (1999). Xinhua News Agency Yearbook 1999. Beijing: Xinhua. 
 
Cao, J., & Liang, S. (2011, January 7, 2011). A Conversation with CNC’s CEO Zhao 
Peng: Let the World Misread China no More. Liberation Daily.  
 
Cao, P. (1999). The Studies of Chinese Press Group. Beijing: Xing Hua Press. 
 
Carmody, P. (2011). The New Scramble for Africa. London: Polity Press. 
 
Carmody, P., & Taylor, I. (2009). Flexigemony and Force in China’s Geo-economic 
Strategy in Africa: Sudan and Zambia Compared. Institute for International 
Integration Studies Discussion Paper, 27, 1-21.  
 
Castells, M. (2009). Communication in the Digital Age. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Cawthrone, A., & Kanina, W. (2008). Kenya Government Turns on Critics. Reuters. 
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/news/intern 
ational/Kenya_government_turns_on_critics.html?siteSect=143&sid=8643744
&cKey=1200920010000&ty=ti  
 
Cha, V. (2008). Beijing’s Olympic-sized Catch-22. The Washington Quarterly, 31(3).  
 
Chan, J. M. (1993). Commercialization without Independecne: Trends and Tensions 
of Media Development in China. In M. B. Joseph Cheng Yu-shek (Ed.), China 
Review 1993. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. 
 
________. (1994). Media Internationalization in China: Processes and Tensions. 
Journal of Communication, 44(3), 70-88.  
 
Chang, C., Cheng, Amy, Kim, Susan, Kuhn-Osius, Johanna, Reyes, Jesús and Turgel, 
Daniel. (2009). Huawei Technologies: A Chinese Trail Blazer in Africa. 
Knowledge @ Wharton. http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/huawei-
technologies-a-chinese-trail-blazer-in-africa/ 
 
Chang, M. H. (1996). The Thought of Deng Xiaoping. Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, 29, 377-384.  
 
 182 
Chang, T. s.-K., Wang, Jian, & Chih-Hsien Chen. (1994). News as Social Knowledge 
in China: The Changing Worldview of Chinese National Media. Journal of 
Communication, 44(3), 52-69.  
 
Chang, T. K., Wang, J., & Chen, Y. (2002). China's Window on the World: TV News, 
            Social Knowledge, and International Spectacles. Hampton Pr. 
 
Chang, W. H. (1989). Mass Media in China: The History and the Future. Ames: Iowa 
State University Press. 
 
Chau, D. C. (2007). Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: U.S. Capabilities and 
Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. Carlisle, 
PA: Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. 
 
Chavula, H. K. (2013). Telecommunications Development and Economic Growth in 
Africa. Information Technology for Development,, 19(1), 5-23.  
 
Chege, M. (2008). Economic Relations between Kenya and China, 1963-2007. In J. 
G. Cooke (Ed.), U.S. and Chinese Engagement in Africa: Prospects for 
Improving U.S.-China Cooperation. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic 
and International Studies. 
 
Chen, C. C., Colapinto, C., & Luo, Q. (2010). China Radio International in the digital 
age: Propagating China on the global scenario. Global Media Journal, 9(16).  
 
Chen, W. (2013). Misleading Portrayal of China in Africa. China Daily. Retrieved 
from China Daily website: http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2013-
05/17/content_16507585.htm 
 
Cheng, E. (2007). Is China Africa’s New Imperialist Power? Green Left Weekly. 
 
Chey, J. (2008). Chinese "Soft Power" - Cultural Diplomacy and The Confucius 
Institutes. The Sydney Papers, 20(1), 33-46.  
 
Chin, Y. (2003). China's Regulatory Policies on Transnational Television Drama 
Flow. Javnost/The Public, 10(4), 75-92.  
 
China Daily (2006). CRI Launches First Oversea FM Radio Station. China Daily.  
 
Cho, L. (2007). The Emergence, Influence and Limitations of Watchdog Journalism 
in Post-1992 China: A Case Study of Southern Weekend. Hong Kong: The 
Hong Kong University Press. 
 
Chow, G. C. (2004). Economic Reform and Growth in China. Annals of Economics 
and Finance, 5, 127–152.  
 
Chu, L. L. (1986). Revolution Becomes Evolution: China’s Communication Across 
30 years. Media Development, 33(1), 8-12.  
 
 183 
Chu, L. L. (1994). Continuity and Change in China's Media Reform. Journal of 
Communication, 44(3), 4-21.  
 
Chuen, L. T. (2008). Regulating China? Regulating Globalization? In D. Guerrero, & 
Manji, F. (Ed.), China's New Role in Africa and the South: A Search for a 
New Perspective. Oxford: Fahamu-Networks for Soical Justice. 
 
Chun, Z. (2013). The Sino-Africa Relationship: Toward a New Strategic Partnership. 
Emerging Powers in Africa.  
 
Cisse, D. (2012). FOCAC: Trade, Investments and Aid in China-Africa Relations. 
 
Condon, M. (2012). China in Africa: What the Policy of Nonintervention Adds to the 
Western Development Dilemma. Praxis: The Fletcher Journal of Human 
Security, XXVII.  
 
Cooke, F. L. (2011). The Globalization of Chinese Telecom Corporations: Strategy, 
Challenges and Human Resources Implications for the MNCs and Host 
Countries. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 23(9), 
1832-1852.  
 
Cooper, A. (2008). China Radio International. A New Presence in the African Media 
Market. Paper presented at the China-Africa: What does it means for the 
Media, University of Westminster.  
 
Cossou, E. (2012). Africa-China Textile Tensions Erupt. In E. Cossou (Ed.), BBC 
News Africa: BBC News. 
 
Cottle, S. (2000). Ethnic Minorities and the Media: Changing Cultural Boundaries. 
Philadelphia: Open University Press. 
 
Crawley, C. E. (2007). Localized Debates of Agricultural Biotechnology in 
Community Newspapers: A Quantitative Content Analysis of Media Frames 
and Sources. Science Communication, 28(3), 314-346.  
 
Dathoren, O. R. (1996). Asian Voyages: Two Thousand Years of Constructing the 
Other. Westport, CT,: Bergin and Harvey. 
 
d'Hooghe, I. (2015). China's Public Diplomacy. Boston: Koninklijke Brill. 
 
Damary, R. (2013). Chinese Institute in Egerton. The Star. Retrieved from The Star 
website: http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2013/12/17/chinese-institute-in-
egerton_c871766 
 
de Burgh, H. (2003). The Chinese Journalist : Mediating Information in the World's 
Most Populous Country. New York: RoutledgeCurzon. 
 
Ding, S. (2011). Branding A Rising China: An Analysis of Beijing's National Image 
Management in the Age of China's Rise. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 
46(3), 293-306.  
 184 
Dittmer, L. (2009). Conclusion. In Y. Hao, & Wei, C.X. G.,  & Dittmer, L. (Ed.), 
Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Globalizaion, and the next 
World Order (pp. 335-348). Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 
 
Dong, R. (2000). The Mass Media Engages with Capital. Retrieved from 
Ultrachina.com website: 
<http://www.ultrachina.com/english/doc.cfm?OID=405&MIDtoc=0&CIDtoc
=62> 
 
Dudek, M. (May 1, 2002). Market Access Report: Media & publishing. 
 
Dumbaugh, K. (2008). China's Foreign Policy: What Does It Mean for US Global 
Interests. Retrieved from Washington DC:  
 
Economy, E., & Monaghan, K. (2006, 7 November 2006). The Perils of Beijing’s 
Africa Strategy. The International Herald Tribune,.  
 
Economy, E. C., & Segal, A. (2008). China's Olympic Nightmare: What the Games 
Mean for Beijing's Future. Foreign Affairs, 87(4), 47-56.  
 
Edney, K. (2012). Soft Power and the Chinese Propaganda System. Journal of 
Contemporary China, 21(78), 898.  
 
Ellul, J. (1965). Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes. New York: Vintage. 
 
Enock, W. W., Okoth, P. G., Were, M. E., & Mwani, C. (2015). From  Ideology to 
Commerce: China's  Foreign Economic Policy Contributing to Development 
of Roads in  Kenya, 1985-2015. Asian Journal of Management Science and 
Economics, 2(2).  
 
Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward Clarification Of A Fractured Paradigm. 
Journal of Communication, 43(4), 51-58.  
 
Esarey, A. (2005). Cornering the Market: State Stragegies for Controlling China's 
Commerical Media. Asian Perspective, 29(4), 37-83.  
 
Esipisu, M., & Khaguli, I. (2009). Eyes of Democracy: The Media and Elections. 
London: Commonwealth Secretariat. 
 
Executive Research Associate (2009). China in Africa: A Strategic Overview, China’s 
Telecommunication Footprint in Africa.  
 
Farah, D. (2010). Winds from the East: How the People's Republic of China seeks to 
influence the Media in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia.  
 
Faringer, G. (1991). Press Freedom in Africa. New York: Praeger. 
 
Farrow, M., & Farrow, R. (2007). The Genocide Olympics. Wall Street Journal, p. 
A17.  
 
 185 
Fathers, M., & Andrew Higgins. (1989). Tiananmen: The Rape of Peking. London: 
Doubleday. 
 
Feng, J. (1991). Xinhua News Agency: 60 Years. Beijing: Xinhua. 
 
Fergus, S. (2013). China and Africa: A Review of Media Coverage.  Retrieved from 
http://politics-reader.blogspot.tw/2013/06/china-africa-review-of-media-
coverage.html 
 
Field, S. (2004). China's Emergence as A World Power: Implications for South Africa 
and Africa. In G. Le Pere (Ed.), China Through the Third Eye: South African 
Perspectives. Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue. 
 
Flynn, D. (2013). Africa Investment-China brings Goods and Roads, now Africa 
wants Jobs. Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/21/africa-china-
idUSL6N0FI3TE20130721  
 
Frynas, J. G., & Paulo, M. (2006). A New Scramble for African Oil? Historical, 
            Political, and Business Perspectives. African Affairs, 106(423), 229-251. 
 
Gagliardone, I. (2013). China as a Persuader: CCTV Africa's First Steps in the 
African Mediashpere. Ecquid Vovi: African Journalism studies, 34(3), 25-40.  
 
____________. (2014). Media Development with Chinese Characteristics. Global 
Media Journal, 4(2).  
 
Gagliardone, I., & Geall, S. (2014). China in Africa's Media and 
Telecommunications: Cooperation, Connectivity and Control.  
 
Gagliardone, I., Repnikova, M., & Stremlau, N. (2010). China in Africa: A new 
Approach to Media Development.  
 
Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1987). Media Discourse and Public Opinion On 
Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach. The American Journal of 
Sociology, 1 (July), 1-37.  
 
Gibson, O. (2002). Murdoch strengthens foothold in China. The Guardian. 
http://media.guardian.co.uk/rupertmurdoch/story/0,11136,863687,00.html>  
 
Gill, B., & Huang, Y. (2006). Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft 
            Power’. Survival, 48(2), 17-36. 
 
Gilward, A. (2005). Good Intentions, Poor Outcomes: Telecommunications Reform in 
South Africa. Telecommunications Policy, 29(7), 469–491.  
 
Gitlin, T. (1980). The Whole World is Watching. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
 
_______. (2005). The Changing Face of China: From Mao to Market. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 186 
 
Glaser, B. S., & Murphy, Melissa E. (2009). Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics: 
The Ongoing Debate.  
 
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. 
New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Goldman, M. (1994). The Role of the Press in Post-Mao Political Struggles. In C.-C. 
Lee (Ed.), China's Media, Media's China (pp. 23-35). Boulder, CO.: Westview 
Press. 
 
Goldstein, A., Pinaud, Nicolas & Helmut Reisen. (2008). China’s Boom: What’s in it 
for Africa? A Trade Perspective. In D. L. Chris Alden, and Ricardo Soares de 
Oliveira (Ed.), China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent 
Embrace. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gordon, K. (1997). Government Allows a New Public Sphere to Evolve in China. 
Media Development, 44(4).  
 
Government of Kenya (2007). Kenya vision 2030. Nairobi 
 
Graber, D. A. (2002). Mass Media and American Politics. Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quaterly Inc. 
 
Grass, S. (2014). Changing the Narrative: China's Media Offensive in Africa.  
 
Green, A. R. (2012). China Daily Launches Africa Edition. Retrieved from This is 
Africa: a Global Perspective website: 
http://www.thisisafricaonline.com/News/ChinaDailylaunchesAfricaedition 
 
Guerrero, D. G., Manji, F., & Manji, F. M. (2008). Introduction: China’s New Role in 
Africa and the South. In Guerrero, D. G., Manji, F., & Manji, F. M. (Eds.), 
China’s New Role in Africa and the South : A Search for A New Perspective 
(pp. 1-6). Nairobi: Fahamu. 
 
Guest, P. (2015). China Pledges $60bn in African Aid at FOCAC Summit. Forbes. 
 
Guo, O. (2016). Bringing U.S. Presidential Debates to a Chinese Audience. The New 
York Times,.  
 
Guo, Z. S. (2001). To Each According to Its Niche: Analyzing the Political and 
Economic Origins for a Structure Segregation in Chinese Press. Journal of 
Media Economics, 14(1), 15-30.  
 
Hachten, W. A. (1993). The Growth of Media in the Third World: African Failures, 
Asian Success. Ames: Iowa State University Press. 
 
Hackett, R. (1991). News and Dissent: The Press and the Politics of Peace in Canada. 
Norwood, N.J.: Ablex. 
 
 187 
Hall, S. (1982). The Rediscovery of Ideology: Return of the Repressed in Media 
Studies, Two Paradigms. In M. Gurevutch, Bennett, T., & Woollacott, J. (Ed.), 
Culture, Society and the Media (pp. 56-90). London: Methuen. 
 
_____. (1997). Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. 
London: Sage. 
 
Hanauer, L., & Morries, Lyle J. (2014). Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drives, 
Reactions, and Implications for U.S. Policy.  
 
Hanban. (2016). Bijing, China: Hanban Retrieved from http://english.hanban.org/ 
 
Harber, A. (2013). China’s Soft Diplomacy in Africa. Ecquid Novi: African 
Journalism Studies, 34, 149-151.  
 
Harneit-Sievers, A., Marks, Stephen,, & Sanusha Naidu (Ed.) (2010). Chinese and 
African Perspectives on China in Africa. Cape Town: Pambazuka Press. 
 
Hartig, F. (2012a). Cultural Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics: The Case of 
Confucius Institutes in Australia. Communication, Politics & Culture, 45, 256-
276.  
 
_______. (2012b). Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China. Journal of Chinese 
Political Science, 17(1), 53-76.  
 
_______. (2015). Africa: China's Confuscius Institutes Aren't Perfect but Have Much 
to Offer Africa. AllAfrica. Retrieved from AllAfrica website: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201512041494.html 
 
Hazelbarth, T. (1997). The Chinese Media: More Autonomous and Diverse--within 
Limits. Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of 
Intelligence. 
 
He, Q. (2008). The Fog of Censorship: Media Control in China. New York: Human 
Rights in China. 
 
He, W. (2006). Moving Forward with the Time: the Evolution of China's African 
Policy. Paper presented at the Workshop on China-Africa Relations: Engaging 
the International Discourse, Hong Kong.  
 
_____. (2008). China's Perspective on Contemporary China-Africa Relations. In C. 
Alden, Large, D., & de Oliveira, R.S. (Ed.), China Returns to Africa: A Rising 
Power and a Continent Embrace. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
He, W. (2013). New Actors in International Development: The Case of China in 
Africa. Paper presented at the A Trilateral Dialogue on the United States, 
Africa and China.  
 
 
 
 188 
He, Z. (2003). How do the Chinese Media Reduce Organizational Incongruence? 
Bureaucratic Capitalism in the Name of Communism. In C. C. Lee (Ed.), 
Chinese Media, Global Contexts. New York: Routledge. 
 
He, Z., & Chen, Hualin. (1998). The Chinese Media: A New Spective. Hong Kong: 
The Pacific Century Press. 
 
Heath, C. (1997). Communication and Press Freedom in Kenya. In F. a. J.-E. Eribo, 
W. (Ed.), Press Freedom and Communication in Africa. Trenton, NJ: Africa 
World Press. 
 
Hellstrom, J. (2009). China's Emerging Role in Africa: A Strategic Overview.  
 
Herman, E. S. (1995). Triumph of the Market: Essays on Economics, Politics and the 
Media. Boston: South End Press. 
 
Hess, S. (2010). Beyond the Rhetoric: Noninterference in China's African Policy. 
African and Asian Studies, 9, 356-383.  
 
Heuvel, J. V., & Dennis, E. E. (1993). The Unfolding Lotus: East Asia's changing 
media.  
 
Hirvensaloor, K. (2012). China Aid and Cooperation: Media Coverage.  Retrieved 
from http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2012/10/chinese-aid-and-coopera- 
 
Hoare-Vance, S. J. (2009). The Confucius Institutes and China’s Evolving Foreign 
Policy. (Master of Art), University of Canterbury, New Zealand.  
 
Hodel, M. (2008). The Scramble for Energy: China’s Oil Investment in Africa. The 
Journal of International Policy Solutions, 9.  
 
Holsag, J. (2008). China's Diplomatic Maneuvering on the Question of Darfur. 
Journal of Contemporary China, 17(54), 83  
 
_______. (2011). The Elusive Axis: Assessing the EU-China Strategic Partnership. 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 49(2), 293-313.  
 
Hong, J. (1994). The Resurrection of Advertising in China: Developments, Problems, 
and Trends. Asian Survey, 34(4), 326-342.  
 
______. (1998). The Internationalisation of Television in China: the Evolution of 
Ideology, Society, and Media since the Reform. New York: Praeger Publisher. 
 
Hong, J. (2011). From the World’s Largest Propaganda Machine to a Multipurposed 
Global News Agency: Factors in and Implications of Xinhua’s Transformation 
Since 1978. Political Communication, 28(3), 377-393.  
 
Hong, J., & Cuthbert, M. (1991). Media Reform in China Since 1978: Background 
Factors, Problems and Future Trends. Gazette, 47, 141-158.  
 
 189 
Hu, J. (2012, July 19 2012). Open Up New Prospects for A New Type of China-
Africa Strategic Partnership. Paper presented at the The 5th Ministerial 
Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing. 
 
Hu, Y. (1986). On the Party’s Journalism Work. Beijing: New China News Agency. 
 
Hu, Z. (2003). The Post-WTO Restructuring of the Chinese Media Industries and the 
Consequences of Capitalization. Javnost/ The Public, 10(4), 19-36. 
 
Hu, Z., & Ji, D. (2012). Ambiguities in Communicating with the World: the “Going- 
             out” Policy of China's Media and its Multilayered Contexts. Chinese journal 
             of Communication, 5(1), 32-37. 
 
Huang, C. (2000). THe Development of a Semi-Independent Press in Post-Mao 
China: An Overview and A Case Study of Chengdu Business News. 
Journalism Studies, 1(4), 649-664.  
 
________. (2001). China’s State-Run Tabloids: The Rise of City Newspapers. 
Gazette, 63(5), 435–450.  
 
________. (2003). Transitional Media vs Normative Theories: Schramm, Altschull, 
and China. Journal of Communication, 53(3), 444-459.  
 
________. (2004). Negotiating with the Global: China’s Response to Post-WTO 
Foreign Media Penetration. Paper presented at the The 15th Biennial 
Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, Canberra.  
 
________. (2006). Transitional Media vs. Normative Theories: Schramm, Altschull, 
and China. Journal of Communication, 53(3), 444-459.  
 
________. (2007). Trace The Stones In Crossing The River: Media Structural 
Changes in Post-WTO China. The International Communication Gazette, 
69(5), 413-430.  
 
________. (2008). China's Renewed Partnership with Africa: Implications for the 
United States. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), China into Africa: Trade, Aid and 
Influence. Washington,, DC: Brooking Institute Press. 
 
Huang, Y. (1994). Peaceful Evolution: The Case of Television Reform in Post-Mao 
China. Media, Culture and Society, 16(217–41).  
 
Huawei. (2013). Telecom Seeds for the Future. In L. Huawei Technologies Co. (Ed.): 
Huawei Technologies Co., LTD. 
 
Hubbert, J. (2014). Authenticating the Nation: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power.  
 
Hughes, C. (2014). Confucius Institutes and the University: Distinguishing the 
Political Mission from the Cultural. Issues and Studies, 50(4), 45-83.  
 
 190 
Hyden, G. (2006). African Politics in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ibelema, M., & Bosch, T. (2009). Sub-Saharan Africa. In A. d. B. J. Merrill (Ed.), 
Global journalism: Topical Issues and Media Systems. Bonton: Pearson 
Education. 
 
Ighobor, K. (2013). China in the Heart of Africa. Africa Renewal, 26(3).  
 
Ilheu, F. (2010). The Role of China in the Portugueses Speaking African Countries: 
The Case of Mozambique. Lisbon: Center of African and Development 
Studies. 
 
Ireri, K. (2012). Tracing African Mass Communication Research Trends from 1980 to 
2009. Paper presented at the The Association for Education in Journalism and 
Mass Communication conference, Chicago, IL.  
 
Itosno, S. (2012). Kenya’s Pay TV Market Set for Boom. Biztech Africa. Retrieved 
from Biztech Africa website: http://www.biztechafrica.com/article/kenyas-
pay-tv-market-set-boom/3214/ - .V_7gYxSGtnk 
 
Jackson, R. (2005). Writing the War on Terrorism. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
 
Jacobs, A. (2012.). Pursuing Soft Power, China Puts Stamp on Africa’s News. New 
York Times.  
 
Jacobs, B. (2011). A Dragon and a Dove? A Comparative Overview of Chinese and 
European Trade Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Current 
Chinese Affairs, 40(4), 17-60.  
 
Jakobson, L. (2009). China's Diplomacy Toward Africa: Drivers and Constraints. 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 9, 403-433.  
 
Jernow, A. L. (1993). Don't Force Us to Lie: The Struggle of Chinese Journalists in 
the Reform Era. New York: Committee to Protest Journalists. 
 
Ju, P. (2016). President Xi's Media Tour Draws Positive Feedback From Reporters, 
Journalism Academia. Xinhua Net. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-
02/21/c_135116423.htm 
 
Juma, V. (2011). Chinese Firm Wins Digital Signal Distribution Tender. Business 
Daily. Retrieved from http://china-screen-news.com/2011/06/chinas-pan-
african-network-wins-kenyan-digital-tv-broadcast-licence-businessdailyafrica-
com/ 
 
Kalyango, Y. (2011). African Media and Democratization. New York: Peter Lang 
Publishing, Inc. 
 
Kan, W. (2003). AOL TW Sells Stake in Key Chinese Net. Daily Variety.  
 191 
Kanyinga, K., & Long, J.D. (2012). The Political Economy of Reforms in Kenya: The 
Post-2007 Election Violence and a New Constitution. African Studies Review, 
55(1), 31-51.  
 
Kapchanga, M. (2013). Changing Channels: The Rise of Chinese Media in Africa. 
Think Africa Press. Retrieved from Think Africa Press website: 
  
Karanja, M. (2000). Growth of Print Media in Kenya. In M. Odero, & Kamweru, E. 
(Ed.), Media Culture and Performance in Kenya. Nairobi, Kenya: East Africa 
Media Institute and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 
 
Kariithi, P. (1996). Power with Responsibility. A Framework for a Press a 
Democratic Press in Africa. (PhD), University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
Massachusetts. 
  
Karumbidza, J. B. (2007). Win-Win Economic Cooperation: Can China Save 
Zimbabwe’s Economy? In F. M. Manji, S. (Ed.), African Perspectives on 
China in Africa (pp. 87-105.). Oxford: Fahamu. 
 
Katz, E., & Lazarsfeld, P. (1995). Personal Influence: the Part Played by People in the 
Flow of Mass Communications. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. 
 
Kauri, V. (2012). China's Ambassador to Canada tells Critics to "shut up" over 
Espionage Claims. The Global and Mail.  
 
Ke, G. (2009). External Communication in China. 
 
Keller, P. (2003). Privilege and Punishment: Press Governance in China. Cardozo 
Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, Winter/Spring.  
 
Kellner, D., & Durham, M. (2001). Adventures in Media and Cultural Studies: 
Introducing the Keywords. In D. Kellner, & Durham, M. (Ed.), Media and 
Cultural Studies: Keywords (pp. 1-29). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Ken'ichi, Y. (2011). China's Focus on External Publicity: the Impact of Changing 
Media Policy at Home and Abroad. NHK Broadcasting Studies, 9, 200.  
 
King, K. (2010). China's Cooperation in Education and Training with Kenya: A 
Different Model". International Journal of Educational Development, 30, 488-
496.  
 
______. (2013). China’s Aid and Soft Power in Africa: The Case of Education and 
Training. Rochester, NY: James Currey. 
 
King, M. (2012). China–Africa Trade Booms. Journal of Commerce. 
 
 
 
 192 
Kisero, J. (2011). China $4.6b Railway Deal to Test Kenya’s Relations with Uganda. 
The East African. http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/1167242/-
/o2jrdqz/- /index.html. 
 
_______. (2015). Digital Migration Across Africa is about Dubious Chinese Deals. 
Africa Review. Retrieved from Africa Review website: 
http://www.africareview.com/opinion/Digital-migration-in-Africa-is-all-
about-Chinese/979188-2627520-73w4r4z/index.html 
 
_______. (2016). In Looking at " Friendly" Chinese Loans, the Devil is in the Detail. 
The Daily Nation.  
 
Kitissou, M. (Ed.) (2007). Africa in China’s Global Strategy. London: Adonis & 
Abbey. 
 
Koffi, A. (2014). Africa: Minerals for Manufacturing: Towards a Bolder China 
Strategy.  Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/stories/201406022546.html 
 
Konings, P. (2006). China and Africa: Building a Strategic Partnership. Journal of 
Developing Societies, 23(3), 342.  
 
Kuan, D. (1990). Regional Cadres Said Demanding More Powers. South China 
Morning Post.  
 
Kuo, L. (2017). Ivory Smuggling Continues to Hurt China's Alliances in Africa. 
Quartz Africa. Retrieved from Save the Elephants website: 
http://www.savetheelephants.org/about-elephants-2-3-2/elephant-news-
post/?detail=ivory-smuggling-continues-to-hurt-china-s-alliances-in-africa 
 
Kurlantzick, J. (2007). Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming 
the World. Binghamton, New York: Yale University Press. 
 
___________. (2009). China's Soft Power in Africa. In M. Lee (Ed.), Soft Power: 
China's Strategy in International Politics. UK: Lexicon Books. 
 
Lacey, M. (2006). Masked Officers Raid TV Station and Newspaper Plant in Kenya. 
            The New York Times. Retrieved from The New York Time website:  
 
Lai, M. W. (2012). Chinese Foreign Policy Making 2010-2011: Using the Cultural 
Approach to Explain Complexity. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 17(2), 
187-205.  
 
Lai, X. (2005). Media Development and Government Policy. Taiwan: Wunan 
Publisher. 
 
Lam, T., & Perry, J. L. (2001). Service organizations in China: Reformed and its 
Limits. In P. N. Lee, & C. W. Lo (Ed.), Remaking China’s Public 
Management. Westport, CT: Quorum Books. 
 
 193 
Lampton, D. M. (2008). The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and 
Minds. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Landler, M. (2001, October 29). AOL Gains Cable Rights in China by Omitting 
News, Sex and Violence. New York Times.  
 
Langdale, J. V. (1997). East Asian Broadcasting Industries: Global, Regional and 
National Perspective. Economic Geography, 73(3), 305-321.  
 
Large, D. (2008). Beyond 'Dragon in the Bush': The Study of China-Africa Relations. 
African Affairs, 107(426), 45-61.  
 
Larkin, B. D. (1971). China and Africa 1949 -1970: The Foreign Policy of the 
People's Republic of China. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Lassanga, G. L., & Makara, S. (2016). Perceptions of Chinese Presence in Africa as 
Reflected in the African Media: case Study of Uganda. Chinese Jouranl of 
Communication, 9(1), 21-37.  
 
Latham, K. (2007). Pop Culture China: Media, Arts, and Lifestyle. California: ABC-
CLIO. 
 
Le Pere, G. (2008). Prospects for A Coherent African Policy Response: Engaging 
China. In H. Edinger, Herman, Hayley, & Jansson, Johanna (Ed.), New 
Impulses from the South: China’s Engagement of Africa. South Africa: Centre 
for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch. 
 
Le Pere, G. (Ed.) (2007). China in Africa: Mercantilist predator, or partner in 
development? Midrand: The Institute for Global Dialogue. 
 
Le Pere, G., & Garth Shelton. (2007). China, Africa and South Africa: South-South 
Co-operation in a Global Era. Midrand, South Africa: Institute for Global 
Dialogue. 
 
Lee, C. C. (2000). China’s Journalism: the Emancipatory Potential of Social Theory. 
Journalism Studies, 1(4), 559-575.  
 
Lee, M. (2011). Hillary Clinton Warns Africa of "New Colonialism". Retrieved from 
Huffington Post website:  
 
Lee, P. S. (1994). Mass Communication and National Development in China: Media 
Roles Reconsidered. Journal of Communication, 44, 22–37.  
 
Leke, A., Lund, Susan, Roxburgy, & Arend van Wamelen. (2010). What is Driving 
Africa's Growth:. McKinsey & Company.  
 
Lemos, A., & Ribeiro, Daniel. (2007). Taking Ownership or Just Changing Owners? 
In F. Manji, & Marks, Stephen (Ed.), African Perspectives on China in Africa 
(pp. 63-70). Oxford: Fahamu-Networks for Soical Justice. 
 
 194 
Leonard, T., Spencer, Richard, & Matthew Moore. (2008, February 14, 2008). Beijing 
Olympics: Nobel Winners Accuse China Amid Boycott Calls. Daily 
Telegraph. 
  
Leow, J. (2004). China's Media Shake-Up. Retrieved from UCLA: International 
Institute website: http://web.international.ucla.edu/institute/article/10080 
 
Leung, D., & Lihuan Zhou. (2014). Where Are Chinese Investments in Africa 
Headed? World Resources Institute.  
 
Li, A. (2005). African Studies in China in the Twentieth Century: A Histographical 
Survey. African Studies Review, 48(1), 60.  
 
_____. (2007). China and Africa: Policy and Challenges. China Security, 3(3), 70–74.  
 
Li, J. (2012). Chinese Regime Courts Africa with Confucius Institutes and 
Scholarships,. The Epoch Times. http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/china-
news/chinese-regime-courts-africa-with-confucius-institutes-and-scholarships-
299558-print.html 
 
Li, X. (1991). The Chinese Television System and Television News. China Quarterly, 
126, 340–355.  
 
Li, X., & Worm, V. (2011). Building China's Soft Power for a Peaceful Rise. Journal 
of Chinese Political Science, 16, 69-89.  
 
Lian, X., Guo, H., & Liu, X. (2010). Discussion about the Influence of Advertising on 
News Media. Journalism & Communication, 3.  
 
Liang, Z. (2010). Neo-colonialism, Ideology or just Business? China’s Perceptions of 
Africa. Global Media and Communication, 6, 271.  
 
Liebman, B. L. (2005). Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal 
System. Columbia Law Review, 105(1).  
 
Lien, D., Chang, Hoon Oh, and W. Travis Selmier. (2012). Confucius Institute Effects 
on China’s Trade and FDI: isn’t it Delightful When Folks afar Study Hanyu. 
International Review of Economics and Finance, 21, 147-155.  
 
Lin, T. (1996). Beijing's Foreign Aid Policy in the 1990s: Continuity and Change. 
Issue and Studies : An International Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East 
Asian Affairs, 32(1), 38.  
 
Lippman, W. (1922). Public Opinion. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company. 
 
Liss, A. (2003). Images of China in the American Print Media: A Survey from 2000 
to 2002. Journal of Contemporary China, 12(35), 299-318.  
 
Liu, X. (2016, August 18, 2016). Future in Bright for China-Kenya Cooperation. the 
Daily Nation.  
 195 
Looy, J. V. (2006). Africa and China: A Strtegic Partnership. Retrieved from Leiden, 
The Netherlands:  
 
Loughran, G. (2010). Birth of a Nation:The Story of a Newspaper in Kenya. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Lu, T. (2002). Review of Sino-African Friendly Relations. Beijing Review, May. 
  
Lucien, N. N. (2011). China's Promises to Africa. African Journal of Political Science 
and International Relations, 5(7), 367-370.  
 
Lull, J. (1991). China Turned On: Television, Reform and Resistance. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Luther, C. A., & Zhou, X. (2005). Within the Boundaries of Politics: News Framing 
of SARS in China and the United States. Journalism & Mass Communication 
Quarterly, 82(4), 857–872.  
 
Lynch, D. (1999). After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and "Thought Work" 
in Reformed China (Vol. Stanford University Press). Palo Alto, CA. 
 
Ma, Q. (2000). A Cultural Interpretation of Female Discourse in Communication. 
Modern Communication, 3, 55-70.  
 
Makali, D. (2003). Media Law and Practice: The Kenyan jurisprudence. Nairobi, 
Kenya: Phoenix Publishers Ltd. 
 
Makoni, M. (2015). AFRICA: Confucius institutes Grow Chinese. University World 
News, (61). Retrieved from University World News website: 
http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20100905072629973 
 
Malakata, M. (2011). Despite Criticism, China Pumps Money into African 
Telecommunications. CIO Perspective. Retrieved from CIO Perspectives 
website: http://www.cfoworld.com/strategic-finance/19033/despite-criticism-
china-pumps-money-african-telecoms  
 
Manji, F. (2008). Introduction. In D. Guerrero, & Manji, F. (Ed.), China's New Role 
in Africa and the South: A Search for a New Perspective. Oxford: Fahamu-
Networks for Soical Justice. 
 
Manji, F., &  Marks, S. (2007). African Perspectives on China in Africa. Nairobi: 
Fahamu. 
 
Marks, O. (2011). Safaricom and Huawei in Deal with Universities. Business Daily. 
Retrieved from Business Daily website: 
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Safaricom-and-Huawei-
in-deal-with-universities/539550-1176652-view-printVersion-
li5d2qz/index.html 
 
 196 
Marshall, A. (2011). China's Mighty Telecom Footprint in Africa. eLearning Africa 
News Portal. Retrieved from eLearning Africa News Portal website: http://ela-
newsportal.com/china’s-mighty-telecom-footprint-in-africa/ 
 
Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1970). The German Ideology. New York: Prometheus Books. 
 
Masta, J. (2009). Countries Case Studies: Chinese Investments in Kenya. In A. Y. 
Baah, Jauch, H. (Ed.), Chinese Investments in Africa: A Labor Perspective 
(pp. 384-421). Windhoek: African Labour Research Network. 
 
Matharu, H. (2016). China Set to Ban All Foreign Media From Publishing Online. 
Independent. Retrieved from Independent website: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-set-to-ban-all-foreign-
media-from-publishing-online-a6883366.html 
 
Mathiesen, K. (2015). China Agrees to Phase Out Its Ivory Industry to Combat 
Elephant Poaching. THe Guardian. Retrieved from The Guardian website: 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/29/china-agrees-to-
phase-out-its-ivory-industry-to-combat-elephant-poaching 
 
Mawdsley, E. (2007). China and Africa: Emerging Challenges to the Geographies of 
Power. Goegraphy Compass, 1(3), 405-421.  
 
Mbaye, S. (2010). Matching China’s Activities with Africa’s Needs. In A. Harneit-
Sievers, Marks, Stephen, & Sanusha Naidu (Ed.), Chinese and African 
Perspectives on China in Africa. Nairobi, Kenya: Fahamu Books. 
 
________. (2011, February 7 2011). Africa Will Not Put Up With a Colonialist 
China. The Guardian.  
 
Mbeke, P. (2010). Mass Mmedia in Kenya: Systems and Practice. Nairobi,  Kenya: 
The Jomo Kenyatta Foundation. 
 
Mbeke, P., & Mshindi, T. (2008). Kenya Media Sector Analysis Report. Accessed 
            November, 22, 2012. 
 
Mbeke, P. O., Okello-Orlale, R., & W. Ugangu. (2010). The Media we Want: The 
Kenya Media Vulnerabilities Study. Nairobi, Kenya: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
 
McChesney, R. (2000). The Political Economy of Communication and the Future of 
the Field. Media, Culture & Society, 22(1).  
 
____________. (2008). The Political Economy of Media: Enduring Issues, Emerging 
            Dilemmas. New York.: Monthly Press. 
 
McCombs, M., & Shaw, D. (1972). The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media. 
             Public Openion Quarterly, 36(2), 176-187.  
 
 197 
McCormick, B. L. (2003). Recent Trends in Mainland China's Media: Political 
Implications of Commercialization. Issues and studies - Institute of 
International Relations, 38(4), 175-.  
 
McGreal, C. (2007). Thanks China, Now Go Home: Buy-up of Zambia Revives Old 
Colonial Fears. The Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/feb/05/china.chrismcgreal 
 
McKenzie, D. (2012). Chinese Media Making Inroads into Africa: CNN. 
 
McGurn, W. (1990). The US and China: Sanctioning Tiananmen Square. In G. Hicks 
(Ed.), The Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen (pp. 233-245). Chicago: St. 
James Press. 
 
McLaughlin, A. (2005). China's Rising Role Counters US Clouts in Africa: Trade 
Drives Political Role ahead Zimbabwe's Election. The Christian Science 
Monitor. 
  
McQuail, D. (2000). McQuail's Mass Communication Theory. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
 
Melber, H. (2007). The (not so) New Kind on the Block: China and the Scramble for 
Africa's Resources An Introductory Rreview. China in Africa: Current African 
Issues, 35, 6-9. 
  
________. (2009). Global Trade Regimes and Multi-Polarity: The US and Chinese 
Scramble for African Resources and Markets. In R. S. a. H. Melber (Ed.), A 
New Scramble for Africa? Imperialism, Investment and Development. 
Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 
 
Michel, S., & Beuret, M. (2009). China Safari: on the Trail of Beijing's Expansion in 
            Africa. Nation Books. 
 
Mo, H. (2015). China Opens Fourth Confucius Institute in Kenya. Xinhuanet. 
Retrieved from Xinhuanet website: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/photo/2015-03/31/c_134113399.htm 
 
Mohan, G., & Power, M. (2008). New African Choices? The Politics of Chinese 
Engagement in Africa and the Changing architecture of International 
Development. Review of African Political Economy, 35(1), 23-42. 
  
Moore, T. (2002). China in the World Market: Chinese Industry and International 
Sources of Reform in the Post-Mao Era. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Moro, N., & Aikat, D. (2010). Chindia’s Newspaper Boom: Identifying Sustainable 
Business Models. Journalism & Communication Monographs, 6(3), 357-367.  
 
Morrison, W. M. (2013). China's Economic RIse: History, Trends, Challenges, and 
Implications for the United States. Retrieved from Washington D.C.:  
 
 198 
Mosco, V. (2009). The Political Economy of Communication. Thousand Oaks, Ca.: 
Sage. 
 
Moumouni, G. (2006). Domestic Tranformations and Change in Sino-African 
Relations. Paper presented at the China-Africa Relations: Engaging the 
International Discourse, Hong Kong University Science and Technology.  
 
Muekalia, D. J. (2004). Africa and China’s Strategic Partnership. African Security 
Review,, 13(1).  
 
Mugwe, D. (2011). China Loans Kenya Sh16.9bn to Build Southern by-pass. 
Business Daily. Retrieved from Business Daily website: 
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/China-loans-Kenya-Sh16-9bn-to-build-
Southern-by-pass/539552-1281524-view-printVersion-pgnsw1z/index.html 
 
Murdock, G., & Golding, P. (1973). For a Political Economy of Mass 
Communications. In R. M. J. Saviller (Ed.), The Socialist Register. London: 
Merlin Press. 
 
Musa, K. (2014). The Supreme Court Judges have Terminated the Broadcasting of 
any Free to Air Content from Royal Media Services Limited, Nation Media 
Group and the Standard Group Limited. Standard Digital. Retrieved from 
Standard Digital website: 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000109174/the-supreme-court-
judges-have-terminated-the-broadcasting-of-any-free-to-air-content-from-
royal-media-services-limited-nation-media-group-and-the-sta 
 
Mutambo, A. (2016). Chinese Government Defends Its Record in Fighting Poaching. 
Daily Naion. Retrieved from Daily Nation website: 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/China-war-on-poaching/1056-3183938-
rw7ji1z/index.html 
 
Mutegi, L. (2014). Beijing TV Series to Premier in Kenya. CIO East Africa. 
Retrieved from CIO/East Africa website: http://www.cio.co.ke/news/top-
stories/beijing-tv-series-to-premier-in-kenya 
 
Mwangi, E. (2014). China in Partnership with Egerton University. Kenya News 
Agency. Retrieved from Kenya New Agency website: 
http://kenyanewsagency.go.ke/en/china-in-partnership-with-egerton-
university/ 
 
Mwenesi, S. (2015). Kenyan Media Houses Digital TV License Revoked After 
Misleading Informercial. Techmoran. Retrieved from TECHMORAN website: 
http://techmoran.com/kenyan-government-withdraws-temporary-
authorization-granted-ntv-citizen-ktn/ 
 
 
 
 
 199 
Naiadu, S. (2007). The Forum on China-Africa (FOCAC): What the Future Hold. 
China Report, 43(3).  
 
________. (2007a). China-African Relations in the 21st Century: A 'win-win' 
Relationship. Current African Affairs, 35, 41-46.  
 
________. (2010). China in Africa: A Maturing of the Engagement. In A. Harneit-
Sievers, Marks, Stephen, & Sanusha Naidu (Ed.), Chinese and African 
Perspectives on China in Africa. Nairobi, Kenya: Fahamu Books. 
 
Naim, M. (2007). Rogue Aid. Foreign Policy, 159, 95-96. 
 
Nalika, P. (2013). Slum Fest; Bring Tech Resources to the Grass Root. CIO East 
Africa. Retrieved from CIO/East Africa website: http://cio.co.ke/news/main-
stories/slum-fest-bring-tech-resources-to-the-grass-root 
 
Nathan, A. (2003). Authoritarian Resilience. Journal of Democracy, 14(1), 6–17. 
  
Naughton, B. (1993). Deng Xiaoping: The Economist. The China Quarterly, 135, 
491-514.  
 
Navarro, P. (2007). The Coming China Wars: Where They Will be Fought, How They 
Can be Won. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Financial Times Press. 
 
Ndegwa, S. (1997). Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition 
Moments in Kenyan Politics. American Political Science Review, 91(3), 559-
616. 
  
Nelson, A. (2013). CCTV's International Expansion: China's Grand Strategy for 
Media? Retrieved from Washington, DC:  
 
Ngugi, B. (2016, April 6, 2016). Appetite for Chinese Loans Risks Choking Kenyan 
Economy. Daily Nation. Retrieved from 
http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Appetite-for-Chinese-loans-costs-Kenyans-
dearly-/-/996/3147468/-/j7p6h3/-/index.html 
 
Nguyen, K. (2006). Police Raid on Kenyan Meida Sparks Outrage. Reuters. Retrieved 
from redOrbit website: 
http://www.redorbit.com/news/international/412439/police_raid_on_kenyan_
media_sparks_outrage/ 
 
Njau, B. (2013). Building BRICs: The New Scramble for Africa.  
  
Nolan, P. (2001). China and The Global Economy: National Champions, Industrial 
Policy, and the Big Business Revolution. New York: Palgrave. 
 
Northrup, D. (2002). The Atlantic Slave Trade. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Nyabuga, G., &. Booker, N. (2013). Kenya, Country Report. Retrieved from Nairobi, 
Kenya:  
 200 
Nyabuga, G., Booker, N., Dragomir, M., Thompson, M., Jamaï, A., Chan, Y. Y.,& 
Tambini, D. (2013). Mapping Digital Media: Kenya. Retrieved from Nairobi, 
Kenya:  
 
Nyamjoh, F. (2005). Africa’s Media, Democracy and the Politics of Belonging. 
London: Zed Books. 
 
Obonyo, L. (2003). Kenya. In A. Quick (Ed.), World Press Encyclopedia: A Survey 
of Press Systems Worldwide (pp. 529-539). New York: Gale Group. 
 
Ochieng, L. (2014). StartTimes to Set Up Sh7bn Center in Nairobi. Daily Nation. 
Retrieved from Daily Nation website: 
http://www.nation.co.ke/business/StarTimes-Centre-Africa-Headquarters-
Karen-Nairobi/996-2383706-1ry7hvz/index.html 
 
Ochieng, W. R. (1995). Structural and Political Changes. In B. A. Ogot, and W.R. 
Ochieng (Ed.), Deconnization and Independence in Kenya (pp. 83-109). 
Nairobi, Kenya: East African Educational Publishers. 
 
Ochilo, P. J. O. (1993). Press Freedom and the Role of the Media in Kenya. Africa 
Media Review, 7(3).  
 
Ogenga, F. (2008). The Role of the Kenyan Media in the 2007 Elections. Journal of 
African Elections, 7(2), 124-134.  
 
Ogola, G. (2011). The Political Economy of the Media in Kenya: from Kenyatta's 
Nation-building Press to Kibaki's Local-language FM Radio. Africa Today, 
57(3), 77-95.  
 
Ogutu, K. (2016, July 4th 2016). Chinese Fish Floods Kisumu Markets. The Standard. 
Retrieved from https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000207446/chinese-
fish-floods-kisumu-markets 
 
Ohito, D. (2015). Kenya’s TV Industry Headed for Stormy Days. The Standard. 
Retrieved from The Standard website: 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000148883/kenya-s-tv-industry-
headed-for-stormy-days 
 
Ojwang, B. O. (2009). The Semantics of Peace and the Role of the Print Media in the 
2007–2008 Post-election Violence in Kenya. Africa Media Review, 17(1), 23-
50.  
 
Okoth, D. (2009). A Comparative Analysis of the New York Times and the Nation 
Media Group Presidential Opinion Polls Coverage 90 Days prior to Election 
Day. Marshall University, Huntington, WV.  
 
 
 
 
 201 
Okoth, E. (March 26th, 2016). Chinese Firms Hir More Locals Than Foreigners: 
Report. The Daily Nation.  
 
_______. (September 20, 2016). The Big Question of Kenya's Piling Debt. The Daily 
Nation.  
 
________. (August 22, 2016). Why Chinese Loans are a recipe for huge debt burden 
on Kenya. Daily Nation. Retrieved from 
http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Why-Chinese-loans-are-a-recipe-for-huge-
debt-burden-on-Kenya/996-3353450-4csm2j/index.html 
 
Olingo, A. (2014). Pay TV Firms ready for Digital Switch. The Eastern African. 
Retrieved from The Eastern African website: 
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Pay-TV-firms-ready-for-digital-
switch/-/2560/2498808/-/tkrdeoz/-/index.html 
 
Olorunnisola, A. L. M. (2013). Contemporary Sino-African Relations: 
Interpenetration of History of Relations with the West, Ideology and 
Comparative Media Frames. Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies, 34(3), 
41-61.  
 
Omondi, D. (2016). Chinese Firms' Dominance in Major Projects Jolts Kenyan 
Constructors. The Standard. Retrieved from The Standard website: 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000211089/chinese-firms-
dominance-in-major-projects-jolts-kenyan-contractors 
 
Onderco, M. (2007). Changing Nature of Sino-African Relations After the Second 
World War. Political Movements and Systems in Modern and Contemporary 
History.  
  
Onjala, J. (2008). A Scoping Study on China-Africa Economic Relations: The Case of 
Kenya. Retrieved from Nairobi : African Economic Research Consortium 
(AERC):  
 
Onyebadi, U. (2008). Towards an Examination and Expansion of the Agenda Setting 
Theory: Did the Media Matter in Kenya’s Presidential Election, 2007. (PhD), 
University of Missouri, Columbia: Missouri.    
  
Onyebadi, U., & Oyedeji, T. (2011). Newspaper Coverage of Post Political Election 
           Violence in Africa: An Assessment of the Kenyan Example. Media, War &  
           Conflict, 4(3), 215-230. 
 
Oriare, P., Okello-Orlale, R., & Wilson Ugangu. (2010). The Media We Want: The 
Kenya Media Vulnerabilities Study. In T. F. E. Stiftung (Ed.). Nairobi, Kenya. 
 
Osondu, A. (2013). Off and On: China’s Principle of Non-Interference in Africa. 
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 4(3), 225-234.  
 
Otuki, N. (2016, April 5, 2016). Kenya's China Imports Cross Sh300bn Mark. The 
Daily Nation.  
 202 
Pan, E. (2006). China’s Soft Power initiative. Council of Foreign Relations. 
 
Pan, Z. (2000). Improvising Reform Activities: The Changing Reality of Journalistic 
Pratice in China. In C.-C. Lee (Ed.), Power, Money and Media: 
Communication Patterns and Bureaucratic Control in Cultural China. 
Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. 
 
Pan, Z., & Chan, J. M. (2003). Shifting Journalistic Paradigms: How China's 
Journalists Assess "Media Excmplars". Communication Research, 
30(December), 649-682. 
  
Paradise, J. F. (2009). China and international Harmony: The Role of Confucius 
Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power. Asian Survey, 49(4), 647-669.  
 
Parenti, J. L. (2009). China–Africa Relations in the 21st Century (Vol. 1). 
Washington, DC: National Defense University. 
 
Park, J.D. (1997). The Special Economic Zones of China and their Impact on its 
Economic Development. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers. 
 
Patroba, H. (2012). China in Kenya: Addressing Counterfeit, Goods and Construction 
Sector Imbalances. Paper presented at the China in Africa Project, South 
Africa.  
 
Payne, R. J., & Veney, C. R. (1998). China's Post-Cold War African policy. Asian 
           Survey, 38(9), 867-879. 
 
 P.C Tech. (2014). Huawei Signed MOU with Kenya ICT Authority. PC Tch 
Magazine. Retrieved from PC Tech Magazine website:  
 
Pei, M. (1994). From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China 
and the Soviet Union. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Peiliang, T. (2005). China and Africa in the New Period. Retrieved from Beijing:  
 
People's Daily. (2004). China Lifts Its Ban on Foreign TV Production. Retrieved from 
People's Daily Online website: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/ 
 
___________. (2006, November, 6, 2006). The Sino- African Cooperative Forum 
Beijing Declaration. People Daily.  
 
____________. (2007). Our Historical Tasks at the Primary Stage of Socialism and 
Several Issues Concerning China’s Foreign Policy.  Retrieved April 10 2013, 
from People's Daily http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200703/07/ 
eng20070307_355104.html 
 
____________. (2012, April 10, 2012). Respond Calmly to China Threat Theory. 
People's Daily. Retrieved from http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-
04/10/content_25105939.htm 
 203 
Polgreen, L., & Howard French. (2007, August 13, 2007). Filling a Void, Drills for 
Riches in Chad. New York Times.  
 
Polumbaum, J. (1992). Chinese Journalism Since the Tragedy of Tiananmen. In W. 
A. Joseph (Ed.), China Briefing, 1991. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
Posthumus, B. (2010). China's Cultural Diplomacy in Africa. Retrieved from 
http://www.rnw.nl 
  
Potter, P. B., & Baum, M. A. (2016). War and Democratic Constraint: How the Public 
Influences Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Power, M., & Mohan, G. (2008). Good Friends and Good Partners: the "New" Face of 
China Africa Cooperation. Review of African Political Economy, 35(115), 5-
6. 
  
Prah, K. K. (2007). Africa in China: Then and Now. In Marks, S., & Manji, F. (Eds.), 
African Perspectives on China in Africa. Nairobi: Fahamu. 
 
Price, M. E. (2004). Media and Sovereighty: The Global Information Revolution and 
Its Challenge to State Power. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
Prime, P. B. (2002). China Joins the WTO: How, Why and What Now? Business 
Economics, XXXVII(2), 26-32.  
 
Procopio, M. (2015). The Effectiveness of Confucius Institutes as a Tool of China’s 
Soft Power in South Africa. African East-Asian Affairs: the China Monitor, 
2(July).  
 
Proctor, K. (2013, Jule 2, 2013). U.S. doesn't Understand. Fortune. 
 
Pu, X. (1986, September 29, 1986). Media Reform Stirs Lively Public Debate. China 
Daily, p. 4.  
 
Qian, G. (2008). Chinese Media under China's Political Reform. In Y. Chan, & Qian, 
Gang (Ed.), A REcord of Change in China's Media. Hong Kong: Cosmos 
Book Ltd. 
 
Qian, Y., & Wu, Jinglian. (2000). China's Transition to a Market Economy: How Far 
Across the River? Paper presented at the Policy Reform in China, Center for 
Research on Economic Development and Policy Reform (CEDPR).  
 
Qiang, Z. (2010). China's Strategic Relations with Africa. In A. Harneit-Sievers, 
Marks, Stephen, & Sanusha Naidu (Ed.), Chinese and African Perspectives on 
China in Africa. Nairobi, Kenya: Pambazuka Press. 
 
Qiu, B. (2011, January 4,  2011). Investment in Media to Present True Picture of 
China. The China Daily. Retrieved from 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-01/04/content_11789006.htm 
 
 204 
Ramo, J. C. (2004). The Beijing Consensus. London: The Foreign Policy Center. 
 
_________. (2007). Brand China. London: The Foreign Policy Center. 
 
Randall, S. (2010). Country must Stop the Collapse of Building. Daily Naion. 
Retrieved from allAfrica website: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201001151005.html 
 
Rao, S. (2010). How to Solve a Problem like His Holiness the 14th Dailai Lama?: 
Studying Indian Media Coverage of China and India’s Evolving Relationship. 
Global Media and Communication, 6(3), 368-373.  
 
Ratner, E. (2011). The Emergent Security Threats Reshaping China’s Rise. The 
Washington Quarterly, 34(1).  
 
Rebol, M. (2010). Public Perceptions and Reactions: Gauging African Views of 
China in Africa. African Journal of Agricultural Research, 5(25), 3524-3535.  
 
Reed, J. (2013, July 30, 2013). Africa’s Big Brother Lives in Beijing: Is Huawei 
Wiring Africa for Surveillance? Or just for Money? Foreign Policy. 
 
Reese, S. D. (2001). Introduction. In S. D. Reese, Gandy, O., & A. Grant (Ed.), 
Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the 
Social Worlds (pp. 7-31). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Renou, X. (2012, January 31 2012). Confronting the New Imperialism. Post Cold War 
Africa. The Southern Times.  
 
Repnikova, M. (2015). Media Oversight in Non-democratic Regimes: The 
             Perspectives of Officials and Journalists in China. 
 
Reuters (2010). China Firms Outmuscling Kenyan Ones on Road Projects. Reuters. 
Retrieved from Reuters Africa website: 
http://af.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idAFJOE6A10L520101102 
 
Rhodes, T. (2012). China's Media Footprint in Kenya.  Retrieved from 
https://cpj.org/blog/2012/05/chinas-media-footprint-in-kenya.php 
 
Rice, X. (2011, February 6 2011). China's Economic Invasion of Africa. The 
Guardian. 
  
Rich, T. S., & Recker, S. (2013). Understanding Sino-African Relations: 
Neocolonialism or a New Era? Journal of International and Area Studies, 
20(1), 61-76.  
 
Roberts, D. (2003, November). Newsstand Fever; Foreign Magazines are a Hit in 
China. Business Week. 
 
Romero, G. R., Kimenyi, S. M., & Dercon, S. (2008). The 2007 Elections, Post-
Conflict Recovery and Coalition Government in Kenya.  
 205 
Ronning, H. (2014). How Much "Soft Power" does China have in Africa? Paper 
Presented at the China and Africa Media, Communications and Public 
Diplomacy, Beijing. 
  
Rono, J. K. (2002). The Impact of the Structural AdjustmentPprogrammes on Kenyan 
Society. Journal of Social Development in Africa, 17(1), 81-98.  
 
Rossouw, G. J., Geerts, S., & Xinwa N. (2014). Africans' Perceptions of Chinese 
Business in Africa: A Survey Retrieved from Pretoria, Ethics Institute of South 
Africa:  
 
Rotberg, R. (2008). China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence. Washington, D.C: 
Brookings Institution. 
 
_________. (2013). Africa Emerges: Consummate Challenges, Abundant 
            Opportunities. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
_________. (2015). China's Economic Slowdown Threatens African Progress.  
 
Rowen, H. S. (1996). The Short March: China's Road to Democracy. The National 
Interest, 45(Fall), 61-70. 
  
Roxburgh, C., Dörr, N., Leke, A., Tazi-Riffi, A., Van Wamelen, A., Lund, S., & 
Zeino-Mahmalat, T. . (2010). Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential 
of African Economies: McKinsey Global Institute. 
 
Roy, D. (1994). Hegemony on the Horizons? China's Threat to East Asian Security. 
International Security, 19(1), 149-168.  
 
Samy, Y. (2010). China's Aid Policies in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges. The 
Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 99(406). 
  
Sanchez, D. (2016). Why is China Trying to Manage African Media? AKF Insider. 
Retrieved from AFK Insider website: http://afkinsider.com/128269/china-
trying-manage-african-media/ 
 
Sanghi, A., & Johnson, D. (2016). Three Myths about China in Kenya.  Retrieved 
from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2016/05/16/three-
myths-about-china-in-kenya/ 
 
Sarkadi, B., Attisano, L., Grinstein, S., Buchwald, M., & Rothstein, A. (1984). 
Volume Regulation of Chinese Hamster Ovary Cells in Anisoosmotic Media. 
Biochim Biophys Acta, 774(2), 159-168.  
 
Sautman, B., & Hairong, Y. (2015). Localizing Chinese Enterprises in Africa: from 
Myths to Policies.  
 
Schiller, H. I. (1989). Culture, Inc.: The Corporate Takeover of Public Expression. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 206 
Schmidt, H. (2013). China’s Confucius Institutes and the “Necessary White Body”. 
Canadian Journal of Sociology, 38(4).  
 
Shambaugh, D. (2010). China Flexes Its Soft Power. New York Times. Retrieved 
from The New York Times website: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/opinion/08iht-edshambaugh.html  
 
___________. (2013). China Goes Global: The Partial Power. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
___________. (2015). China's Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect. Foreign 
Affairs(July/August).  
 
Shek, C. (2013). Chinese Media Expands Africa Presence. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from 
Al Jazeera website: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/201312071929822435.ht
ml 
 
Shelton, G. (2009). China and Africa: Building an Economic Partnership. South 
African Journal of International Affairs, 8(2), 111-119.  
 
Shelton, G., & Kabemba, K. (Ed.) (2012). China, Southern Africa and Extractive 
Industries. Johannesburg: SARW. 
 
Shelton, G., & Paruk, F. (2008). The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: A 
            Strategic Opportunity. Institute for Security Studies Monographs, 2008(156), 
            222. 
 
Shi, A. (2015). Re-orienting the "Charm Offensive" to the "Charm Defeisive" : A 
Critical Review of Chinese Media Development in Africa. African Journalism 
Studies, 36(1), 135-140.  
 
Shi, G. (2000). China's Accession to WTO and Participation in Economic 
Globalization. Beijing, China Retrieved from 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/translatorsgarden/famousspeech7.html 
 
Shimazu, N. (2014). Diplomacy As Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 
1955. Modern Asian Studies, 48(1), 225-252.  
 
Shinn, D. (2007). An Opportunistic Ally: China's Increasing Involvement in Africa. 
Harvard International Revies, 29(2).  
 
Shinn, D., & Eisenman, J. (2012). China and Africa: A Century of Engagement. 
Philadephia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Shirk, S. (1993). The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
 
_______. (2011). Changing Media, Changing Chinese Foregin Policy. In S. Shirk 
(Ed.), Changing Media, Changing China. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 207 
Si, S. (2014). Expansion of International Broadcasting The Growing Global Reach of 
China Central Television. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism.  
 
Sihanya, B. (2012). Media Law in Kenya in the Era of Digital Broadcasting. Nairobi: 
University of Nairobi. 
  
Siow, M. (2011). China’s Confucius Institutes: Crossing the River by Feeding the 
Stones. Asia Pacific Bulletin, 91(6), 1–2.  
 
Sishuwa, S. (2015, May 21 2015). How China's Confucius Centers Affect African 
Culture. New African. 
 
Snow, P. (1988). The Star Raft, China's Encounter with Africa. New York: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
 
Somerville, K. (2011). Violence, Hate Speech and Inflammatory Broadcasting in 
Kenya: the Problems of Definition and Identification. Ecquid Novi: African 
Journalism Studies, 32(1), 82-101.  
 
Song, K. (1996). Overview of China's Press Development. In China Journalism 
Yearbook. Beijing: China Journalism Yearbook Press. 
 
Sorman, G. (2008). The Empire of Lies: The Truth about China in the Twenty-First 
Century. New York: Encounter Books. 
 
Sparks, C. (2009). Globalization, Development and the Mass Media. London: Sage. 
 
Stockmann, D. (2011). Race to the Bottom: Media Marketization and Increasing   
            Negativity Toward the United States in China. Political Communication, 
            28(3), 268-290.  
 
Stross, R. (1990). The Return of Advertising in China: A Survey of the Ideological 
Reversal. The China Quarterly, 123(Sep.), 485-502.  
 
Sun, G. (2004). Speech by Mr. Sun Guangxiang on Follow-up Action of China–
Africa Co-Operation Forum at the Briefing Meeting with African Diplomatic 
Envoys. 
 
Sun, W. (2010). Mission Impossible? Soft Power, Communication Capacity, and the 
Globalization of Chinese Media. International Journal of Communication, 4, 
54-72.  
 
Sun, X., & Michel, Elizabeth C. (2001). An Orchestra of Voices: Making the 
Argument for Greater Speech and Press Freedom in the People's Republic of 
China. Michign: Praeger. 
 
Sun, Y. (2015). Xi and the 6th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: Major 
Commitments, but with Questions.  Retrieved from 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/12/07/xi-and-the-6th-
forum-on-china-africa-cooperation-major-commitments-but-with-questions/ 
 208 
Suzuki, S. (2009). Chinese Soft Power, Insecurity Studies, Myopia and Fantasy. Third 
World Quarterly, 30.  
 
Tang, L., & Li, H. (2011). Chinese Corporate Diplomacy: Huawei’s CSR Discourse 
           in Africa. In Soft Power in China (pp. 95-115). Palgrave Macmillan, New 
           York. 
 
Tang, W. (2005). Public Opinion and Political Change in China. Stanford University 
Press. 
 
Tao, T. (2001). Media Stars in Its Own Investment Extravaganza. Shanghai Star. 
Retrieved from China Daily website: 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/star/2001/0614/bz10-1.html>  
 
Taylor, I. (1998). China’s Foreign Policy Towards Africa in the 1990s. The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 36(3), 443.  
 
_______. (2006). China's Oil Diplomacy in Africa. International Affairs, 82(5), 938.  
 
_______. (2006a). China and Africa: Engagement and Compromises. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
_______. (2009). China's New Role in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
The Economist (2012). The Company that Spooked the World The Economist. 
Retrieved from The Economist website: 
http://www.economist.com/node/21559929/print 
 
The Standard (2008, January 1, 2008). Media Vow to Ignore Ban on Live Coverage. 
The Standard.  
 
__________. (2016, July 5th, 2016). Protect !sh sector against competition, Editorial. 
The Standard. Retrieved from 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000207528/protect-fish-sector-
against-competition 
 
Thierstein, J., & Kamalipour, Y. R. (Eds.). (2000). Religion, Law, and Freedom: a 
            global perspective. Greenwood Publishing Group. 
 
Tisdell, C. (2009). Economic Reform and Openness in China: China's Development 
Policies in the Last 30 Years. Working Paper No. 51. University of 
Queensland. Brisbane, Australia.  
 
Tong, B. C. (1993). A Teaching Program for Journalism Theory. Beijing: Chinese 
People’s University Press. 
 
Tong, J., & Sparks, C. (2009). Investigative journalism in China today. Journalism 
           Studies, 10(3), 337-352. 
 
  
 209 
 
Tu, J. (2008). Sino-African Relations: Historical Development and Long-term 
Challenges. China: An International Journal, 6(2), 330-343.  
 
Tull, D. M. (2006). China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and 
Consequences. Journal of Modern African Studies, 44(3), 459-479.  
 
Tung, C.Y. (2005). Overview of Chinese Economic Reforms: Initiatives, Approachs 
and Consequences. Paper presented at the Is There an Economic Orthodoxy 
for Developing Nations?, Taipei, Taiwan.  
 
Van Dijk, M. P. (Ed.). (2009). The New Presence of China in Africa. Amsterdam 
           University Press. 
 
van Dijk, T. A. (1993). Elite Discourse and Racism. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
 
Vasagar, J. (2005). President's Wife Stroms Kenyan Newpaper. The Guardian. 
Retrieved from The Guradian website: 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2005/may/04/pressandpublishing.kenya 
 
Verhoeven, H., & Iginio, G. (2012). China's Positive Spin on Africa. CNN. Retrieved 
from CNN website: http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/18/opinion/china-media-
africa-verhoeven-gagliardone/ 
 
Victor, J. (2011). Chinese Firm Wins Digital Signal Distribution Tender. Business 
Daily. Retrieved from Business Daily website: 
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Chinese-firm-wins-
digital-signal-distribution-tender/-/539550/1187362/-/gf5v9j/-/index.html 
 
Vogel, E. F. (2011). Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Wahito, M. (2015). Kenya: License Ban Lifted, TV Stations Fined Sh500,000 Each. 
Capital FM. Retrieved from allAfrica.com website: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201502090315.html 
 
Wallis, W., & Manson, K. (2011, Oct. 28, 2011). A Fragile State is put to the Test. 
Financial Times. Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/reports/kenya-business-
2011 
 
Wallsten, S. J. (2001). An Econometric Analysis of Telecom Competition, 
Privatisation and Regulation in Africa and Latin America. Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 49, 1–19.  
 
Walsh, C. (2006, November 1 2008). Is China the New Colonial Power in Africa? 
The Observer.  
 
Wang, F. L., & Elliot, E. A. (2014). China in Africa: presence, perceptions and 
            prospects. Journal of Contemporary China, 23(90), 1012-1032. 
 
 210 
Wang, J. (1997). From Four Hundred Million to More than One Billion Consumers: 
             A Brief History of the Foreign Advertising Industry in China. International 
             journal of advertising, 16(4).  
 
______. (2001, May 21, 2001). Kenya, China to Enhance Broadcasting Cooperation. 
Xinhua News Agency.  
 
______. (2008). The Power and Limits of Branding in National Image 
Communication in the Global Society. Journal of International 
Communication, 14(2), 9-24.  
 
Wang, J., & Chang, T. K. (1996). From Class Ideologue to State Manager: TV 
            Programming and Foreign Imports in China, 1970–1990. Journal of  
           Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 40(2), 196-207. 
 
Wanjiku, R. (2011). Chinese Firm Stirs Kenya Digital TV Signal Controversy. 
TechAdviser. 
 
Wanyande, P. (1995). Mass Media-state Relations in Post-colonial Kenya.  
 
Wasserman, H. (2012). China in South Africa: Media Responses to a Developing 
Relationship. Chinese Journal of Communication, 5(3), 336-354.  
 
____________. (2014). China's 'Soft Power' and on Editorial Agendas in South 
            Africa. China and Africa: Media. Communication and Public Diplomacy: 
Beijing. 
 
Watts, J. (2006, November 4, 2006). The Savannah Comes to Beijing as China Host 
its New Empire. The Guardian.  
 
Weber, I. (2003). Localizing the Global: Successful Strategies for Selling Television 
Programmes to China. Gazette: The International Journalfor Communication 
Studies, 65(3), 273-290.  
 
Wei, L. (2012). China’s Soft Power in Africa: Is Economic Power Sufficient? Asian 
Perspective, 36, 667-692.  
 
Wei, R. (2000). China's Television in the Era of Marketization. In D. French, & M. 
Richards (Ed.), Television in Contemporary Asia. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Wei, R., & Pan, Z. D. (1999). Mass Media and Consumerist Values in the People’s 
Republic of China. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 1, 75-96. 
  
Wekesa, B. (2013). The Media Framing of China's Image in East Africa: An 
Exploratory Study. THe China Monitor, 1(1), 15-41.  
 
________. (2014). No Need to Fear Chinese Media in Africa. China–Africa. 
Retrieved from http://china-africa-re-porting.co.za/2014/03/no-need-to-fear-
chinese-media-in-africa/ 
 211 
Wekesa, B. (2016). Building Blocks and Themes in Chinese Soft Power. In X. Zhang, 
Wasserman, H., & Mano, Winston (Ed.), China's Media and Soft Power in 
Africa: Promotion and Perception. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Wekesa, B., & Zhang, Y. (2014). Live, Talk, Faces: an Analysis of CCTVs Adaption 
to the African Media Market. Retrieved from Stellenbosch, South Africa:  
 
Wheeler, A. (2014). Cultural Diplomacy, Language Planning, and the Case of the 
University of Nairobi Confucius Institute. Journal of Asian and African 
Studies, 49(1), 49-63.  
 
White, L. T. (1990). All the News: Structures and Politics in Shanghai's Reform 
Media. In C.-C. Lee (Ed.), Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and 
Journalism. New York: Guilford. 
 
Winfield, B. H., & Peng, Z. (2005). Market or Party Controls? Chinese Media in 
Transition. Gazette: The International Journalfor Communication Studies, 
67(3), 255-270.  
 
Winsbury, R. (2000). The Print Journalist, UK and Africa. In H. Tumber (Ed.), 
Media, Power, Professionals and Policies. New York: Routledge. 
 
Wong, A. (2015). China's Telecommunications Boom in Africa: Causes and 
Consequences. E-International Relations Studies. Retrieved from E-
International Relations Studies website: http://www.e-
ir.info/2015/09/21/chinas-telecommunications-boom-in-africa-causes-and-
consequences/ 
 
Wong, C. H. (2016). In Rare State Media Tour, Xi Jinping Takes the Anchor's Chair.  
Retrieved from http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/02/19/in-rare-state-
media-tour-xi-jinping-takes-the-anchors-chair/ 
 
Wong, Y. C. (2005). From Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin: Two Decades of Political 
Reform. Maryland: University Press of America. 
 
Wright, K. (1990). The Political Fortunes of Shanghai's World Economic Herald. The 
Australian Journal of Chinese Affair, 23, 121-132.  
 
Wu, F. W. (1985). Socialist Development of Self-Reliance within the Capitalist 
World Economy: the Chinese View in the Post-Mao Era. In K. Harish (Ed.), 
The End of An Isolation: China after Mao. Boston: M. Nijhoff Publishers. 
 
Wu, G. (1994). Command Communication: The Politics of Editorial Formulation in 
the People's Daily. China Quarterly, 137(Summer), 191-211.  
 
Wu, N. (2015). Textile Culture Further Promoted. Study in Shanghai. Retrieved from 
Study in Shanghai website: http://en.study-shanghai.org/nc/news/2015-04-
23/1457.html 
 
 212 
Wu, Y. (2014). China’s Media and Public Diplomacy: Illustrations from South Africa. 
Paper presented at the International Conference China and Africa Media, 
Communications and Public Diplomacy, Bejing.  
 
Wu, Y. S. (2012). The Rise of China's State-Led Media Dynasty in Africa. Retrieved 
from Johannesburg:  
 
Xi, J. (2013). China will be Africa's All-Weather Friend and Partner: Chinese 
President [Video]. CNTV. 
 
Xiao, H. (1993). On Propaganda of Reform and Opening-Up. Beijing: Xinhua Press. 
 
Xie, T., & Page, B. I. (2013). What Affects China's National Image? A Cross-national 
            Study of Public Opinion. Journal of Contemporary China, 22(83), 850-867. 
 
Xin, X. (2006). A Developing Market in News: Xinhua News Agency and Chinese 
Newspapers. Media, Culture & Society, 28(1), 45–66.  
 
_____. (2009). Xinhua News Agency in Africa’. Journal of African Media Studies, 
1(3), 364.  
 
Xinhua. (2006a, January 26, 2006). China to Launch First Oversea Radio Service in 
Kenya. Xinhua.  
 
______. (2006b). China-Africa Cooperation Fruitful over Past 50 Years. Retrieved 
from CRJ English.com website: 
http://english.cri.cn/3126/2006/11/02/264@158010.htm 
 
______. (2007). Hu Jintao Calls for Enhancing ‘Soft Power’ of Chinese Culture.  
Retrieved April 10 2013 
 
______. (2009, Feburary 24, 2009). China Daily Launches U.S. Edition in New York. 
Xinhua.  
 
______. (2010). China Launched 2nd Confucius Institute in Kenya. Xinhua News. 
Retrieved from Xinhua News website: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/culture/2010-06/05/c_13334963.htm 
 
_______. (2013). Chinese Firm Seeks to Impart ICT Skills to Kenya. China Daily. 
Retrieved from China Daily.com website: 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-06/07/content_16580576.htm 
 
_______. (2016a). China's Huawei Lauded for Promoting ICT in Kenya. Xinhua 
News. Retrieved from XinhuaNet website: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/05/c_135488389.htm 
 
_______. (2016b). Confucius Institutes Enhance China-Africa Ties: S. African 
Academic. ChinaNews.com. Retrieved from Ecns.cn website: 
http://www.ecns.cn/2016/02-24/200238.shtml 
 
 213 
Xinhuanet. (2010a). Report on the Work of the Government by Premier Wen Jiabao.  
Retrieved April 10 2013, from Xinhua 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010- 
03/15/c_13211657_11.htm 
 
________. (2010b). Xinhua Launches CNC World English Channel. Xinhuanet. 
Retrieved from Xinhuanet website: http://news.xinhuanet. 
com/english2010/china/2010-07/01/c_13378575.htm 
 
________. (2011a). China vows to Increase Government Scholarships for African 
Students. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-
04/21/c_13838308.htm 
 
________. (2011b). Xinhua's 80-year Journey to Global State. Xinhuanet. Retrieved 
from Xinhuanet website: http://news.xinhuanet. 
com/english2010/indepth/2011-11/07/c_131233213.htm. 
 
Xu, X. (2009). Development Journalism. In K. Wahi-Jorgensen, and Thomas 
Hanitzsch (Ed.), The Handbook of Journalism Studies. New York: Routledge. 
 
Yan, X. (1997). Analysis of China’s National Interest. Tianjing: Tianjing People’s 
Press. 
 
Yang, R. (2010). Soft Power and Higher Education: An Examination of China’s 
Confucius Institutes. Globalization, Societies and Education, 8(2), 235–245.  
 
Yin, C. W., & Yun, M. S. (2009). The Making of a Chinese Head of the WHO: a 
Study of the Media Discourse on Margaret Chan's Contest for the WHO 
Director-generalship and its Implications for the Collective Memory of SARS. 
Int J Health Serv, 39(3), 587-614.  
 
Yin, J. (2006). China's Second Long March: A Review of Chinese Media Discourse 
on Globalization. The Review of Communication, 6(1-2), 32-51.  
 
York, G. (2013). Why China is Making a Big Play to Control Africa's Media. The 
Globe Mail.  
 
Youngman, F. (2014). Engaging academically with China in Africa–the institutional  
           approach of the University of Botswana. African East-Asian Affairs, (3). 
 
Yu, Q. (1989). On the Editor-in-Chief Responsibility System. South China Morning 
Post.  
 
Yuan, W. (2010). E-democracy@China: Does it work? Chinese Journal of 
Communication, 3(4), 488-503.  
 
Zeleza, P. T. (2008). Dancing with the Dragon: Africa’s Courtship with China. The 
Global South, 2(2), 171-187.  
 
 
 214 
Zelizer, B., & Allan, S. (Eds.). (2011). Journalism after September 11. Taylor & 
            Francis. 
 
Zhang, H. (2011). The Globalization of Chinese Television: The Role of the Party-
State. The International Communication Gazette, 73(7), 573-594.  
 
Zhang, P. (2012). CCTV Africa’ and ‘I Love Africa’ Mobile TV launched in Kenya.   
http://english.cntv.cn/20120112/106326.shtml 
 
Zhang, X. (1993). The Market Versus the State: The Chinese Press Since Tiananmen. 
Journal of International Affairs, 47(1), 195-221.  
 
_______. (2009). Chinese State Media Going Global. Retrieved from Singapore: 
  
_______. (2010). China lunches 2nd Confucisu Institute in Kenya. Xinhua News. 
Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/culture/2010-
06/05/c_13334963.htm 
 
_______. (2010a). Chinese State Media Going Global. East Asia Policy, 2(1), 42-50.  
 
_______. (2011). China’s International Broadcasting: A Case Study of CCTV 
International. In J. Wang (Ed.), Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy 
through Communication. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Zhang, Y. (2000). From Masses to Audience: Changing Media Ideologies and 
Practices in Reform China. Journalism Studies, 1(4), 617–635.  
 
_______. (2014). Understanding China's Media in Africa: from the Perspective of 
Constrcutive Journalism. Paper presented at the China and Africa Media, 
Communications and Public Diplomacy, Beijing.  
 
Zhang, Y., & Mwangi, J. M. (2016). A perception study on China’s Media 
           Engagement in Kenya: from media presence to power influence?. Chinese 
           Journal of Communication, 9(1), 71-80. 
  
Zhao, H., & Zheng, Y. (2012, January 16, 2012). The African Telecoms War. Caixin 
New Century. 
 
Zhao, Q. (2007). Better Public Diplomacy to Present a Truer Picture of China. The 
People's Daily.  
 
Zhao, Y. (1998). Media, Market and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line 
and the Bottom Line. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
 
______. (2000). From Commericalization to Conglomeration: The Transformation of 
the Chinese Press Within the Orbit of the Party State. Journal of 
Communication, 50(2), 3-26.  
 
 215 
Zhao, Y. (2005). The State, Market, and Media Control in China. In P. Thomas, & Z. 
Nain (Ed.), Who Owns the Media: Global Trends and Local Resistance. 
Penang, Malaysia: Southbound. 
 
______. (2005a). Who Wants Democracy and Does it Deliever Food? 
Communication and Power in a Globally Integrated China. In R. A. Hackeet, , 
& Y. Zhao (Ed.), Democratizing Global Media: One World, Many Struggles. 
Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
______. (2008). Communication in China. Lanham, UK: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Zhao, Y., & Guo, Z. Z. (2005). Television in China: History, Political Economy and 
Ideology. In J. Wasko (Ed.), A Companion to Television. Malden, MA: Black 
Publishing. 
 
Zheng, D. (2002). Three Stages of Xinhua News Agency’s Bid for World News 
Agency. In X. Yanjiusuo (Ed.), Strategies of Media’s Development. Beijing, 
China:: Xinhua. 
 
Zhou, Q. A. (2006). How do the Western Media Write about China? People's Daily. 
http://media.people.com.cn/GB/40606/4546107.html 
 
Zhou, Y., & Luk, S. (2016). Establishing Confucius Institutes: A Tool for Promoting 
           China’s Soft Power?. Journal of Contemporary China, 25(100), 628-642. 
 
Zweig, D., & Bi, Jianhai. (2005). China Global Hunt for Energy. Foreign Affairs, 85. 
 	  
